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Investment in physical infrastructure - roads, bridges, power plants, hospitals, schools, airports, 
sea ports, water ports, railways etc. -  is a fundamental ingredient in the growth and economic 
development of a country. Compared to countries like Singapore, South Korea and China, 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have significantly underinvested in infrastructure over the 
years, resulting in stunted growth. Kenya has a large infrastructure funding gap, and with 
ballooning government debt, the country cannot solely rely on the government to meet its 
infrastructure funding needs. This study looks at the two predominant infrastructure funding 
models in Kenya, government funded procurement and public-private partnerships, to 
understand the salient features of each of the models and the causal relationships between them, 
before embarking on a process of creating a new model that results in the benefits of both. This 
systematic combining method emancipates the researcher, allowing the study to make use of 
Roger Martin’s process of integrative thinking to innovate new models for funding transport 
megaprojects in Kenya.  
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Research area and the research problem 
Kenya has underinvested in transport infrastructure since the country gained independence in 
1963. As a consequence, its economy has performed well below its potential, with the per-
person GNI1 measured at US$ 1,340 in 2015 by the World Bank, and the country ranked 83rd 
(out of 140) in the 2016 Happy Planet Index2 (Jeffrey, Wheatley, & Abdallah, 2016, p. 4). Its 
contemporaries from five decades, Singapore and South Korea, are now leading lights in the 
league of industrialised countries while Kenya “remains among the poorest 25% of countries 
in the world, and the poverty is high at around 40 percent of the population” (World Bank 
Group, 2016b, p. vi). Since the early 2000s the country has embarked on an aggressive 
infrastructure building path guided by its Vision 2030 development blueprint that seeks to 
transform Kenya into an “industrializing middle income country providing a high quality of 
life for its citizens by the year 2030” (Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2007). 
Owing to under-collection by the national tax authority, KRA, in the past, Kenya would be 
forced to fund large portions of its national government budget, including recurrent 
expenditure, from sources such as foreign aid. With budget deficits year-in year-out, and an 
inability to fully fund even recurrent spending, the country’s pace of developing its 
infrastructure was significantly hampered. Under these conditions, the country lapsed into an 
‘infrastructure deficit trap’ where the state was unable to pay for infrastructure programs, and 
the general public infrastructure deteriorated. Given fixed quantities of capital and labour, a 
country with advanced technology will produce much more output than another one using 
outdated technology. A country’s transport infrastructure is a proxy for its technological 
advancement and a contributor to its capital stocks (Blanchard, 2017, p. 210). Considering two 
countries, one with an efficient, well-connected transport system and another whose transport 
system is ever in gridlock, the nation with the better transport system is expected to yield much 
more output for the same level of inputs. In Kenya’s context of insufficient tax collections, 
government budget deficits and a reliance on public debt and foreign aid to fund the state’s 
                                                 
1 GNI (formerly GNP) is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) 
not included in the valuation of output, plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and 
property income) from abroad. 
 
2 The Happy Planet Index (HPI) measures how nations are performing at achieving long, happy, sustainable lives 




expenses, there was little capacity for the nation to make the required infrastructure 
investments. Following a regime change in the year 2002, fresh impetus of political will was 
harnessed and focus placed squarely on KRA to improve tax collections, and within a decade, 
tax revenues had increased nearly 3 times. In fact, the government’s recurrent expenditure3 was 
fully-funded from domestic revenue collections4 by the year 2005. The improved national 
accounts created capacity for the state to make use of budget deficits to pay for infrastructure 
programs. In effect, while budget deficits have remained, their purpose has completely changed 
– from meeting recurrent expenditure needs, to funding infrastructure programs. The former 
perpetuates the infrastructure deficit trap that creates an environment of slow economic 
growth, while the latter creates a virtuous cycle where infrastructure investment speeds up 
growth. Consequently, a large part of Kenya’s new infrastructure has been paid for through 
budget deficits that are funded through public debt. As a result, the overall public debt portfolio 
has ballooned, standing at 52.7% of GDP as of the end of September 2015 (International 
Monetary Fund, 2016). Kenya’s capital markets are quite sophisticated, and the government 
has taken advantage of this to issue bonds earmarked for funding infrastructure projects. 
Domestic public debt has shot up in the last decade, rising from 6.3% of GDP in 2009 to 24% 
in 2015 (Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2010, 2015b), demonstrating the government’s 
success in tapping domestic private capital to fund infrastructure. In international markets, 
Kenya’s debt must be attractive enough to investors who are exposed to a wide variety of 
investment options, by providing satisfactory returns that allay country risk fears. Locally, 
government debt has the effect of signalling the cost of credit in the economy, with the private 
sector paying a risk premium over and above the rate established by “risk free” government 
debt. The higher the interest rate on government securities, the higher the cost of credit for 
individuals and corporates, and this has the effect of slowing down economic growth since 
credit is more expensive and increasing the general level of prices in the economy (inflation). 
Depending on how high the cost of capital is driven, it may cancel out or even negate the short-
term growth impact that investments in infrastructure are expected to produce. A delicate 
balance indeed, but one that must be met if a debt-fuelled budget deficit approach is used to 
fund infrastructure projects and the desired outcomes are to be achieved. The country needs to 
                                                 
3 Expenditure, as used here, includes cash payments for operating activities of the government in providing goods 
and services. It includes compensation of employees (such as wages and salaries), interest and subsidies, grants, 
social benefits, and other expenses such as rent and dividends. 
 
4 Domestic collections here comprise cash receipts from taxes, social contributions, and other revenues such as 
fines, fees, rent, and income from property or sales, but excluding grants. 
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continue spending heavily to close its infrastructure deficit. But with a growing mountain of 
public debt, national budget deficits are fast losing their lustre as a primary mode of 
infrastructure. Kempe (2010) puts it bluntly that the strategy is no longer sustainable and 
advises that “given the order of magnitude of the annual infrastructure spending requirements, 
there is need to mobilise other sources of investment capital and more needs to be done to 
attract private investment and PPPs, in particular private participation in infrastructure (PPI)” 
(Kempe, 2010, p. 99). Kenya needs alternative models of funding its public infrastructure 
programs to avoid a fiscal crisis and keep its goal of achieving economic prosperity by the year 
2030 alive. A reduced public debt balance would release resources previously paid out to 
service public debt, which could be directed towards infrastructure projects, or other 
government programs. With a smaller debt portfolio, the public debt burden would not only be 
reduced but the overall economy would be more robust to shocks or other economic crises that 
may arise and require urgent funding. 
This study explored the economic significance of transport infrastructure, and the 
characteristics of a unique type of infrastructure project, the megaproject, owing to their 
increased frequency as a mode for delivering infrastructure. The funding landscape for 
infrastructure in Kenya was reviewed and the two key funding models explored in depth. The 
traditional government procurement process and private-capital infrastructure financing 
initiatives were investigated, to develop understanding about how and why they worked. 
Martin’s (2007) integrative thinking framework was used to activate the method of systematic 
combining put forward by Dubois and Gadde (2002), to interrogate the infrastructure funding 
problem in Kenya, and to interact with the empirical world in trying to develop innovative 
solutions. 
This study aspired to contribute to the general body of literature on economic development; 
specific propositions in the areas of innovation theory and infrastructure financing would be 
icing on the proverbial cake. As a living body of work, the study should be of importance to 
scholars, policy makers, and practitioners in the areas of development economics and finance, 
and innovation theory, with ideas and language from these spheres of knowledge used 





Research questions and scope 
The study explored the funding landscape for infrastructure projects in Kenya, and closely 
looked at the two dominant infrastructure funding models: the government procurement 
process and private-capital funding initiatives. Applying the method of systematic combining 
allowed the researcher to move between the worlds of theory and data using integrative 
thinking as a guiding framework to analyse the problem of funding infrastructure in the Kenyan 
case. The integrative thinking process required a deep understanding of the salient features of 
both funding models, and would draw on those insights to identify the essential features for 
success in privately-financed infrastructure initiatives. Once the study arrived at this point, it 
was well placed to shine a light on the weak links in the current funding systems, and point out 
areas in which improvements could be made to make the entire funding ecosystem for transport 
megaprojects in Kenya more efficient. Increased efficiency would increase the ease with which 
resources can flow into the funding ecosystem for transport megaprojects. By doing so, the 
study hoped to answer the following questions: 
• Who were the key players in the infrastructure funding ecosystem in Kenya? 
• What were the bottlenecks in the ecosystem? 
• What roles have private-capital financing initiatives played in the development of 
infrastructure in Kenya? 
• How can the private sector be better incentivised to direct capital into transport 
megaprojects? 
Megaprojects are typically large-scale infrastructure projects that cost at least US$ 1 billion. 
Considering that the economies of most African countries do not exceed US$ 100 billion in 
size, transport megaprojects are a relatively novel and rare phenomenon on the African 
continent. Because African countries are priced out from pursuing them, they are very few and 
far in between. To address the challenge this posed in collecting data, the study widened its 
scope to include projects that cost US$ 100 million or more implemented between 1st January 
1991 and 31st January 2016. Considering that the study is situated in the African context where 
many countries are still grappling with the challenges of poverty, lack of access to clean 
drinking water, lack of food and other basic human needs, lowering the cost threshold set by 
Flyvbjerg (2014) was would not have adverse effects on the central point being advanced. So 
while such projects do not exactly fit the bill in terms of cost as described by Flyvbjerg (2014), 
they remain (when looked at in context) “large-scale complex ventures” that tend to “take many 
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years to develop and build, involve multiple public and private stakeholders, are 
transformational, and impact millions of people” (Flyvbjerg, 2014, p. 6). This redefinition and 
re-scaling of the phenomenon of megaprojects ensured there was a data sample that was large 
enough for analysis. The study considered a variety of megaprojects, from air and sea ports, to 
roads, bridges and pipelines, airlines, cargo and commuter rail projects, bus service systems, 
power plants and telecommunications projects. To improve the data sample further, the study 
loosened the definition of megaprojects to include any projects costing at least KES 10 billion 
or about US$ 100 million in 2016 terms.  
From the onset, the study was conscious that it faced several obstacles which would impact 
negatively upon the data, findings, and analyses, and, possibly, the final recommendations: 
• As already mentioned, there is a limited number of projects that cost US$ 1 billion or 
more in Africa. Consequently, the study has responded to this limitation by widening 
its scope to include those costing at least KES 10 billion or US$ 100 million in 2016 
terms. Considering that Kenya’s GDP was about US$ 8 billion in 1991 and 
approximately US$ 63 billion in 2015, the frequency of individual infrastructure 
projects costing US$ 1 billion or more would certainly be low. 
 
• Access to project documents that detail project players and the relationships between 
them may not be publicly available. The study may be forced to rely on sources that are 
not purely scholarly such as published reports or media sources, which may not 
necessarily be academic in their style and content. 
 
• There is a possibility that the available data may be focussed on a narrow subset of 
infrastructure (such transport or energy infrastructure), or even a smaller subset such as 
rail systems (under the transport sector) or hydroelectric power plants (under the energy 
sector). This could introduce bias into the data and its derivatives, and could potentially 






Based on the research questions and the scope of the study, the initial assumption is that there 
are enough megaprojects implemented in Kenya in the years running from 1 January 1991 to 
31 January 2016 for the study to analyse as a sample. 
It is possible that some projects were implemented in phases, divided into stand-alone 
‘medium-scale’ projects that may each have cost less than the KES 10 billion threshold amount 
that the study has set as a sample criterion. In such an event, the researcher assumes that by 
consolidating the mini-projects into a larger construct that is satisfactory for study, the defining 
features of the mini-projects are not lost. 
The researcher assumes that 1 Kenyan shilling will not be able to purchase the same bundle of 
goods in January 1991 as in January 2016. The study shall consider the time value of money 
and the depreciating purchasing power of money over time. Where necessary, projects shall be 




The Ethics Clearance form was submitted for review and clearance was subsequently received 
in July 2016. 
Given that the study does not involve the use of interviews or surveys, or primary data that 
involves collection from human or animal respondents, the researcher does not anticipate 
ethical concerns arising out of human or animal interaction. 
The researcher took all measures to ensure that all data that is collected and analysed, any third-







This research study locates itself at the nexus of various topics and in the writings of various 
scholars. The research problem can be looked at from several points of view, and thus the 
intellectual foundation on which the study rests needs to be broad enough to coherently address 
the problem. Literature on the role of infrastructure in economic growth and development, the 
emergence of megaprojects as an increasingly popular method of delivering infrastructure, the 
role and usage of PPPs in delivering infrastructure, the problems of sovereign debt 
accumulation and other related topics is covered to demonstrate that the research problem is 
real and demands serious attention, before embarking on an effort to innovate potential 
solutions to the problem. Let us begin at the beginning. 
 
The role of transport infrastructure in growing an economy 
A frequently used framework for thinking about growth is a model developed by the economist 
and Nobel Prize winner Robert Solow in the 1950’s. The Solow growth model is, 6 decades 
on, the textbook5 framework students are taught and that economists use to think about growth. 
The Solow growth model shows how labour, technology and capital interact to affect the output 
of goods and services. We shall use Solow’s model to understand the role of transport 
infrastructure in economic growth. 
Solow’s 1956 model puts it that “there is only one commodity, output as a whole, whose rate 
of production is designated Y(t)… Part of each instant’s output is consumed and the rest is 
saved and invested… Output is produced with the help of two factors of production, capital 
and labor, whose rate of return is L(t). Technological possibilities are represented by a 
production function Y=F(k,L)” (Solow, 1956, p. 66). Solow’s model has been revised over the 
years, but it remains a cornerstone of economic growth modelling because of its logic and 
explanatory power. Infrastructure, including transportation systems, can be thought of as a part 
of a country’s capital stocks (k), and as denoted in the production function above, an increase 
in the capital stocks shall result in increased output (for a given level of labour). Blanchard 
makes the point succinctly while discussing economic growth in France after World War II: 
“There is plenty of anecdotal evidence that small increases in capital led to large increase in 
output. Minor repairs to a major bridge would lead to the reopening of the bridge. Reopening 
                                                 
5 The Solow growth model features prominently in the most recent editions of macroeconomics textbooks, such 
as Mankiw (2016) and Blanchard (2017). 
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the bridge would significantly shorten the travel time between two cities, leading to much lower 
transport costs. The lower transport costs would then enable a plant to get much needed inputs, 
increasing production, and so on” (Blanchard, 2017, p. 224). To grow an economy, that is, to 
increase the quantity of output produced each year, Solow’s model is intuitive and direct: 
(i) You can increase consumption, say by increasing the rate of consumption per 
person for a given level of population, or you can increase the population of 
consumers; 
(ii) You can increase the quantity of output saved by reducing present-day 
consumption, which will have the effect of increasing the quantity available for 
future consumption; 
(iii) You can increase the present stock of capital by tapping into past savings, which 
will effectively increase future output; 
(iv) You can increase the productivity of a given level of labour, resulting in increased 
yield for a given level of labour employed. This approach, one the world has 
witnessed and enjoyed for a century, is referred to as technological progress. 
An increase in physical public infrastructure6, then, has a direct catalytic effect on economic 
growth and transport infrastructure is specifically concerned with improved connectedness 
between the factors of production and markets. Through this improved connectedness, the 
economy I catalysed to grow even faster. R.D. Mallion, in making his case regarding the 
relationship between transport networks and economic development, puts forward that “the 
role of transport lies not only in accommodating the needs of directly productive sectors such 
as agriculture and industry, but also in initiating and accelerating growth” (Mallion, 1960, p. 
8). The author continues that “it is no coincidence that the periods of intensive railway 
construction in Great Britain, the United States, pre-Soviet Russia, Italy and other countries 
were also their periods of rapid economic development”  (p. 8), stating that market expansion 
and increased mobility of goods and people would only be part of the explanation for this 
phenomenon. Mallion (1960) suggests that the heavy investment required to develop transport 
infrastructure has a multiplier effect on investment and income in other sectors of the economy, 
thereby pushing the overall economy upwards. 
                                                 
6 As defined by Otto and Voss (1995) who refer to infrastructure as “capital projects that are pervasive inputs into 
production: that is, projects that provide services used at any one time by a large number of different firms and 
individuals to facilitate production” (Otto & Voss, 1995, p. 181).  
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Jean-Baptiste Say put it powerfully in his 2-century old treatise: “Commercial, in like manner 
as manufacturing industry, concurs in production, by augmenting the value of a product by its 
transport from one place to another. A quintal of Brazil cotton has acquired greater utility, and 
therefore larger value, by the time it reaches a warehouse in Europe, than it possessed in one 
at Pernambuco. The transport is a modification that the trader gives to the commodity, whereby 
he adapts to our use what was not before available; which modification is equally useful, 
complex and uncertain in the result, as any it derives from the other two branches of industry. 
He avails himself of the natural properties of the timber and the materials used in the 
construction of his ships, of the hemp whereof his rigging is composed, of the wind that fills 
his sails, of all the natural agents brought to concur in his purpose, with precisely the same 
view and the same result, and in the same manner too, as the agriculturalist avails himself of 
the earth, the rain, and the atmosphere” (Say, 1821, p. 66). The mere act of transporting finished 
goods to markets adds value (or utility, as Say puts it) to those finished goods, because the 
potential economic value they possess is more likely to be unlocked at the market place, than 
at the factory warehouse. The mere act of better connecting factors of production through 
improvements in a country’s transport network similarly adds value to those separate factors 
of production: raw materials are more likely to be converted into value-added products, labour 
is more likely fulfil its internal potential to produce valuable goods and services if they are 
exposed to a wider variety of raw materials that can be utilised, capital is likely to be productive 
if it can be moved to where it is needed most, and so on. In itself, transport infrastructure may 
not have as much direct value to an economy (when compared to the project’s cost) other than 
the short-term economic bump experienced during the construction phase. The real -and much 
more important- value of transport infrastructure is the economic multiplier caused by the 
‘spillovers’ and these are often exponentially more valuable than the cost of individual 
transport projects. 
In his 1776 magnum opus describing how nations build wealth, Adam Smith made the 
importance of good transportation networks clear. Mr. Smith describes 3 modes of transport, 
goods for delivery, and their estimated freight costs. In one scenario, a “broad-wheeled 
waggon, attended by two men, and drawn by eight horses, in about six weeks’ time carries and 
brings back between London and Edinburgh near four ton weight of goods…In about the same 
time a ship navigated by six or eight men, and sailing between the ports of London and Leigh, 
frequently carries and brings back two hundred ton weight of goods. Six or eight men, 
therefore, by the help of water-carriage, can carry and bring back in the same time the same 
10 
 
quantity of goods between London and Edinburgh, as fifty broad-wheeled waggons, attended 
by a hundred men, and drawn by four hundred horses[…] Were there no other communication 
between those two places, therefore, but by land-carriage, as no goods could be transported 
from the one to the other, except such whose price was very considerable in proportion to their 
weight, they could carry on but a small part of that commerce which at present subsists between 
them, and consequently could give but a small part of that encouragement which they at present 
mutually afford to each other’s industry. There could be little or no commerce of any kind 
between the distant parts of the world. What goods could bear the expense of land-carriage 
between London and Calcutta?” (Smith, 1776). While Mr. Smith’s work is well known for its 
theme of the self-regulation of free markets, that the supply of goods and services rises and 
falls to meet demand, this freedom is encumbered by external pressures caused by the 
regulatory environment, tax laws, externalities7, and others. While individuals and firms 
certainly are motivated by profits, there are not only motivated by profit. Therefore, even if 
markets were as free as Smith intended, externalities such as bridges on the road between 
London and Edinburgh, and ports along the seas between London and Leigh, greatly influence 
which means of transportation is used to deliver a consignment of goods, which in turn affects 
the price of delivered goods and the volume of trade carried out. The spillovers from 
improvements in transport networks are hard to quantify precisely, probably because of how 
diffused they tend to be, but they are easily seen and felt. In Mr. Smith’s case, traders at the 
main London markets will immediately notice the 50-fold increased volume of cheaper goods 
brought on by usage of the London-Leigh cargo ship compared to the London-Edinburgh road 
wagons. Consumers will immediately experience the reductions in price and exponential 
increase in the variety of goods they can purchase. The savings made by use of cheaper, more 
efficient cargo transportation can be channelled towards hiring more labour to load and unload 
cargo at the London port, and hence the wagon drivers who would likely suffer dismissal 
following the introduction of the London-Leigh sea route would have alternative employment 
opportunities, with the net economic effect being a win for all. 
In a John Maynard Keynes’ 1933 essay written in preparation for the World Economic 
Conference (also referred to as the London Economic Conference), he speaks optimistically 
about the power of capital development as a means to restore (and by extension, cause) 
                                                 
7 Externalities or external effects are the “impacts of activities in one market on another market without 
compensation” (Blum, 1998, p. 84). Positive externalities are the benefits that accrue to one market owing to 
activities in another market. For example, when the roads and street lights in a certain residential area are 
rehabilitated, the prices of houses in that area usually shoot up. 
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economic prosperity. “It is often said that it costs £500 capital expenditure on public works to 
give one man employment for one year. This is based on the amount of labour directly 
employed on the spot. But it is easy to see that the materials used and the transport required 
also give employment… But if the new expenditure is additional and not merely in substitution 
for other expenditure, the increase of employment does not stop there. The additional wages 
and other incomes paid out are spent on additional purchases, which in turn lead to further 
employment[…] Moreover, in so far as the increased demand for food, resulting from the 
increased purchasing power of the working classes, served either to raise the prices or to 
increase the sales of the output of primary producers at home and abroad, we should to-day 
positively welcome it… Nor have we yet reached the end. The newly employed who supply 
the increased purchases of those employed on the new capital works will, in their turn, spend 
more, thus adding to the employment of others; and so on” (Keynes, 1933, pp. 9–10). By 
Keynes’ analysis, even the direct and immediate economic impact caused by construction of 
new infrastructure has positive multiplier. Thus, the overall economic value derived from 
expanded transport infrastructure, directly during the construction phase and indirectly 
thereafter, while difficult to precisely measure, is very substantial. Transport infrastructure, by 
increasing the connectivity of raw materials to centres of production, production centres to 
domestic and foreign markets, shortening the time and reducing the costs of freight, 
significantly contribute to a nation’s speed of economic growth. 
Mankiw et. al augment Solow’s framework by including human capital in their model. After 
analysing data of real income, government and private consumption for over 90 countries for 
a 25-year period, the authors conclude that “the accumulation of physical capital has a larger 
impact on income per capita than the textbook Solow model implies” when human capital is 
considered in the economic growth framework (Mankiw, Romer, & Weil, 1992, p. 432). If we 
use national literacy levels and the attainment of primary, secondary, and tertiary education as 
a measure of human capital, the findings of Mankiw and company (1992) bode well for Kenya 
with the country introducing a free public primary education program 14 years ago, which has 
helped raised the adjusted net primary enrolment8 rate from 62.68% in 2002 to 86.21% in 2012, 
and is on course to introduce a follow-on free public secondary education policy. 
                                                 
8 The World Bank defines the adjusted net primary enrolment rate as the total number of students of the official 





The challenge of public infrastructure such as transportation systems is that they are, by their 
nature, largely exempt from the incentivising effects of markets. Orthodox economics puts it 
that the interaction of demand for a specific product and the supply of that product, through a 
market, leads to the determination of a price, the level of which market demand and supply 
reaches equilibrium. “When a good does not have a price attached to it, private markets cannot 
ensure that the good is produced and consumed in the proper amounts. In such cases, 
government policy can potentially remedy the market failure and increase economic well-
being” (Mankiw, 2015, p. 216). Mankiw defines public goods as those that are “neither 
excludable nor rival in consumption9. That is, people cannot be prevented from using a public 
good, and one person’s use of a public good does not reduce another person’s ability to use it”. 
The author goes on further to define common resources as those that “are rival in consumption 
but not excludable. For example, fish in the ocean are rival in consumption: When one person 
catches fish, there are fewer fish for the next person to catch. Yet these fish are not an 
excludable good because, given the vast size of an ocean, it is difficult to stop fishermen from 
taking fish out of it” (Mankiw, 2015, p. 216). The reason this comes up – public goods and 
common resources – is because they are inextricably linked to the topic of externalities, and, I 
submit, transport infrastructure can be thought of as economic externalities. “For both of these 
types of goods, externalities arise because something of value has no price attached to it. If one 
person were to provide a public good, such as a tornado siren, other people would be better off. 
They would receive a benefit without paying for it – a positive externality. Similarly, when one 
person uses a common resource such as the fish in the ocean, other people are worse off because 
there are fewer fish to catch. They suffer a loss but are nor compensated for it – a negative 
externality. Because of these external effects, private decisions about consumption and 
production can lead to an inefficient allocation of resources, and government intervention can 
potentially raise economic well-being” (Mankiw, 2015, p. 217). Transport infrastructure is not 
subject to the price-setting mechanism of markets because it is partially a public good and 
partially a common resource. For this reason, society relies on government to provide transport 
infrastructure and through state intervention, as Mankiw puts it, private economic well-being 
can be raised. Bartelsman, Caballero and Lyons (1991) investigate the transmission of 
externalities in US manufacturing. The authors find that in the short-run, the linkage between 
an industry and its customers is the most important factor in the transmission of external effects, 
                                                 
9 Mankiw defines excludability as “the property of a good whereby a person can be prevented from using it”. The 
author further defines rivalry in consumption as “the property of a good whereby one person’s use diminishes 
other people’s use” (Mankiw, 2015, p. 216). 
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while in the long-run, it is the linkage between an industry and its suppliers that is essential 
(Bartelsman, Caballero, & Lyons, 1991, p. 16). The stronger the linkages between an industry 
and its customers and suppliers, the greater the spillover effect of positive external effects on 
that industry on other sectors of the economy.  In effect, transport infrastructure is itself not 
only a positive externality to an economy, but also can be a transmission mechanism for 
externalities between other sectors of the economy, enhancing the case for greater investment 
in national transport infrastructure. In their study on the relationship between road transport 
infrastructure and economic growth in India, Tripathi and Gautam are explicit that “transport 
projects may lead to economies of agglomeration, that is, positive externalities in terms of the 
productivity benefits that firms gain from being located close to other firms through knowledge 
spillover, access to more suppliers and larger labour markets. Second, reduced transport costs 
would save resources and may lead to increased output. This effect would be larger, the bigger 
the price-cost margins. Third, transport projects may lead to improved labour supply, for 
example, cheaper commuting may give people better access to jobs and it can also help in 
specialisation of labour” (Tripathi & Gautam, 2010, p. 136). The authors expand the scope of 
discussion under theme of transport infrastructure and externalities by highlighting “the 
dynamic externalities associated with transport infrastructure” (p. 136) and in particular, 
network dynamic externalities, those that “represent knowledge spillovers resulting from the 
whole agglomerated area” (p. 136).  The authors find that there exists a positive long-run 
relationship between the network dynamic externalities that result from transport infrastructure 
and the level of GDP, the rate of employment and gross public capital formation. Furthermore, 
Tripathi and Gautam find that the long-run elasticity of output as measured by GDP is positive 
with respect to public capital, an important conclusion which “suggests that in the long term, 
public investment crowds in both private capital and employment” (p. 148), two 
macroeconomic variables that a developing country such as Kenya would need to improve if it 
desires to grow its economy quickly.  
Without heavy focused investment in a country’s transport infrastructure, growth may occur, 
but with it, growth is almost certain to occur at a much faster pace. The marginal gains to the 
economy are restricted to the country’s base, that is, a country’s level of economic 
development, with marginal gains narrowing as the base rises. For Kenya, starting from a 
national GDP level of around US$ 1,400 dollars, the gains to be made from heavy investment 
in the country’s transport infrastructure are nothing short of enormous. At the same time, it 
must be made clear that infrastructure is neither the silver bullet that permanently fixes the 
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economic growth problem, nor the hen that forever lays the golden growth eggs. The 
relationship between transport infrastructure and economic growth is a nonlinear one, and the 
marginal effects of increased transport investment diminish as the stock of transport 
infrastructure accumulates. Deng clarifies that “once a threshold level of the transport network 
is exceeded, additional transport investments (building a new link or upgrading an existing 
link) tend to bring less impact on the economy, as accessibility enhancement benefits become 
limited…The magnitude of the impact of transport infrastructure investment on productivity 
and economic growth depends on the development stage of the transport network” (Deng, 
2013, p. 694). The immediate growth spurt and the long-term catalytic effect that transport 
infrastructure has on the overall economy is limited by a country’s level of transport 
infrastructure accumulation. For a developed, well-connected country, increased capital 
accumulation through improvements in transport infrastructure may not produce much 
marginal gain. But for Kenya, a country of over 580,000 square kilometres in land area but less 
than 1,000 kilometres of paved highways, increases in capital stocks through improvements in 
transport infrastructure are very likely to result in substantial increases in the level of economic 
growth. In fact, Briceño-Garmendia and Shkaratan (2011) find that Kenya’s paved road density 
stands at 152 kilometres for 1,000 square kilometres of arable land, or 30% of the average for 
middle-income countries. This is an indicator that Kenya is yet to fully utilise the lever of 
capital accumulation and particularly transport infrastructure, as an approach to stimulating 
economic growth, and to put forward that the country likely to experience great gains, in the 
immediate construction phase and in long-run, from a dedicated program of transport 
infrastructure. 
 
Introduction to megaprojects 
While initially very few and far in between, transport megaprojects have become much more 
common, seemingly a preferred mode of delivery for government programmes in many parts 
of the world. Since they are a relatively new phenomenon, there is no expert consensus around 
the definition, or even the spelling of the word, with some authors writing “mega projects”, 
and others “megaprojects”. I defer to Bent Flyvbjerg, a pioneer in the field, that “megaprojects 
are large-scale complex ventures that typically cost US$1 billion or more, take many years to 
develop and build, involve multiple public and private stakeholders, are transformational, and 
impact millions of people” (Flyvbjerg, 2014, p. 6). Megaprojects are not just large-scale, 
complicated public works projects. As Flyvbjerg points out, they are “a completely different 
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breed of project in terms of their level of aspiration, lead times, complexity, and stakeholder 
involvement” (p. 6).  They are “trait making” in as much as they are intentionally designed to 
alter the physical structures of society, rather than “trait taking,” and fitting into pre-existing 
moulds. The eight-lane Thika Superhighway in Kenya (African Development Bank Group, 
2016) is a good example of the “trait making” capability of megaprojects, even though itself is 
not a megaproject10 as per the Flyvbjerg definition above. Before its completion in November 
2012, the widest, most sophisticated highways in Kenya were four-lane dual carriageways (two 
lanes on each side). Following its completion, expectations on road planners today surely must 
be to deliver highways that meet (“trait taking”) or improve the standards set by the Thika 
Superhighway. The study of megaprojects is of critical importance when discussing issues 
concerned with African infrastructural development today. This high level of significance 
arises from several things: 
1) As discussed earlier, investment in transport infrastructure is a fundamental component 
for growing an economy. 
An efficient, well-connected transport infrastructure network– roads, bridges, airports, railway 
lines, sea ports, etc. – is crucially important for the creation of an enabling environment that 
facilitates and supports private enterprise to thrive. In fact, Kenya’s post-independence 
development blueprint described a strategy “to develop transport, power and marketing 
facilities, and other infrastructure in order to draw the entire nation into the market economy 
and to lay the basis for a rapid acceleration of industrial growth” (Republic of Kenya, 1965, p. 
48). A well-connected and efficient transport network is essential for many reasons, most of 
which can be captured under the following themes: 
• The cheap, quick and easy movement of goods and services, and 
• The cheap, quick and easy movement of labour and capital. 
The free movement of capital and labour to where they are needed for the production of goods 
and services, and the free movement of goods and services to where they are consumed (by 
labour, and paid for with capital), are foundational precepts upon which economies are built. 
As has already been noted, there is an immediate economic bump experienced during the 
                                                 
10 The 50-kilometre Nairobi-Thika superhighway, completed in November 2012, cost US$ 360 million, hence 
was technically not a megaproject since it cost less than US$ 1 billion. Given its sheer size and impact, being the 
first superhighway in East Africa, it very well may have been. 
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construction phase of transport projects, as well as a lasting longer-term effect caused by an 
increase in commerce owing to cheaper and faster movement of labour and goods. 
2) The emergence of the East Asian Tiger economies in the last half-century (Mankiw, 
2016, p. 276). 
Singapore was a low-income country in 1960, with a GDP11 of US$ 704 million. Kenya, at the 
same time, had national GDP of US$ 791 million (see figure 1). Singapore now boasts a per-
capita GDP of over US$ 50,000 while Kenya is a low middle-income country with per-capita 
GDP of US$ 1,377 as of 2015. While there are many plausible reasons as to why the two 
nations took such divergent development paths, Singapore’s US$ 1 trillion investment in GCF12 
is 7 times more than that of Kenya (US$ 150 billion) over the same 5-decade period, and that 
undeniably counts for something. Whereas Kenya has committed an average of 18.39% of its 
annual GDP to gross fixed capital formation since 196413, Singapore has averaged nearly 
double that amount, with 31.1% of annual GDP committed to gross fixed capital formation 
over the same time. There are other factors to be considered in such analyses, but suffice it to 
say that the relationship between investments in infrastructure and long-term economic growth 
is plain to see. Calderón’s 45-year, 136-country research paper underlies this, concluding that 
“growth is positively affected by the volume of infrastructure stocks and the quality of 
infrastructure services” and even going on to state that the statistical results “reflect causal, and 
not merely coincidental, effects of infrastructure on productivity growth” (Calderón, 2009, p. 
19). 
                                                 
11 The International Monetary Fund defines GDP as “the total value of goods and services produced within a 
country during a specified time period, such as one year” (International Monetary Fund, n.d.). 
 
12 The OECD glossary of statistical terms defines Gross Capital Formation as “the total value of the gross fixed 
capital formation, changes in inventories and acquisitions less disposals of valuables for a unit or sector” (OECD, 
2016). In addition, “Gross Fixed Capital Formation is measured by the total value of a producer’s acquisitions, 
less disposals, of fixed assets during the accounting period plus certain additions to the value of non-produced 
assets (such as subsoil assets or major improvements in the quality, quantity or productivity of land) realized by 
the productive activity of institutional units” (United Nations Statistics Division, 2016). 
This study considers Gross Capital Formation as a proxy measure for physical infrastructure within a country. 
 




Figure 1: GDP and GCF comparison between Kenya and Singapore, 1960 to 2015 
3) The “paradox of megaprojects” identified by (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003, pp. 1–10) suggests 
that megaprojects, as a mode of delivery for public and private sector ventures, are 
becoming incredibly popular with increasing size and frequency of projects. 
Data from Flyvbjerg (2014) puts the largest megaprojects, the Joint Strike Fighter military 
aircraft program and China’s HSR project at US$ 400 billion and US$ 300 billion respectively. 
On the African continent, among the first megaprojects to be implemented was the Aswan High 
Dam, constructed between 1960 and 1970, and costing E£ 450 million at the time, which 
translates14 to approximately US$ 4.8 billion today. Today there are numerous megaprojects 
being implemented across the continent such as Kenya’s US$ 3.4 billion Mombasa-Nairobi 
SGR line, South Africa’s Sere Wind Power Plant and Upington Concentrating Solar Plant 
costing US$ 1.55 billion15 (World Bank Group, 2011), and Nigeria’s US$ 1.67 billion deep sea 
port at Lekki (African Development Bank Group, 2015a). 
On one hand, megaprojects are being planned and implemented much more frequently, with 
the size and cost of projects ever increasing, as they fast become a primary method for 
delivering new transport infrastructure on the continent. On the other side of the paradox is the 
                                                 
14 This computation was done by multiplying E£ 450 million, the project cost as of 1970, by accumulated annual 
inflation (consumer prices) from 1971 up to 2015. This inflation computation suggests that it would cost about 
E£ 95.5975 of present-day Egyptian currency to buy E£ 1 worth of 1970-goods. Ceteris paribus, the E£ 450 
million dam constructed in 1970 would cost 95 times more in 2015 owing to the effect of price inflation. This 
figure was then converted to US$, using the exchange rate as of 21 July 2016 of US$ 0.11. 
 




























fact that the performance of megaprojects is “strikingly poor and has not improved for the 70-
year period for which comparable data are available, at least not when measured in terms of 
cost overruns, schedule delays, and benefit  shortfalls” (Flyvbjerg, 2014, p. 12). Flyvbjerg, 
Bruzelius and Rothengatter suggest a 1 in 1,000 (0.001) success rate for megaprojects 
(Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). “If as the evidence indicates, approximately one out of ten 
megaprojects is on budget, one out of ten is on schedule, and one out of ten delivers the 
promised benefits, then approximately one in one thousand projects is a success, defined as 
“on target” for all three. Even if the numbers were wrong by a factor of two – so that two, 
instead of one out of ten were on target for cost, schedule, and benefits respectively – the 
success rate would still be dismal, now eight in one thousand. This serves to illustrate what 
may be called the “iron law of megaprojects: Over budget, over time, over and over again” 
(Flyvbjerg, 2014, p. 11). If the Flyvbjerg, Holm and Buhl position is anything to go by, that 
“every passing year from the decision to build until operations begin, the average increase in 
cost escalation is 4.64%” (Flyvbjerg, Holm, & Buhl, 2004, p. 16), Kenyans should then expect, 
with a 9 in 10 (90%) chance, of spending an extra US$ 158 million16 on its SGR project during 
its construction phase, just from schedule delays. The paradox, therefore, is that one hand we 
have an ever-increasing size and frequency of megaprojects, and on the other we have the 
astonishingly poor performance of megaprojects when measured in terms of cost overruns, 
schedule delays, and benefit shortfalls. Because of this paradox, the spotlight has been shone 
on megaprojects as low and low-middle income countries work to develop their transport 
networks, while at the same time trying to get the value for money given their scarce resources. 
Interestingly, in spite of the seemingly overwhelming evidence against the utilisation of 
megaprojects as a delivery mode for public and private transport infrastructure, the global 
market for large-scale infrastructure projects is bigger now than at any other point in history, 
estimated at US$ 3.3 trillion per year through to 2030 (McKinsey Global Institute, 2016). This 
figure could turn out to be an underestimation, given that it does not account for baseline 
infrastructural needs required to meet the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs (United 
Nations General Assembly, 2015) or the investment required to mitigate climate change 
effects. It is merely the minimum investment in infrastructure required to meet global economic 
growth projections. In practice, much more than US$ 3.3 trillion may be spent on megaprojects 
and other large-scale projects globally over the next decade and a half. 
                                                 
16 Computed as 4.64% of the US$ 3.4 billion cost of Kenya’s SGR. 
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Flyvbjerg proffers the following phenomena - what he calls the “four sublimes of megaproject 
management” (Flyvbjerg, 2014, p. 8) – as they key factors driving the growth in size and 
frequency of megaprojects. These four sublimes offer some explanations as to why 
megaprojects are so popular, and why this is likely to be the case for years to come. 
I. The technological sublime – This is the rapture derived from building large, futuristic 
infrastructure such as “the longest-” something, “the tallest-” something, and/or “the 
first of-” something. The Space Race17 at the twilight end of the 20th century is a good 
illustration of this behaviour at play.  
 
II. The political sublime – The rapture politicians derive from building large-scale 
infrastructure, particularly the media attention megaprojects tend to attract. The pomp 
and colour surrounding launch ceremonies where politicians jostle for spotlight and 
newspaper photographs is common all over the world. 
 
III. The economic sublime – This is the rapture that landowners, contractors, architects, 
engineers, project consultants and others directly involved in these very expensive 
projects derive, as well as the stimulus such projects give to the economy during the 
construction phase. 
 
IV. The aesthetic sublime – The good feeling that anyone who appreciates good design 
gets from building, making use of or even just looking at something beautiful. 
Taken together, these four sublimes form a considerable coalition in making the case for the 
increasing scale and use of megaprojects in delivering large-scale transport infrastructure 
projects. Except for the economic sublime that offers a rational justification for using 
megaprojects to deliver public projects, the other three sublimes seem to be irrational, driven 
by factors other than cold, hard economics. By Flyvbjerg and company’s (2003) math that there 
is a 90% chance that projects will experience delays, and Flyvbjerg and company’s (2004) 
estimation of cost escalations from delays at 4.64% of costs, this translates into a serious 
erosion of global wealth owing from megaproject mismanagement. To put this into perspective, 
Kenya’s 2015 national GDP was US$ 66 billion, about 2% of the estimated US$ 3.3 trillion 
                                                 
17 The United States of America and the Soviet Union engaged in a post-World War II competition for space flight 
capability. The Soviet Union succeeded by orbiting the first artificial earth satellite and sending the first person 
into space, but the USA got one over them by landing the first man on the surface of the moon. 
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global expenditure on large scale infrastructure projects, and less than half of what the world 
stands to lose from schedule delays in infrastructure projects annually. The paradox of 
megaprojects, considering the trillions of dollars going into them and their implications, is an 
area requiring serious study. 
The low success rate of such projects coupled with their huge costs, makes the study of 
megaprojects and their financing arrangements very important within the scholarship on 
African economic growth and infrastructure development. The continent is badly in need of 
heavy transport infrastructure investment, but at the same time the continent has scarce 
resources and therefore cannot afford the wastage inherent in transport megaprojects. Those 
are the overarching tensions that this study is grappling with and hopes to innovatively address. 
 
Characteristics of megaprojects 
By themselves, megaprojects are not inherently bad. Flyvbjerg (2014) is categorical that if they 
are planned, organised, and implemented properly, megaprojects can: 
• Create and sustain employment; 
• Increase domestic productivity and competitiveness by lowering production costs; 
• Benefit consumers by increasing the quality of services; 
• Increase environmental friendliness where eco-friendly infrastructure replaces 
infrastructure that was harmful to the environment, etc. 
Jia and company provide a unique contribution to the field of megaproject management, 
suggesting that an additional key benefit that megaprojects can yield is the resolution of social 
conflicts. The definition of social conflict used by Jia and company is “an expressed struggle 
between at least two interdependent parties who perceive that incompatible goals, scarce 
resources, and interface from others who are preventing them from achieving their goals” 
(Wilmot and Hocker, 2001 as cited in Jia et al., 2011). 
While three propositions are put forward by the authors, this study places emphasis on two: 
1) Proposition 1: Megaprojects can be the product of social conflict. 
2) Proposition 2: Megaprojects can play a role as a safety valve for society. 
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The first proposition suggests that, in consideration of the unique socio-economic conditions 
of a country, megaprojects can be used as a tool with which societal conflicts can be resolved. 
The second proposition advances this idea, that megaprojects can be used as a safety valve in 
society, much like that in a pressure cooker, helping to relieve pent-up pressure caused by the 
social conflicts existing within a society. In many African countries, infrastructural 
development and the associated economic prosperity is concentrated in specific areas. This 
may be due to the concentration of natural resources in those areas, factors such as towns 
developed during pre-independence times by the colonialists, or even specific programs aimed 
to develop certain regions and neglect others by racist apartheid governments or tribalist 
regimes. The city of Nairobi, for instance, was founded by the British colonialists as a railway 
depot and stop-over town, but grew to become the capital city of the Republic of Kenya. In 
addition to the usual economic case-making done for megaprojects by project promoters, if a 
light is shone to this “second important factor” (p. 826), megaprojects can be used as a tool to 
address the infrastructural imbalances that have accumulated over time within a society, 
helping to relieve the pressure and potential societal conflicts. Major infrastructure programs 
can be initiated and implemented in geographical areas that have received underinvestment in 
the past, providing the necessary impetus to spur economic activity in those locales. 
Communities that have previously been disenfranchised can be beneficiaries of social and 
economic inclusion initiatives through such innovative methods that address their most 
pressing social, environmental, and economic concerns, helping to even out inequalities 
existing within the broader society. 
Any risk that may be attributed to a megaproject is a feature of its inherent characteristics. 
Flyvbjerg lists the characteristics of megaprojects (from which the risks can be derived) as 
follows (Flyvbjerg, 2014, p. 9): 
i. They have long planning horizons and complex interfaces; 
ii. Planning, decision-making and management are typically multi-factor processes 
involving multiple stakeholders from public and private sectors; 
iii. They are often led by planners and managers who lack deep domain experience and 
who keep changing over project cycles; 
iv. Planners and managers tend to consider their projects as unique and singular, impeding 
their learning from other projects; 
v. There is over-commitment to project concepts at an early stage, leaving analyses of 
alternatives weak and absent; 
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vi. Principal-agent problems, rent-seeking behaviour and optimism bias is common owing 
to the huge sums involved; 
vii. Delivery is a high-risk, stochastic activity with overexposure to black swans; 
viii. Complexity and unplanned events are often unaccounted for, leaving budget and time 
contingencies inadequate; 
ix. Misinformation about costs, schedules and expected benefits is common, resulting in 
cost overruns, schedule delays and benefit shortfalls; 
x. Project scope and ambition levels typically change significantly over time. 
 
Complexity: The causes and cures for the crisis in megaproject performance 
In the characteristics of megaprojects, described above, lie the causes for their poor 
performance. Megaprojects are rife with complexity. Backlund describes a complex 
organisation as “an organisation whose behaviour is complex…or whose inner structure is 
complex, or whose processes are complex” (Backlund, 2002, p. 32). The author goes on to 
elaborate that “the structure of the organisation is complex when: (1) it consists of many 
components or subsystems (“parts”), (2) and/or there are many relations and/or interactions 
between the components or subsystems, (3) and/or when these relations are not symmetric, (4) 
and/or when the arrangement of the components and/or subsystems is not symmetric” (p. 32). 
From this description and Flyvbjerg’s (2014) elaboration of the features of megaprojects, it is 
clear that they can be described as having a high degree of complexity. Giezen puts this into 
perspective, saying that “the sheer size of the [a] project (in numbers of affected actors or in 
the amount of dollars invested) dwarfs day-to-day projects, and if the institutional context is 
taken into consideration, the task ahead can become almost paralyzing” (Giezen, 2013, p. 723). 
Given the many components that make up a megaproject, the many interactions between those 
components and the asymmetry between those interactions, megaprojects are characterised by 
high levels of uncertainty. This ‘natural’ uncertainty is compounded by the incentivising effect 
of the political sublime, where politicians and project promoters, intentionally or otherwise, 
underestimate the costs and/or overestimate the benefits of a megaproject, and/or their capacity 
to deliver the project on time. In many countries around the world where the rule of law is not 
always strictly adhered to and there is a locus between the political class and the business class, 
the economic sublime could also compound the uncertainty around megaprojects. In such 
instances, not only is the political class promoting megaprojects to advance their political 
agenda, but the politicians themselves or their families and associates could be beneficiaries of 
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lucrative contracts. In such an environment, the likelihood of underestimating the costs and/or 
overestimating the benefits from a megaproject, even unintentionally, is really quite high. 
Unfortunately, many young democracies such as Kenya fall into this bracket where the nexus 
between the political class and the business class is particularly strong. In addition to the 
‘structural complexity’ (due to the many distinct and interdependent components of a 
megaproject) and uncertainty descried above, Geraldi and company tease out other forms of 
complexity that are congenital to projects. The authors include “dynamics”, referring to 
“changes in projects, such as changes in specifications…, management team, suppliers, or the 
environmental context” (Geraldi et al., 2011, p. 978), “pace”, when “urgency and criticality of 
time goals require different structures and managerial attention” (p. 980) and “socio-political 
complexity” which “emerges as a combination of political aspects and emotional aspects 
involved in projects” and which is “expected to be high in situations such as mergers and 
acquisitions, organisational change or where a project is required to unite different interests, 
agendas or opinions” (p. 981).  Broadly speaking, the principle cause of the problems 
surrounding megaprojects is their inherent complexity. Despite writing principally for business 
managers, the three solutions proffered by De Toni and De Zan can be considered in the realm 
of megaprojects. 
I. To the extent possible, megaprojects can be modularized such that they “have discrete 
functions that arise from interactions among their components” (De Toni & De Zan, 
2016, p. 3). Modularity could increase the level of adaptability within the megaproject, 
with each module better suited to address complexity at the local level, and thereby 
increasing the overall “antifragility”18 of the system. 
 
II. A second proposal is that of setting simple rules, a “few straightforward, hard and fast 
rules that define direction without confining it” (p. 4). In the highly complex world that 
is megaproject planning and management, the ability to be flexible and creative can be 
the difference between a successful megaproject, and an unsuccessful one. Cantarelli 
and company concluded that cost overruns in megaprojects can be avoided if decision 
lock-in can be prevented (Cantarelli et al., 2010, p. 805). The authors study the effects 
of path-dependence in megaprojects caused by decision lock-in, showing that lock-in 
                                                 
18 The concept of “antifragility” was formally introduced by Nassim Nicholas Taleb, referring to things that benefit 
from shocks, that thrive and grow when exposed to volatility, randomness, disorder and stressors, in direct 
opposition to the fragile, yet beyond the resilient (Taleb, 2012). 
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can harm project performance by escalating commitments to earlier decisions, even in 
situations where better alternatives exist and are known. If project planners and 
managers do not have creative latitude (bound by simple rules) to make tactical 
changes, a bad decision can carry through and escalate throughout the project. 
 
III. De Toni and De Zan suggest developing capabilities, capacities that can enable better 
navigate and manage complexity (p. 5). From their multiple case studies, the authors 
discovered that organisations have to nurture the level of their capabilities – 
“interconnection, redundancy, sharing and reconfiguration” (p. 6) - to match the 
complexity they face, if they were to achieve greater levels of firm performance. While 
oversized capabilities drag on performance through excessive costs, undersized 
capabilities limit performance through lack of knowledge and the intellectual resources 
required to manage complexity. In the realm of megaproject planning and management 
where complexity is inherent, it is essential that project promoters and planners develop 
the capabilities required to improve the chances of megaproject success. 
Giezen and company make the case for improving the decision-making processes involved in 
megaproject planning by developing strategic capacity19. “While adaptive capacity deals with 
ways of handling uncertainty and complexity, strategic capacity is about organising the process 
so it is best equipped to maximise the value from uncertainty and complexity” (Giezen, 2013, 
p. 724). Developing such capacity in project planners and managers is essential, given that 
megaprojects are characterised by multi-factor processes, involving private and public-sector 
participants often with misaligned incentives. The authors highlight three principles that are 
key for the development of strategic capacity: (i) strategic ambiguity, (ii) redundancy and, (iii) 
resilience (Giezen et al., 2015): 
a) Strategic ambiguity: Requires that a project’s mission is described as ambiguously as 
possible to avoid closing the decision-making process. By placing the highest emphasis 
on a project’s purpose or motivation, project planners allow themselves to consider a 
wider set of options in the implementation of this purpose. At this strategic level, all 
key purposes or motivations should be recognized and considered, even if they are in 
competition. This is in line with the findings of Cantarelli and company mentioned 
                                                 
19 The authors describe strategic capacity as “the ability to open and close the process…by widening perspectives, 
not just at the beginning but also throughout the whole process” (Giezen et al., 2015, p. 2), the “process” here 
referring to the decision-making process. 
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earlier, that decision lock-in, “the overcommitment of decision makers to an ineffective 
course of action (for example, a decision or a project)” could lead to cost overruns, 
reducing the chances of megaproject success (Cantarelli et al., 2010, p. 793). Strategic 
ambiguity speaks to De Toni and De Zan’s proposal of setting a few key simple rules 
as a way of setting the strategic direction of a megaproject, while at the same time 
opening up avenues for tactical and operational creativity. 
 
b) Redundancy: Once the project direction is expressed, a set of alternative models 
fulfilling all the project’s purposes should be sought. “We may have hunches and rules 
of thumb and we may write elaborate plans which anticipate all conceivable outcomes, 
but these are only hypotheses” (Landau, 1969: 355 as cited in Giezen et al., 2015, p. 3). 
The authors specify redundancy of both project actors as well as that of knowledge in 
dealing with unexpected events, providing anchorage through a variety of alternative 
options when turbulence arises in the implementation of the project. Redundancy is one 
of the capabilities mentioned by De Toni and De Zan, whose development within a 
megaproject or among the megaproject actors is essential for the successful 
management of complexity within and during the implementation of a megaproject. 
 
c) Resilience: “This concept of resilience deals with the ability of the decision-making 
process to deal with unexpected influences without risking indefinite delays in the 
process” (Giezen et al., 2015, p. 3). Sufficient strategic ambiguity and redundancy 
avails a buffet of options and alternatives that can be combined in various ways to fulfil 
the project’s purpose. “From a problem perspective, resilience means that the 
commitment to the mission and overarching goals remain intact; however, the chosen 
solution can still change” (pp. 3–4). Resilience would be the outcome of setting a few 
key simple rules as proposed by De Toni and De Zan, and would go a long way in 
giving megaproject actors the creative license and freedom to better manage the 
complexities inherent in a megaproject. 
Flyvbjerg elaborates on specific problems affecting megaprojects and suggests that the primary 
problem in the (front-end) planning of megaprojects is a high level of misrepresentation about 
the costs and benefits of such projects. This problem is so common, claims the author, “that 
large infrastructure and technology projects tend statistically to follow a pattern of cost 
underestimation and overrun” (Flyvbjerg, 2007, p. 581). “For rail, average cost overrun is 
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44.7%...For bridges and tunnels, the equivalent figure is 33.8%, and for roads 20.4%” (p. 579). 
Adding to this, the accuracy of demand forecasts is found to vary wildly. “For rail, actual 
passenger traffic is 51.4% lower than estimated traffic on average” while “for roads, actual 
vehicle traffic is on average 9.5% higher than forecast traffic” (p. 580). The author does 
concede that the data set on rail was less than ideal with 25 cases, but for both rail and road 
“standard deviations are large, indicating that forecasting errors vary widely across projects” 
(p. 580). It is important to clarify that this is not a blanket condemnation of all transport 
megaprojects. There do exist transport megaprojects that are delivered on or below budget, 
delivered according on schedule, and meet or surpass the promised benefits. They are simply 
much rarer. Flyvbjerg posits that the misinformation – understated costs and overstated benefits 
– “can be traced to political and organisational pressures, for instance competition for scarce 
funds or jockeying for position...Where there is political pressure there is misrepresentation 
and lying, according to this explanation, but misrepresentation and lying can be moderated by 
measures of accountability” (p. 584). This hypothesis seems sensible enough, especially in a 
context where legal systems and structures are either not fully formed, fully implemented, or 
fully adhered to, as is too often the case in Kenya. Flyvbjerg offers two solutions to address the 
misrepresentation problem plaguing megaprojects: better forecasting methods, and improved 
incentive structures. 
I. Better forecasting methods: The key recommendation here is that of reference-class 
forecasting that aims to “reduce inaccuracy and bias” (p. 588). The method “consists in 
taking a so-called ‘outside view’ on the particular project being forecast. This contrasts 
from an “‘inside view’ focussing on the constituents of the specific planned action 
rather than on the outcomes of similar actions already completed” (Flyvbjerg, 2013, p. 
761). The outside view is established on the basis of information from a class of similar 
projects, “using experience from previous similar ventures already completed, 
including (a) the average outcome in sets of such ventures and (b) distributional 
information about outcomes” (p. 761). Use of the outside view does not involve trying 
to forecast the specific uncertain events that will affect the particular project, but instead 
involves placing the project in a statistical distribution of outcomes from this class of 
reference projects” (Flyvbjerg, 2007, p. 11). Practically speaking, this consists of 
designing a class of similar projects already done elsewhere and preparing a statistical 
distribution. From this one can draw inferences on what the likely costs and expected 
benefits of the project will be, avoiding the trap of optimism bias that would be inherent 
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in a worst-case vs base-case vs best-case simulation. Reference-class forecasting would 
go a long way to address the challenges identified by Skamris and Flyvbjerg in their 
study on the inaccuracy of traffic forecasts and cost estimates on large-scale transport 
projects (Skamris & Flyvbjerg, 1997). 
 
II. Improved incentive structures: Project planners can be motivated to improve the 
accuracy of cost and benefit forecasts, away from political pressures and other 
interested parties who are often ignorant of the financial, economic, social, and 
environmental ramifications, because of over-emphasis on scoring political points. 
Flyvbjerg’s suggestion is that an intervention needs to be set up that hinges “not so 
much on what planners can do to reduce inaccuracy and risk in forecasting, but what 
others can do to impose on planners the checks and balances that would give planners 
the incentive to stop producing biased forecasts and begin to work according to their 
code of ethics” (Flyvbjerg, 2007, p. 16). 
To achieve increased accountability in megaproject planning, the author’s recommendations 
include: 
1. To devolve transport infrastructure decision making powers to local infrastructure 
agencies to “let local political officials spend the funds however they choose to, but 
make sure that every dollar they spend on one type of infrastructure reduces their ability 
to fund another” (p. 16); 
2. To submit forecasts for independent peer review; 
3. To ensure all projects are evaluated using reference-class forecasting methods; 
4. To make sure all project-related documentation is available to the public; 
5. Hosting public forums where planners can defend their forecasts; 
6. Projects found to have faulty forecasts should be reconsidered and stopped if necessary; 
7. Professional and criminal penalties to be enforced on planners who produce deceptive 
forecasts; 
8. To avoid issuing projects with sovereign guarantees for capital and, if necessary, 
capping any such guarantees at 30% of total capital needs; 
9. To avoid full public financing of megaprojects, with or without sovereign guarantees; 
10. To institute legal ways in which planners share financial responsibility for cost overruns 
and benefit shortfalls. 
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Bruzelius and company propose a set of suggestions that they believe would help to improve 
accountability in project planning, some of which have already been captured above (Bruzelius, 
Flyvbjerg, & Rothengatter, 2002, p. 148): 
i. Engaging members of the general public and vulnerable groups in planning and 
decision-making from an early stage; 
ii. To identify, to the extent possible, the public-interest objectives and requirements that 
projects must meet; 
iii. To define, to the extent possible, the regulatory regime that will apply to the project; 
iv. No total sovereign guarantee should be given to any lenders, and if any must be given, 
it must be limited; 
v. The government must define its role within the project with a view to ensure that all 
project players are kept at arms-length, that it can be able to provide oversight on public-
interest objectives and requirements; 
vi. Some degree of private risk capital should be used to finance the project, to ensure that 
private-sector incentives are aligned with those of the government and the general 
public; 
vii. Private-sector participants involved in construction should be given an opportunity to 
make technical suggestions, in the spirit of strategic ambiguity described above; 
viii. Business and special-interest lobby groups should be closed out from planning and 
decision-making process, to minimise the opportunities available to introduce political 
pressure, decision lock-in and rent-seeking opportunities. 
Patanakul and company also add their voices to the matter. Other than the recommendations 
already highlighted in this section, the authors add (Patanakul et al., 2016, p. 456): 
a) The establishment and agreement on a methodology that will be used to evaluate the 
expected benefits of a megaproject; 
b) Establishment of an effective quality management process that will ensure that projects 
will maximise long-term utility; 
c) Modularise projects into sub-projects to manage the complexity inherent in 
megaprojects; 
d) Project participants to make use of an integrated master schedule to coordinate the 
various project activities; 
29 
 
e) Government entities should ensure alignment between the project precepts and 
prevailing legislation; 
An important addition to the recommendations highlighted above is put forward by Samset and 
Volden, a suggestion that “ex post evaluation should be an essential element in any project 
governance scheme. When a project succeeds at all levels, it should be imperative to ask what 
was done right. Correspondingly, one should learn from mistakes” (Samset & Volden, 2016, 
p. 311). Project evaluations should be considered an important part of the megaproject 
implementation process that promoters and planners should prioritise. While this activity of 
critical self-reflection may not provide direct benefits to the immediate project under review, 
it could lead to insights that may improve the chances of success of future projects. 
In a 2012 paper, Flyvbjerg shares the experiences he and his colleagues have had in engaging 
the mass media to disseminate the findings of their research on megaprojects in Denmark. 
Lessons from Flyvbjerg’s experience could go a long way in assisting scholars on PPPs and 
transport megaprojects in Africa to ensure that their research can achieve the desired impact in 
public debate, policy making and even in practice. Some of the lessons can be summarised as 
follows (Flyvbjerg, 2012): 
I. In liberal democracies, working with mass media is essential to drive scholarship into 
public deliberation, policy and practice because public attention is dominated by the 
mass media; 
II. By problematising tension points within megaproject policy and practice, scholars are 
able to generate interest in the findings and results of their research from media and 
members of the public. 
III. Phronetic research and phronetic impact is scalable across different levels (for example, 
from the constituency level through to a national level) and replicable across different 
geographies and time periods. “The aim of phronetic research is to inform public 
deliberation and practice” (p. 169), to direct reason (from the research) to action 
(practice in the field). If producing research that aspires to change the practice of 
megaproject planning and management in Africa, mass media is likely to be an ally in 
sharing research results with the public. 




V. Press-releases are a much more effective way of communication research results, say 
compared to newspaper op-eds. “Generally, it works better for scholars to help 
journalists do their work by feeding journalists important and newsworthy research 
results than it is for scholars to try to do the work of journalists by writing journalistic 
articles about their own research” (p. 178). 
Working with mass media to disseminate research findings, results and recommendations takes 
a significantly shorter time than the actual research process. By spending a relatively short 
length of time with media, the impact of research on policy and practice could be greatly 
increased, helping to achieve the phronetic aim of such research. 
A caveat to the application of these recommendations is put forward by Muriithi and Crawford: 
“The growing weight of empirical evidence from cross-cultural management research suggests 
that Western management concepts may be wholly or partially inapplicable and irrelevant to 
other cultures. Why? Because values at work and in social settings are culturally based- 
therefore when dealing with human behaviour (i.e. managing) we must recognise the cultural 
context” (Muriithi & Crawford, 2003, p. 309). Megaprojects are not conceived, planned and 
executed in a vacuum. Planners, promoters and the projects themselves each exist in unique 
social, cultural, environmental, economic, environmental, technological and political 
circumstances, and considerations must be made to these, and any other externalities, that 
would have a direct or indirect impact on planning and implementation process. Indeed, 
conditions in and across African countries are very different from those in the Western world 
from whence most of the research on megaprojects comes. Academics, planners, financiers, 
government entities and other interest parties would do well to produce research, situated in 
Africa, that builds on lessons learnt elsewhere to address the challenges afflicting megaprojects 
in Africa. The scholarly landscape on megaprojects in Africa is bare when compared to that in 
other parts of the world, virgin lands that researchers should rise to the occasion and conquer. 
Megaprojects are highly complex, long-term, multi-faceted, multi-actor, large-scale ventures 
that cost US$1 billion or more, and have the potential to significantly impact the society. They 
are beset by problems caused by their complexity, and because of their large political, 
economic and societal impact, attract the problems of politics, public resource management, 
and the challenges that characterise any human society. Geraldi et al. (2011) and Giezen (2013) 
make the case that megaprojects face problems brought on by their innate20 complexity. De 
                                                 
20 The complex nature is made clear by Flyvbjerg (2014) in his definition of a megaproject. 
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Toni and De Zan (2016) put forward 3 ways in which complexity can be managed, ideas which 
coincide with those of Cantarelli et al. (2010) and Giezen et al. (2015) which speak specifically 
to megaprojects. Flyvbjerg (2007) addresses the specific megaproject planning problems 
concerning the misrepresentation of costs and benefits, and makes proposals that seek to 
improve the forecasting methods used during the planning phase and the incentive structures 
for megaproject actors. Flyvbjerg’s work is an extension of Bruzelius et al. (2002) who put 
forward specific ideas about how to improve the accountability of agents during the planning 
process, some of which are refined by Patanakul et al. (2016). Samset and Volden (2016) 
emphasise the importance of ex-post evaluation of megaprojects, that future project planners 
and promoters can learn from their immediate past experiences. Institutionalising such a 
learning culture among megaproject practitioners would go a long way to address the 
challenges made clear by Muriithi and Crawford (2003). The causes of poor megaproject 
performance are well known, and solutions to these problems have been put forward. This 
study spotlights the problems faced by megaprojects and highlights solutions, that any 
recommendations it shall put forward, assume that the specific problems already mentioned are 
either fully addressed, or undergoing remedy. Only then can the immense economic potential 
of transport infrastructure be fully unleashed on the Kenyan economy. 
 
 
Funding transport infrastructure 
In the earlier section addressing the role of transport infrastructure in growing an economy, this 
study makes the proposition that transport infrastructure is a positive externality to an economy, 
thereby making the case for increased investment in transport infrastructure megaprojects in 
Kenya to speed up economic growth. 
Blum (1998) extends the field of discussion between public21 goods and private goods by 
speaking of Samuelson’s definition of public goods (and the inference made of private goods) 
as a continuum, with “pure public goods” on one end and “pure private goods” on the other. 
This is because “ideal public goods rarely exist in reality and that private allocation is possible 
                                                 
 
21 Blum cites Samuelson, that public goods are those ‘which all enjoy in common in the sense that each 
individual’s consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction from any other individual’s consumption of that 




once mechanisms can be found that: prevent the free use of public goods, and force groups to 
reveal their preferences, at transaction costs that do not reduce demand to zero”  (Blum, 1998, 
p. 83). As this study expressed earlier, and in line with Blum’s position on the matter, transport 
infrastructure cannot be entirely categorised22 as a public good and “the usual one-dimensional 
classification of goods from pure public to pure private no longer applies” (Blum, 1998, p. 84). 
Consequently, the financing of transport infrastructure can be looked at from this expanded 
lens. To the extent to which the private good-ness of transport infrastructure megaprojects can 
be defined and ringfenced, the private sector can be incentivised to finance such infrastructure, 
while those megaprojects leaning on the public good side of Blum’s continuum can be financed 
by public resources. Rienstra and Nijkamp clarify that “a good should now be provided by the 
sector which can offer this good against the lowest transaction costs” (Rienstra & Nijkamp, 
1997, p. 232). The authors put forward that “for ‘normal’ goods, provision by the private sector 
will usually be optimal” (p. 232) and that other types of goods can justify public intervention. 
“At the same time it is widely acknowledged that provision by the public sector also causes 
costs – the so-called government failures – because this makes provision of goods more 
inefficient and is largely influenced by e.g. pressure groups” (p. 233). But they add that there 
are still reasons for governments to intervene in the transport sector. 
Rienstra and Nijkamp look at the characteristics of investments in transport infrastructure and 
particularly why these investments are typically ill-suited to private investors (pp. 233–234): 
• High fixed costs and long planning and construction periods; 
• Transport infrastructure requires huge upfront investment and have long payback 
periods; 
• The cashflow profiles of transport infrastructure projects (high upfront costs, little or 
no revenues until construction completion, and long payback periods thereafter) make 
them have high levels of uncertainty and risk; 
• Political exposure and the attendant risks associated with transport infrastructure 
projects; 
• High legal and regulatory risks since governing laws and regulations can be changed 
during the long planning and construction periods; 
                                                 




• The high risk of variances in cost and revenue forecasts makes it difficult to estimate 
the potential return on investment for such transport ventures; 
From the characteristics above, a private investor seeking a reasonably-safe positive real23 
return on investment within a short-to-medium term horizon, transport infrastructure is a most 
unlikely investment option. These characteristics, coupled with the features and risks inherent 
in megaprojects described in earlier sections go on to make transport megaprojects even less 
attractive to the profit-minded investor. Even then, in pursuit of profit, the private sector has 
still sought to participate in transport infrastructure ventures. Rienstra and Nijkamp (1997) refer 
to 4 possible ways in which the private sector participates in the provision of infrastructure: 
 
Figure 2: The role of the private sector in infrastructure projects | Source: Nijkamp and Rienstra, 1995, as cited in 
Rienstra & Nijkamp, 1997, pp. 234–235 
Category I refers to transport infrastructure that is privately financed and privately operated, 
with no government intervention at the funding or operational level. Category II refers to 
infrastructure that is financed by public resources, but whose operations are left to the private 
sector. This scenario can obtain in a situation where fixed costs can be paid by the government, 
while operations and the associated variable costs can be paid for a private-sector actor. The 
third category – and probably the rarest - is one in which infrastructure is financed by the 
private-sector while operations are left to government. Category IV is the more common 
scenario and the conventional way in which Kenya has developed its road infrastructure. In 
this category, the government finances and operates infrastructure. For the private sector to be 
incentivised to participate in the provision of transport infrastructure, the operational aspects 
of that infrastructure venture should be able to be clearly defined and legally ringfenced, with 
the ability to levy charges and fees to compensate for the entity’s operational effort. In cases 
where these conditions cannot be met – operational control over the infrastructure venture and 
                                                 
23 After accounting for inflation, which has the effect of reducing one’s buying power over time. 
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the attendant financial compensation – it is very unlikely that private sector players can be 
attracted to participate in transport megaprojects, and government will therefore be required to 
step in. 
Trew (2010) demonstrates that a lot of the significant Industrial-era infrastructure (turnpikes, 
canals and railways) in the United Kingdom was initiated and financed by private investors, 
manufacturers, professionals and other capitalists (Trew, 2010). While today it seems that the 
consensus belief is that infrastructure investment is an ipso facto government function, Trew 
shows that “the majority of investments came from local landowners, merchants, tradesmen, 
manufacturers, and professionals – people whose wealth was not only relatively limited but 
also mostly tied up in their primary employment” (p. 990). Trew’s work reminds us that the 
provision of transport infrastructure has never been a responsibility left only to the state. In 
fact, the private sector has often initiated and financed significant transport projects. If the 
conditions that Rienstra and Nijkamp (1997) express above can be met, there is no reason why 
the private sector cannot participate in financing the implementation of transport megaprojects, 
as they did with the canals, turnpikes and railways of Industrial Britain. 
 
The role of government 
Given the economic catalytic function of transport infrastructure which has been explored in 
earlier sections of this study, and the unique characteristics of transport infrastructure detailed 
above, it is essential that governments take leadership in creating an enabling environment and 
directly investing in transport infrastructure. It is widely agreed that it behoves a government 
to, in addition to protecting its citizens from external threats and aggressors, securing peace, 
law and order within its borders, and protecting the naturally-occurring public goods and 
common resources (like fresh air, clean rivers and lakes, animal habitats, etc.), to create and 
cultivate an environment in which all citizens have an opportunity to lead happy, healthy, 
productive and prosperous lives. From this point of view, government has the premier 
responsibility of allocating the funds collected from taxes levied on citizens and raised from 
other sources to investments in the public infrastructure that Otto and Voss (1995) referred to 




How governments facilitate private investment in transport megaprojects 
Eichengreen (1995) describes a “low-level equilibrium trap” (Eichengreen, 1995, p. 75) that 
low-income countries can find themselves entangled in, a vicious cycle where the lack of 
physical infrastructure limits investment in the economy, and this lack of investment limits 
infrastructure development, and so on. The author highlights two initiatives a country can use 
to either avoiding getting caught up in this trap, or to break out of it: government subsidies and 
guarantees, and foreign borrowing. In the event that the returns from an investment in 
infrastructure fall below a pre-determined minimum benchmark, a government can step up to 
plug in that shortfall through a subsidy and protect investor returns. In doing so, the state is 
effectively sealing the gap between the private investors’ gains (the profit incentive) and the 
social benefits (externalities) that accrue from the development of infrastructure. The essential 
reason why a government would subsidise a private investment in transport infrastructure is to 
ensure and protect the externalities that such investment would generate for the broader society, 
social benefits which would be at risk of being unrealised if the private investor’s returns were 
to fall short of expectations and thereby causing the investment to be pulled back. Eichengreen 
also mentions land grants as specific government subsidy interventions that were made in the 
United States and Canada during the development of the railways in these countries. The author 
suggests that up to 150 million acres of land were granted to railways in the two decades 
between 1850 and 1870. This was very significant because “such grants obviated problems of 
assembling parcels for right-of-ways” and “compared with other bonds, those backed by 
mortgages on land had minimal bankruptcy costs; the interest and principal due to the primary 
creditors could be paid off, at least in part, through the sale of the land if the project failed” (p. 
87). Through land grants from the government, the potential high costs that would be associated 
with direct purchases of parcels of land or right-of-ways on land are avoided, reducing project 
costs. Further, through land grants, infrastructure projects possess usage rights to these lands, 
providing important additional collateral that is critical when sourcing funding for transport 
infrastructure projects. In addition to subsidies, governments can make use of debt guarantees 
to assist project promoters source for project funding. When project promoters are unable to 
attract local capital at affordable interest rates, governments can intervene through debt 
guarantees that serve to de-risk projects, and thereby assisting project promoters in sourcing 
for capital at home and abroad. Given that a foreign investor would typically have much less 
information about a developing infrastructure project compared to local players, the foreign 
investor is given to price in this information asymmetry in the rate of return they would expect 
from their potential investment, reducing the chances of closing a deal. Through a partial or 
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full guarantee, the foreign investor is given comfort on their investment since the risk of default 
is significantly reduced (governments are generally less likely to default on their obligations 
that firms), increasing the chances of the project promoter successfully raising foreign capital. 
The key benefit of using these tools with respect to transport megaprojects is that they act like 
a catalyst for capital. They de-risk projects by reducing the costs of capital/ financing costs, 
and protect investor returns by partially or fully guaranteeing their investment. That said, they 
do present a set of challenges that project planners, promoters and managers must be aware of 
even while considering their benefits. With returns on their investment guaranteed, investors 
have no incentive to hold project managers accountable to performance standards. This 
behaviour problem cascades into the projects themselves, with managers insufficiently 
motivated to ensure that projects are planned, constructed, and managed such that they are 
delivered within the appropriated budget and on time. Without these incentives, but provided 
with enhanced access to capital markets through subsidies and guarantees, the principal-agent 
problems and rent-seeking behaviour earlier identified as a feature of megaprojects are 
amplified, damaging the chances of a project’s success. In using these tools to support the 
mobilisation of private capital towards transport megaprojects, governments must be aware of 
the potential pitfalls and be proactive to re-establish the right behaviour and incentive structures 
that would align all actors and catalyse successful project implementation. 
 
How governments directly finance transport megaprojects 
The government initiatives explored above – subsidies and guarantees, and government-backed 
foreign borrowing – are, at the core, government-supported private-sector ventures in transport 
infrastructure. The central protagonist in such transport megaprojects is the private-sector 
promoter, whereas the government would play an important but cameo role in the whole affair, 
helping to push the venture over the line. The other key method through which governments 
participate in infrastructure development is in the role of protagonist, taking the reins of project 
conceptualisation, planning, promotion, and funding. In fact, for many of the large-scale 
transport infrastructure projects in developing countries, this is the principal approach used. 
Many developing countries do not have well-established legal frameworks and regulatory 
environments for private investment in transport infrastructure, or trusted judicial systems that 
can reliably enforce contracts, or well-developed capital markets that can mobilise private 
capital for allocation to transport megaprojects. In countries where these institutions, systems 
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and frameworks are still being developed, governments can be expected to be relied on to 
initiate transport infrastructure ventures. However, even in countries where the environment is 
already in place for the private sector to comfortably participate in funding infrastructure 
ventures, the rationale for government involvement (the 4 sublimes referred to in earlier 
sections) remains strong. 
Governments typically fund transport infrastructure ventures in 3 key ways: (i) through taxes 
and other revenues contributed to the exchequer, (ii) through conditional grants from 
development partners, and (iii) through debt. From the pooled funds raised from taxes and other 
sources of revenue, and through a political process involving the executive and legislative arms 
of government, budgets are prepared and appropriations made for recurrent expenditures (such 
as salaries and wages, health and education programs, welfare initiatives, etc.) and 
development expenditures (such as building new schools and hospitals or paying for transport 
infrastructure projects, etc.). In this way, the resources available for a specific transport 
megaproject would be, at the very least, a function of (a) the total public resources available to 
government, (b) the recurrent budget, (c) the number and cost of other infrastructure projects 
required, and, (d) Flyvbjerg’s 4 sublimes. In developing countries specifically, the 
infrastructure funding challenge government’s face is enormous. Governments have limited 
resources on one hand, but have seemingly unlimited and urgent infrastructure needs on the 
other. This problem is compounded by the effects of politics, such that even if a particular 
transport project was identified as having the highest overall return to the society at large, 
individual political considerations would typically have a deciding influence on determining 
whether or not that project would get funded. Depending on the potential social and economic 
benefits of a particular project, a country’s development partners - foreign governments, 
international development agencies, multilateral organisations, etc. - can be approached to 
provide project funding through a grant. When the potential social and economic benefits of a 
project are aligned with the impact objectives being pursued by a development entity, a 
government can approach the entity for a grant to fund the implementation of the project. Since 
a grant is, in accounting terms, free money, it would seem to be a choice way of funding 
transport projects. However, finding development partners whose goals can be met through the 
implementation of the transport projects at hand, and with the resources being sought is no easy 
feat. Even when these partners can be found, the due diligence they would perform on the 
proposed projects and the process of moving from initial conversations to contract signing and 
financial closure would take at least a few years. Given the churn rate among the political class, 
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it is possible that the government representatives on project teams can be changed before grant 
discussions are concluded and contracts signed as new leaders are elected into office, possibly 
setting discussions back years. Considering the long-term planning horizons that characterise 
transport megaprojects, the typically long negotiation and due diligence periods that 
characterise grants, and uncertainty of job tenure among government representatives in grant 
negotiating teams, grants should not be relied on as a primary method of funding transport 
infrastructure. A frequently used alternative infrastructure funding approach is debt. With 
developing countries encumbered by the budget constraints imposed by limited resources, and 
the practical challenges of getting transport megaprojects funded using grant sources, debt rises 
as an attractive alternate. With debt, governments are freed from the immediate problem of 
resource limitations that reliance on taxes and other revenue sources would imply, and liberated 
from the long-winding discussions and contracting process that would be feature when seeking 
grant funding. Governments can structure bonds that can be sold in domestic or foreign 
markets, tap concessional loans from development banks, or commercial loans from ordinary 
banks relatively quickly, usually without having to be interrogated on the minutiae of the 
specific megaproject as much as being assessed on their ability to satisfy the debt. 
• Concessional debts are loans extended to a government by a friendly foreign 
government or multilateral development agency at “concessional” terms, that is, below 
market rates, often with a view of either strengthening political and economic ties (in 
the case of government-to-government debt) or achieving certain impact objectives. 
 
• Bonds are simply short- and long-term debt instruments. A summary of Fabozzi and 
company’s (2005) exposition on the defining features of bonds is provided below, 
whose understanding is integral to appreciating why governments are so enchanted to 
these debt instruments (Fabozzi, Ferri, & Mann, 2005, pp. 3–13). 
 
➢ Type of issuer – Bonds can be issued by domestic firms, local or municipal 
governments, and national or federal governments. Firms are able to place their 
bonds on securities markets for sale to the general public, or sell them directly to a 
few buyers (private placement), they can secure their bonds with assets, or even 
issue bonds without collateral. Local or municipal governments can issue ‘general 
obligation bonds’ that are “backed by the full faith, credit and taxing power of the 
governmental unit issuing them” (p. 4) or ‘revenue bonds’ whose creditworthiness 
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is limited to the success of the specific entity within the governmental agency 
issuing the bond. 
 
➢ Maturity – The term to maturity is the number of years that the borrower has 
promised to honour the conditions of the bond, running from the bonds’ date of 
issue through to the maturity date when the principal (or “par value” or “face 
value”) of the bond shall be paid to the bondholder. In practice, “term” and “term 
to maturity” are used interchangeably to refer to the number of years remaining in 
the life of a bond. 
 
➢ Coupon and principal – The coupon on a bond is the periodic interest payment 
made by the borrower to bondholders. The coupon rate, usually denoted in 
percentage terms per year, is multiplied by the face value of the bond to get the 
money value of the coupon payment made every year to bondholders. Although 
much rarer, there do exists “zero coupon” bonds, securities which do not have the 
periodic interest payment to bondholders. Investors therefore seek to buy such 
instruments at prices below their face value and hold on to them through to their 
maturity. “Floating rate” bonds on the other hand have the unique feature of coupon 
rates that vary over the term of a bond. In such instances, the coupon rate is pegged 
on some other reference rate (say, inflation, or a benchmark interest rate) and 
adjusted for a pre-determined spread (say, 2% or 3% above the reference rate). The 
principal or face value of a bond is the amount to be paid by the borrower to the 
bondholder either at maturity, when the bond is called or retired according to a 
repayment schedule in the bond indenture documents. 
With the scope to set bond maturities and coupon rates, governments can issue bonds, 
domestically or in international markets relatively easily. Depending on the state of financial 
markets, governments can offer long or shorter terms, higher or lower coupon rates, or even 
auction the bonds such that coupon rates are determined by market forces. In the event that 
bond issues are successful, governments can open up windows for “tap sales” where investors 
can take up more of the securities on offer. Most importantly for governments, when a bond 
issue is about to mature such that principal payments are nearly due, they can easily structure 
new bond issues and offer them in the market, using the money collected from the new issue 
to pay the principal on the maturing bonds, effectively postponing principal payments into the 
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future. This ability to theoretically ‘roll over’ bonds infinitely into the future is a major 
attraction for governments trying to raise money, and it has the advantage of reducing the 
default risk of bonds to investors. The resultant effect is that of lowering coupon rates, since 
paying the bond principal is as easy as issuing a new bond. 
• Commercial loans are loans extended to a government by commercial banks, at 
“commercial” terms, that is, at prevailing market rates, often when bond markets are 
experiencing distress or the money is urgently needed to stave off some sort of 
emergency. If the required amount is very large, several commercial banks can come 
together as a group of lenders to pool funds and ‘syndicate’ the loan. 
While debt offers ease and numerous practical benefits, an ability to fast-track important 
transport megaprojects, and is a lever that can be used to hasten economic growth through 
Keynesian stimulus programs, there are significant problems presented by taking on too much 
debt. 
Following the law of demand and supply, as a government’s demand for money rises (taking 
on more debt), the price of money (that is, interest rates) rises as well to attract suppliers of 
money (investors), distorting the private credit market. With government securities acting as 
benchmarks for the ‘risk-free’ cost of money in an economy, as interest rates rise, the cost of 
capital in the overall economy rises as well, pricing out and other borrowers in the economy. 
When the cost of credit rises, borrowers are charged higher interest rates on bank loans, or 
required to put up more collateral to secure loans, or both. This may result in fewer individuals 
and businesses getting bank loans, as banks prefer to lend to the ‘risk-free’ government, which 
causes the economy to slow down. Debt that was taken up by a government with a view to 
stimulate the economy through spending on transport infrastructure or other programs could, 
in fact, have the opposite “crowding out” effect on an economy (Carlson & Spencer, 1975). If 
commercial banks are of the view that interest rates will rise even further in future, they are 
likely to hold on to capital tighter – lending less to borrowers – with the goal of lending to 
government through bonds or to borrowers at higher rates. This can cause private credit access 
to narrow even more, exacerbating a bad situation, and cancelling out the short-term economic 
stimulation that expansionary government policies such as infrastructure spending are intended 
to yield. Moreover, for a developing country heavily relying on micro, small and medium-size 
businesses to create jobs and growth, this may have negative residual effects as credit that 
would fuel business mechanisation and expansion is denied to them.  
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Reinhart and company (2003) introduce the concept of debt intolerance “which manifests itself 
in the extreme duress many emerging market economies experience at overall debt levels that 
would seem quite manageable by the standards of the advanced industrial economies. For 
external debt, ‘safe’ thresholds for highly debt-intolerant emerging markets appear to be 
surprisingly low, perhaps as low as 15 to 20 percent of GNP in many cases, and these thresholds 
depend heavily on the country’s record of default and inflation” (Reinhart, Rogoff, & 
Savastano, 2003, p. 3). This is an important reminder that even through a government’s external 
debt levels may seem manageable to policy makers and politicians, “well below the 50-percent 
indicative threshold” of the IMF (International Monetary Fund, 2016, p. 4), the country’s debt 
intolerance levels may be quite high, making the country vulnerable to economic shocks and 
even at risk of default. To avoid creating a misconception that externally issued debt is a more 
important variable with respect to debt intolerance that domestically issued debt, Reinhart and 
company clarify that “the view that external debt is completely separable from domestic debt 
is dead wrong. As a by-product of capital mobility and financial integration, foreigners hold 
increasingly large amounts of the domestically issued debt of emerging markets, and their 
residents hold increasingly hold instruments issued by governments in advanced economies” 
(p. 48) showing the increasingly blurred line between externally-issued and domestically-
issued government debt. While government debt, locally-issued and denominated in local 
currency, is considered free of default risk (since a government can always print local currency 
to pay off debts), as more debt is issued, the interest rate on debt tends to increase owing to 
market dynamics. 
Depending on the levels of foreign-denominated debt, a country may be growing increasingly 
vulnerable to shocks which could have adverse effects on the economy. If, for instance, a large 
portion of a country’s debts are denominated in a foreign currency such as the US dollar, the 
country is exposed to the market vicissitudes experienced by the US dollar. If the US dollar 
appreciates in value because of a geo-political event that has adversely affected the British 
Pound and/or the Euro, this country’s debt payments automatically increase. This is because 
the country’s currency would lose value relative to the strengthened US dollar, required more 
local currency per dollar to meet debt payments. This has the effects of reducing a country’s 
reserves of foreign currency that it uses to keep its own currency stable, diminishing its ability 
to support its local currency. Importers of goods would be immediately required to pay more 
for them, owing to the local currency’s depreciated value. This cost increase would be 
translated into higher market prices of goods and services, causing a spike in inflation. For 
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countries that are net-importers, this could have very significant effects of the cost of living for 
its citizens. If the currency depreciation is big enough, it could require taking on an emergency 
loan from the IMF to help contain the currency volatility, having the third effect of increasing 
public debt. Even the seemingly-distant effects of third party currencies, market moves which 
could be triggered by all sorts of events, could quickly escalate through the financial markets 
and bring an economy to a halt. According to the 2016 medium-term debt management strategy 
report of the National Treasury, “approximately half of the total government debt portfolio is 
exposed to exchange rate risk” (Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2016, p. 11), that is, 
US$ 14.213 billion (p. 8), and Kenya’s Treasury finds that the “macroeconomic framework is 
exposed to significant downside risks” (p. 16). Policy makers and politicians must therefore be 
wary of the increased fragility they cause to the economy by taking on government debt. 
Despite its strong allure in funding transport infrastructure projects, it must be taken only after 
very careful consideration because even ‘safe’ levels of debt, as has been discussed above, can 
cause a lot of damage to an economy in the event of market shocks. 
With a huge need for transport infrastructure, but limited resources from taxes and other 
government revenues, the long lead time required to secure grant funds and the narrowing 
capacity for public debt, Kenya should begin to look for other ways of funding its 
infrastructure. 
 
The role of the private sector 
It has already been shown above (Rienstra & Nijkamp, 1997) that private investors and private-
sector capital played a central role in initiating and financing transport infrastructure projects 
in the Netherlands in the 19th century. Private-sector involvement in financing infrastructure 
projects in England has been shown (Trew, 2010) to go back to as early as the mid-eighteenth 
century, with individuals and companies pooling resources through joint-stock companies to 
fund the UK’s turnpikes, waterways and railways. Private capital in transport infrastructure is 
not a new phenomenon; in fact, it has always been core to financing transport projects. 
Extending from figure 2 above, we can elaborate specific ways that the private sector has been 




Figure 3: How the private sector participates in the provision of transport infrastrcuture 
a) The private sector can participate in the provision of infrastructure from a purely 
financing point of view. Here, projects are conceived, planned, and constructed by the 
government, but using funding from the private sector. The primary incentive for 
private capital in such an arrangement would be safe and/or attractive returns, tax 
benefits, or other financial incentives. Private capital can be tapped through 
infrastructure bonds issued by a central/federal or municipal/local (or “county”, in the 
case of Kenya) government. There are instances where transport projects are conceived, 
planned, promoted, and developed by private entities, and funded by other private 
entities. In such a case, the financier would be providing private equity capital or debt 
to the private project promoter, in the expectation of making attractive returns. 
 
b) The private sector can be enticed to participate in transport infrastructure projects in an 
operational capacity. It is generally believed that rational economic agents (individuals 
and firms) work to provide better or the same value for customers, at cheaper prices 
through production efficiencies, to increase profit. By extension it is generally believed 
that if the private sector could be sufficiently incentivised, it could produce the same or 
better value for transport users than governments could, and at lower costs. Through 
this thinking, private firms can be contracted or granted concessions to operate 
transport projects and installations (such as railways, road tolls, airlines, sea ports, etc.) 
be financially compensated either by the government (based on the cost savings made) 




c) Other than these two binary forms, there are many approaches that combine aspects of 
financing and operations through which the private sector can participate in the 
provision of transport infrastructure. Combining the operational efficiencies that can 
theoretically be gained from the private sector, with an opportunity to make attractive 
financial returns, private actors can be persuaded to invest their own capital in transport 
megaprojects. The simplest illustration of this is when firms conceive and plan transport 
projects and finance them directly, with a view of charging users for services e.g. a 
private airport where the owner would levy fees to airlines operating out of the airport, 
charge shop operators rent for leasing space, charge companies and individuals fees for 
parking their aircraft at the hangars, and so on. Governments also have the option of 
privatising public utilities through direct sale to private-sector actors. Partial or full 
ownership of a public utility could be sold through listing on a securities exchange, 
private placement, direct tendering or other methods of sale, on the basis that the private 
sector has the financing and/or operational capability of delivering better services, 
better than the public sector. Privatisation, however, is not a favoured approach for 
many governments because such actions could have political consequences, possibly 
signalling a dereliction of public duty. Given the limitations of public resources and the 
inefficiencies of government, and the need for transport infrastructure, an important 
approach that combines financing and operations is the public-private partnership. 
While experts are yet to agree on the definition of a PPP (or “P3”), this study uses the 
IMF description that a PPP “refers to arrangements in which the private sector supplies 
infrastructure assets and services traditionally provided by governments” (International 
Monetary Fund, 2008). Through PPPs, the government and private sector can join 
forces to leverage on the assets, strengths, and efficiencies of each party for the 
provision of transport infrastructure. PPPs are becoming a buzzword in the parlance of 
transport and infrastructure provision, and can be a vital approach for solving 
infrastructure problems faced by societies, without loading governments with debt. 
 
Public Private Partnerships in the provision of transport infrastructure 
Broadbent and Laughlin (2003) come out assertively that “PPPs open up the possibilities for 
the provision of public services, not only to come exclusively from organisations owned and 
controlled by the public sector, but also from both public and private sectors in partnership” 
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(Broadbent & Laughlin, 2003, p. 332). As this study has explained above, liberalisation in the 
financing and provision of transport infrastructure has (i) often been the case in the past, and 
(ii), is quickly evolving into an important ‘third way’ of implementing transport infrastructure 
for countries like Kenya that face the dual challenges of limited public resources and narrowing 
capacity to absorb additional public debt (Roumboutsos & Macário, 2013). From the IMF 
description of PPPs above, it is quite difficult to distinguish between a PPP and a concession 
or contractual arrangement to operate transport utilities. Fortunately, Broadbent and Laughlin 
shed light on this, explaining that “a PPP is an approach to delivering public services that 
involves the private sector, but one that provides for a more direct control relationship between 
the public and private sector than would be achieved by a simple (legally-protected) market-
based and arms-length purchase” (Broadbent & Laughlin, 2003, p. 334). In explaining why the 
UK’s Private Finance Initiative of 199224 is a bonafide PPP as opposed to merely being an 
arrangement to provide public services, the authors put forward three key differentiating factors 
which can be generalised as follows (p. 336): 
• The underlying asset may or may not be owned by the public sector (this is contentious 
even among experts), 
• The design of the underlying asset and accompany services is a responsibility of the 
private sector, and 
• The public sector is locked into a long-term relationship specified through a legal 
contract. 
A defining fourth factor is made explicit by Roumboutsos and Macário (2013) who state that 
while there are many approaches to PPPs, they “all have a common denominator: the use of 
private capital for financing and/or funding (through user charges or taxes)” (Roumboutsos & 
Macário, 2013, p. 161). Through PPPs, the provision of transport infrastructure can be 
expanded to include the private sector in financing and/or operating transport installations and 
utilities, ideally lowering the costs to the public while simultaneously increasing value for 
money (Kain, 2002, pp. 44–45 and Mouraviev & Kakabadse, 2012, p. 263). Siemiatycki and 
Farooqi (2012) define value for money (VfM) as “a measure of the extent to which cost savings 
                                                 
24 The Private Finance Initiative put in place by the UK’s Conservative government in 1992 was a pioneer in the 
field of PPPs as a mainstream government policy, deliberately shifting the state’s role in the provision of 
infrastructure. The PFI was, at the core, a project financing scheme through which “the public sector purchases, 
directly or indirectly, services from the private sector responsible for owning, financing, and operating the capital 
asset that delivers the service, whereas before it owned the capital assets and was a direct service provider” 
(Debande, 2002, p. 371). 
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are achieved when delivering a public infrastructure project through a PPP relative to a 
traditional government-led procurement approach” (Siemiatycki & Farooqi, 2012, p. 286). To 
determine if society is better off using PPPs as opposed to traditional procurement of 
infrastructure by government, a “public-sector comparator” methodology can be used to 
evaluate value for money. “The financial VfM of PPPs commonly boils down to a calculation 
of whether innovation and efficiencies and real risk transfer as realized through the PPP 
arrangement outweigh the higher costs of private-sector financing, a premium paid to the 
private sector for assuming greater risk, and higher associated transaction costs” (Siemiatycki 
& Farooqi, 2012, p. 288). The public-sector comparator of VfM is designed to estimate the 
envisioned public benefits to be gained by collaborating with the private sector, and to examine 
whether indeed these public benefits have indeed been achieved. Value for money is the net 
sum of financial benefits gained by the public by procuring infrastructure through partnerships 
with the private sector, which are entered based on an expectation of lower costs and higher 
value. The authors describe 3 different payment models through which private-sector partners 
in PPPs can earn revenue (Siemiatycki & Farooqi, 2012, p. 294): 
a) User fees: The private-sector operator can recoup their financial investment in the 
project by charging fees to users of the utility or facility over a period of time; 
 
b) Scheduled payments by government: The private operator can be compensated through 
scheduled payments from the government over a period conditional on the 
underlying utility operating as specified in contractual agreements;  
 
c) Payment on construction completion: The private-sector party can be compensated by 
the government at once and in full through a single bullet payment once construction 
is complete and the utility is confirmed to be operating as agreed. This would likely be 
the case when the private party is not engaged in a long-term arrangement to operate 
the utility or facility. 
Mouraviev and Kakabadse (2012) contribute to the literature by distinguishing various forms 
of public-private partnership. While a PPP is generally understood to be a specific project 
implemented through collaboration between the public and private sectors, this describes a 
single variant called a contractual PPP. The authors describe an additional variant, called an 
institutional PPP, that arises when a company is owned jointly by the government and private 
sector entities and exists for the purpose of providing public services (Mouraviev & Kakabadse, 
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2012, pp. 264–265). PPPs can take various forms. Mouraviev and Kakabadse look at 3 common 
types, concessions, Private Finance Initiatives (PFIs) and asset life-cycle contracts (pp. 267–
268): 
▪ A concession is a PPP arrangement where a public asset or utility is constructed or 
renovated by a private entity using private funds, and thereafter assumes operational 
responsibility for a specified period. In effect, through a concession, the public sector 
is purchasing services rather than an asset. The private entity is responsible for 
providing services to the public and maintaining the underlying asset or facility during 
the specified period, in return for fees that it charges users. 
 
▪ PFIs are similar to concessions, differing mainly in the specification of the public 
services to be provided. While concessions may allow for changes in the required 
service provisions over time (e.g. they may allow for upgrading of the underlying asset 
or utility and hence changes in the specifications of services provided), PFIs define the 
entire set of services that the private party is to provide over the life of the contract at 
the contract signing stage. Moreover, a PFI would be a direct service provider to the 
contracting public agency, and hence would be a going-concern kind of entity, whereas 
a concession may be a consortium of companies or a special purpose vehicle established 
for the sole purpose of engaging in the PPP. 
 
▪ An asset life-cycle contract is like a concession, differing mainly in terms of the source 
of payment. Unlike a concession, here it is the contracting public agency that is 
responsible for making payments to the private entity over the length of the contract. 
The length of the contract is tied to the usable life of the underlying asset or utility, with 
members of the public receiving services that are paid for by the contracting public 
agency. 
There are various models through which the public and private sector can interact, other than 
the finance only and finance-and-operate models referenced above. Each of these PPP models 
is defined by the degree to which risk is transferred from the public sector to the private sector 
(Kain, 2002, pp. 55–58). Commonly used PPP models include build-operate-transfer (BOT), 
design-build-finance-operate-transfer (DBFOT) and design-build-finance-own-operate-
maintain-transfer (DBFOOMT) models (p. 268). In a BOT, the private entity constructs an 
asset or utility using public resources from the contracting agency, operates the new utility until 
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the end of the PPP contract when it transfers operations and management to the government. 
In a DBFOT arrangement on the other hand, a private entity designs and constructs a facility 
using private funds, operates it for a defined period after which operations and management is 
transferred to the contracting public agency. PPPs, as concepts, are pliable and can be arranged 
into all sorts of forms depending on the needs of the public agency and how they can be 
packaged into attractive ventures for private actors. In traditional government procurement, the 
public sector is responsible for designing, financing and operating infrastructure, usually only 
engaging a contractor to build a facility to pre-determined specifications. The builder is fully 
paid upon construction completion, with the funding burden left to the public through taxes or 
public debts. When it comes to a PPP however, the private sector takes up these roles from the 
public sector, aiming, of course, to maximise private benefits. The aim of a PPP is usually the 
delivery of specific outcomes, say certain transport infrastructure, and the public sector 
interacts with the private sector in a PPP to achieve these outcomes. However, the interests that 
bring PPP participants to the table are very different. The business of business is almost always, 
business. Private actors will tend to work to maximise private benefits, while public actors will 
tend to work to maximise public benefits. Because of the disparate and often-opposed 
motivations that drive the private sector and the public sector, and the interaction between them 
in a PPP, aligning these different interests is an essential prerequisite for success in any public-
private partnership. PPPs come with unique challenges that project planners and policy makers 
must contend with. 
➢ By their nature, some PPPs are intergenerational, with contract periods that run for 
several decades. This is an issue of concern because through PPPs, governments can 
create financial obligations for future generations. While they may alleviate the short-
term fiscal concerns of present-day politicians, shifting the burden of paying for 
transport infrastructure to future generations could create a problem in future, where 
tax rates may have to be raised to meet financial obligations of PPPs entered into in 
decades past. 
 
➢ Because of the long contract periods that characterise PPPs, the probability of 
unforeseen events occurring is high. It is quite possible that through a multi-decade 
period, natural calamities or other unforeseeable events could occur that cause 
significant damage to PPP assets. Repair costs arising from such damage could 
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potentially turn even exceptional PPP projects (in terms of the interim VfM) into bad 
projects, with the public already financially committed. 
 
➢ By delivering infrastructure through partnerships with the private sector, governments 
are likely to be relieved of the fiscal pressure that would otherwise be weighing on 
them. Over time this could have negative ramifications as politicians and government 
officers are less compelled to be as strictly accountable as may have been the case 
before. This newfound fiscal comfort could easily lead to wastage and mismanagement 
of public resources, potentially offset the benefits gained from engaging in PPPs in the 
first place. 
Siemiatycki and Farooqi (2012) put it that “the strength of the partnership approach is derived 
from the aligning of interests, risks, and rewards between the partners,” (Siemiatycki & 
Farooqi, 2012, p. 287) and any form of public-private partnership that does not appreciate this 
is almost certain to fail. Considering that transport megaprojects typically cost hundreds of 
millions of US dollars, potentially impact millions of people and are themselves beset with 
unique challenges, getting the PPP arrangements around them wrong could compound the 
public losses in the event of failure. In guarding against this, Little (2011) proposes that the 
following should be basic tenets in transport megaproject PPPs (Little, 2011, p. 248): 
o Clarity – This involves ensuring alignment of objectives between all PPP participants, 
and a statement of how the project objectives would be achieved and measured. By 
developing strategic ambiguity over the desired PPP outcomes and setting simple rules 
of engagement between the project players, a strong sense of clarity can be created that 
ensures all parties are on the same page, and have an agreed-upon point of reference 
going forward. 
 
o Transparency – This would entail creating a culture of openness among the project 
partners, but also with the public. This can be established for instance by negotiating in 
public view, submitting project forecasts and other documentation such as VfM 
evaluation reports to the public for scrutiny, or holding public engagement forums. If 
properly established and maintained, a culture of transparency within a PPP would go 




o True partnership – To create a spirit of true partnership, PPP participants must come 
to the table with ‘clean hands’, appreciating the goals of each party, and respecting the 
knowledge and skills each party brings. To ensure that all parties have sufficient ‘skin 
in the game,’ the stakes can be raised through imposing professional and/or criminal 
penalties on public planners who produce deceptive forecasts, and imposing criminal 
penalties on private-sector players who engage in corrupt practices such as seeking 
preferential treatment in PPP negotiations. Enabling competitive dialogue25 between 
potential private-sector partners and the public-sector agency could be beneficial since 
the approach “maintains competitive tensions between the bidders throughout the 
tendering process, spurs efficiency gaining project innovations, and builds trust and 
reduces conflicts between the partners” (Siemiatycki & Farooqi, 2012, p. 297). 
 
o Risk management – It must be ensured that all parties to a PPP take responsibility for 
risks and eventualities as they arise during the implementation of project. By 
modularising the project say into phases, developing strategic capacity within the PPP, 
and creating redundancies of the key actors and project-specific knowledge, 
adaptability and resilience can be developed to ensure the PPP is able to manage 
complexity over the course of implementing the project. 
 
o Accountability – All participants in a PPP must be held accountable for meeting the 
provisions of all contracts if public VfM is to be achieved. To incentivise both the 
private and public parties in a PPP, payment schedules can be tied to performance goals, 
and failure to achieve pre-set targets can attract financial penalties. 
These suggestions are in line with the findings of Trafford and Proctor (2006) who emphasise 
effective communication, trust and openness, strategic planning, a coherent and cohesive ethos 
that is cultivated and directed through strong leadership as characteristic of successful public-
private partnerships (Trafford & Proctor, 2006). Chou and Pramudawardhani (2015) contribute 
to the literature by providing a synthesis of several key aspects required for PPP success based 
on a literature review of PPPs in Taiwan, Singapore, China, and the UK. The authors develop 
                                                 
25 The authors define this as an approach to tendering practice where “the public-sector client develops the 
performance specifications for a given project. They then enter into a dialogue with multiple prequalified 
concessionaires in order to refine the design and contract specifications of their bids to best meet the desired 




an assessment tool comprised of 15 key drivers (for success), 20 critical success factors 
(“CFSs”) and 69 risk allocation factors which could be used by project promoters and PPP 
teams (Chou & Pramudawardhani, 2015). The authors submit that their tool could be used by 
“investors who intend to invest in infrastructure procurements based on PPPs, and to enhance 
[…] understanding of country profiles (i.e., key drivers, CSFs, and risk allocation preference)” 
(Chou & Pramudawardhani, 2015, p. 1137). By creating a PPP assessment framework that is 
publicly available, governments can lead national dialogues that can go a long way in- 
(i) assessing local environments for readiness of PPPs, 
(ii) creating awareness about government interest in engaging the private sector through 
PPPs, 
(iii) helping legislators and regulators create the supporting legal and regulatory 
frameworks, 
(iv) signalling to the market the expectations of government, and informing government 
on the expectations of the private sector based on the market response, and 
(v) setting the tone for formal public and private sector engagement through PPPs. 
In their evaluation of 15 countries in Africa, The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) ranks 
Kenya third behind South Africa and Morocco, in terms of its capacity to carry out sustainable 
infrastructure PPPs (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015). The EIU’s benchmarking index 
is designed to assess a country’s capacity for carrying out infrastructure PPPs by evaluating 6 
broad areas: 1) “a country’s legal and regulatory framework for private participation in 
infrastructure; 2) the design and responsibilities of institutions that prepare, award and oversee 
projects; 3) a government’s ability to uphold laws and regulations for concessions, as well as 
the number of past projects and their success rate (operational maturity); 4) the business, 
political and social environment for investment;5) the financial facilities for funding 
infrastructure; and 6) the quality of subnational frameworks and experiences in PPPs” (p. 45). 
According to the EIU’s index of 19 indicators, the country’s institutional framework and PPP 
operational maturity, the investment climate and local (subnational) technical capacity are 
areas requiring improvement. The report finds that Kenya lacks enough well-trained talent in 
the field of PPPs, concluding that “units at both national and county levels need to be staffed 
with trained personnel with PPP-specific knowledge. At the moment, most transactions rely on 
international advisors” (p. 32). The country is also urged to harmonise the institutional 
framework established by recent legislation - the Public Private Partnerships Act, no. 15 of 
2013 of the Laws of Kenya - with existing laws to harmonise the institutional framework 
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between the national and county levels of government, and to ensure that personnel at these 
levels of government are adequately capacitated. The report notes that Kenya’s PPP legal 
framework is new and untested with no PPP project implemented since the law’s enactment, 
but comments that it (the PPP law) borrows from international best practice, a cautious vote of 
confidence on the improving PPP environment in the country. 
The Public Private Partnerships Act was assented into Kenyan law on the 14th of January 2013 
“to provide for the participation of the private sector in the financing, construction, 
development, operation, or maintenance of infrastructure or development projects of the 
Government through concession or other contractual arrangements; the establishment of the 
institutions to regulate, monitor and supervise the implementation of project agreements on 
infrastructure or development projects and for connected” (Republic of Kenya, 2013b). The 
Act establishes a Public Private Partnership Committee that is constituted of 13 members, 9 
senior government officials and 4 expert appointees. The Committee is tasked with 
responsibilities for setting policy and governance standards and guidelines, review and 
approval of project proposals submitted to it by contracting public agencies, overseeing the 
monitoring and evaluation of contracting public agencies, and ensuring implementation of all 
PPP project agreements. Further to this, the law creates a Public Private Partnerships Unit 
within the National Treasury. The PPP Unit is envisaged to function as a secretariat and 
technical arm of the PPP Committee that provides technical, financial and legal expertise to 
the Committee, as well as a serving as a knowledge repository and resource centre for the 
public also tasked with conducting civic education and promoting public awareness about PPPs 
and the PPP process in Kenya. Activation and implementation of the 2013 PPP Act to establish 
a strong legal and regulatory framework, and fully operationalising the institutions created by 
the Act, would significantly improve the environment for PPP projects in Kenya. Kenya has 
improved 21 places in the World Bank’s ease of doing business ranking over the last 2 years 
to position 92 (World Bank, 2017), suggesting that the investment and business climate is 
steadily improving. Looking holistically at Kenya’s PPP regulatory framework and investment 
environment, it is evident that the country is on a positive trajectory with regard to improving 
the conditions for stimulating interest in and cultivating partnership ventures between the 
public and private sectors. Public-private partnerships, if well planned and executed, can be a 
game changer in implementing public policy and delivering transport infrastructure. They can 
deliver the infrastructure that is so badly needed in Kenya through transport megaprojects, 
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while simultaneously reducing the reliance on the public purse and relieving the ballooning 
public debt burden. 
Since megaprojects are likely to continue to be a choice method for delivering transport 
infrastructure, and PPPs an attractive instrument for delivering megaprojects, 
recommendations that seek to improve the chances of success should be taken seriously. 
Indeed, if typical transport megaprojects usually exceed the budgeted costs, take longer to be 
built than planned, and the realised benefits fall short of expectations, “the question of whether 
infrastructure investment leads to economic growth must be answered in the negative” (Ansar 
et al., 2016, p. 384). In an analysis of 95 transport projects developed over a 24-year period in 
China, Ansar and company conclude: “a typical infrastructure project fails to deliver a positive 
risk-adjusted return. There is a common tendency for the benefit-to-cost ratio of major 
infrastructure investments to fall below 1.0. Such unproductive projects detract from economic 
prosperity” (p. 384). Policy makers, project planners, and government officers must strive to 
ensure that the transport PPP megaprojects they implement in Kenya, and the continent at large, 
are not done in the typical way. Project planning, financing and decision-making must not be 
typical. Project management, governance and ex post evaluation must not be typical. The 
recommendations gathered above and in earlier sections, if implemented, could mean the 
difference for Kenya as the country endeavours to leapfrog out of low-middle income status 
and achieve its 2030 vision. 
 
 
The infrastructure funding gap 
McKinsey (2016) approximates that excluding past underinvestment, the world needs to spend 
US$ 3.3 trillion on infrastructure each year for the next 15 years just to meet the expected 
projections of global economic growth (McKinsey Global Institute, 2016). If one is to include 
the total infrastructure costs required to compensate for past underinvestment, this number 
swells. In fact, McKinsey estimates an annual shortfall of US$ 350 billion, not including 
maintenance backlogs, adding that “the size of the gap triples when we compare current26 
investment against what would be required to meet the UN Sustainable Development Goals, 
                                                 
26 McKinsey estimates that the world spends US$ 2.5 trillion annual on transport, power, water and 
telecommunications infrastructure (McKinsey Global Institute, 2016).  
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which are critical for the future of undersupplied regions such as Africa” (p. 1). It is clear that 
most infrastructure funding should be going to the low income and low-middle income 
countries where extreme poverty is commonplace, since the investment would likely yield the 
highest return. Continuing at the current rate for instance, it will take most African countries 
more than 50 years to provide universal sanitation and access to clean water (Foster & Briceño-
Garmendia, 2010, p. 3). The UN SDGs target to “ensure availability and sustainable 
management of water and sanitation for all” by the year 2030 (United Nations General 
Assembly, 2015, p. 14), and if Foster and Briceño-Garmendia’s estimates are correct, many 
African countries will be more than 30 years late in achieving this goal. If developing countries 
are to catch up with their counterparts in the developed world, sustained high investment in 
infrastructure should be a top priority for governments all across the African continent and in 
other parts of the world struggling to emerge out of poverty. Yet looking at the historical 
amounts spent on infrastructure, one is likely to think that Africa should be much further along. 
Over the last 25 years for instance, Sub-Saharan Africa has collectively spent US$ 3.71 trillion, 
an average of US$ 148 billion every year on GCF (see figure 4 below). This translates to about 
17.9% of GDP per year. In other words, for every dollar worth of goods and services produced 
in SSA annually, 18 cents was invested in accumulating physical infrastructure assets net of 
disposals. 
 
Figure 4: Sub-Saharan Africa's GDP and GCF, 1991- 2015 
This seems quite good, until you compare it with the investment in other parts of the world, 
and account for the effect of compounding. In that same 25-year period, China maintained an 
average annual GCF rate of 40% of GDP (see figure 5 below). For every dollar of goods 






























infrastructure assets net of disposals, more than twice the 25-year average rate in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
 
Figure 5: China's GDP and GCF, 1991 - 2015 
Singapore managed an average annual GCF rate of 29% while South Korea averaged 31% over 
the same period. Considering the investment in infrastructure elsewhere, SSA’s investment in 
its infrastructure has been decidedly deficient. Picture this: the difference between 3 and 2, is 
1, or 50%. But the difference between 3 compounded 25 times (847,288,609,443) and 2 
compounded 25 times (33,554,432) is 847,255,055,011, or 2,525,016%. The difference 
between China’s 40% annual investment in infrastructure and Africa’s annual 18%, 
compounded over 25 years, yields a truly astonishing result. In all fairness, SSA investment in 
GCF has increased in recent years. In fact, investment in GCF has averaged 19.8% of GDP per 
year over the last decade, almost a 20% increase compared to the 15 years prior. This is already 
beginning to pay off in many parts of the continent: freshly tarmacked highways litter cities 
and towns, numerous new power plants are being connected into national grids, there’s 
increased investment by the private sector and consumer spending is on the up, supported by a 
growing African middle class. For Sub-Saharan Africa to experience the sustained economic 
growth that can lift the vast majority up out of poverty, a concerted and sustained effort to 
invest in its physical infrastructure must be made. The Global Infrastructure Hub27 forecasts: 
“the total infrastructure investment forecast for Africa to 2040 is projected to be $4.3 trillion, 
                                                 
27 The Global Infrastructure Hub is an initiative of the G20 club of developed countries, set up to grow the global 
pipeline of quality bankable infrastructure projects by facilitating access to knowledge, highlighting opportunities 























or $174 billion per year” (Global Infrastructure Hub, 2017, p. 56). While African countries 
collectively spent a substantial US$ 148 billion each year over the last 25 years, they will have 
to ramp up spending by at least 18% and sustain those levels for the next 23 years to match 
future infrastructure needs. The Global Infrastructure Hub predicts that Africa will fall short in 
meeting future infrastructure funding requirements by 28% (see figure 6 below), adding that 
“Africa’s investment gap is forecast to widen further to 43%, if investment need includes 
SDGs” (p. iii). The report observes that Africa’s infrastructure investment has been particularly 
heavy on utilities. The continent matched the global average spend on electricity and doubled 
the global average in water. This sector-strong focus has come at a cost: the report observes 
that Africa’s transport sector received below-average investment at “27 percent of the total 
between 2007 and 2015, compared to the world average of 45 percent” (p. 56). 
 
Figure 6: Africa's infrastructure funding need | Source: Global Infrastructure Hub, 2017, p. 56 
Through their Heads of State and Government, Africans committed to meeting the continent’s 
aspirations as espoused and documented in the African Union’s Agenda 2063. The document 
envisions and describes “the Africa we want”, it defines the collective aspirations of the 
continent, and sets target dates for achieving them. Through Agenda 2063, Africans have set a 
goal that “the necessary infrastructure will be in place to support Africa’s accelerated 
integration and growth, technological transformation, trade and development. This will include 
high-speed railway networks, roads, shipping lines, sea and air transport, as well as well-
developed ICT and the digital economy. A Pan-African High Speed Train Network will 
connect all the major cities/capitals of the continent, with adjacent highways and pipelines for 
gas, oil, water, as well as ICT Broadband cables and other infrastructure” (African Union 
Commission, 2015, p. 5). In an analysis of Agenda 2063, DeGhetto and company summarise 
that the continent targets to have developed its infrastructure for road, air and marine 
connectivity by the year 2025, and rail connectivity by the year 2040 (DeGhetto et al., 2016, 
p. 111). According to the UN Economic Commission for Africa, the annual African 
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infrastructure funding gap currently stands at about US$ 50 billion, and is forecast to grow by 
between US$ 14-15 billion annually owing to adaptation costs required to manage the effects 
of climate change  (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2015, pp. 12–13). To 
meet the infrastructure goals of Agenda 2063 (which significantly raises the potential 
infrastructure bill when compared to the forecast by Global Infrastructure Hub that uses global 
growth predictions) while compensating for the existing funding gaps and past 
underinvestment, and mitigating for the effects of climate change, the continent requires to 
quickly mobilise, deploy and manage hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of capital projects. 
Paying for such massive infrastructure programmes through taxes and government revenues is 
nigh impossible. Taxes would be insufficient, and increasing taxation to the levels required to 
raise the funds needed would be political suicide, and the equivalent of economic sabotage by 
the political class. Fortunately, SSA countries currently hold much less sovereign debt as a 
percentage of GDP compared to countries in other parts of the world. It can be argued that there 
is a lot of room for government debt levels to be raised and used as a primary financing method 
for plugging in the infrastructure funding gap. There is certainly some truth to this. But as has 
been noted in earlier sections of this study, the debt tolerance of developing countries is much 
lower than that of developed countries. With increased debt comes the need to service that debt. 
The annual principal and interest payments to creditors increases, reducing the pool of 
resources available for other development needs. Ideally this increase in outbound payments is 
offset by economic growth, reflected through increased investment and consumer spending, 
increased revenues from taxes, increased savings, and higher income from increased exports. 
Unfortunately, things often do not work out so smoothly. Even when there are moratorium 
periods before the beginning of debt service, there could be time lags between the predicted 
increase in economic growth and when debt service begins. The immediate benefits expected 
from transport megaprojects could fall short after projects are completed owing to deceptive 
forecasts or construction cost overruns. In addition, as countries accumulate debt, the marginal 
cost of that debt rises owing to increased risk of default. Depending on a country’s debt 
tolerance as assessed by financial markets, an increase in debt could result in a more than 
proportional increase in interest rates. Domestic capital markets take pricing signals and are 
benchmarked against the interest rates paid by ‘risk free’ governments, adjusted for borrower-
specific risk premia. As interest rates on government securities increases, this increase in the 
risk-free rate is transmitted through the financial system onward to final borrowers – 
individuals and firms. This has the undesirable effect of slowing down the economy as private 
58 
 
credit becomes increasingly expensive and harder to access. If this slowdown goes on for a 
prolonged of time, a vicious cycle of economic stagnation could begin. The rationale relied on 
by project promoters and politicians for taking on debt to fund transport megaprojects could 
fail, and very well be their undoing. If megaprojects do not deliver the promised benefits, they 
turn toxic, and depending on their cost relative to GDP, they could metastasize and become a 
burden to the overall economy as huge, unproductive debts are serviced from the public purse. 
 
Kenya, and the need for innovating the funding models for transport megaprojects  
McKinsey (2013) defines the infrastructure funding gap as “the difference between investment 
need and the resources available to address the need” (McKinsey Global Institute, 2013, p. 9). 
The definition of need, per McKinsey, “is more complex not least because it depends on the 
aspirations of each country, and these may differ widely” (p. 9). It is important to bear this in 
mind when estimating a country’s infrastructure funding gap, that any solutions proposed to 
plug in the gap are thoughtfully designed to (i) address broad national fiscal concerns, and (ii) 
meet specific funding needs. Kenya’s aspirations are articulated in the country’s Vision 2030 
development blueprint, and infrastructure is addressed therein as follows: 
“The 2030 vision aspires for a country firmly interconnected through a network of 
roads, railways, ports, airports, water and sanitation facilities, and 
telecommunications. By 2030, it will be impossible to refer to any region of our country 
as “remote” (Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2007)”. 
Much like in many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, “the infrastructure requirements for 
sustainable development in Kenya are seriously lacking and that means that the country’s 
infrastructure stock needs to be upgraded” (Hope,Sr, 2010, p. 92). The Second Medium Term 
Plan (MTP 2) that runs from 2013 through to 2017 outlines the specific policies, programmes 
and projects planned for implementation during the period, inspired by and in line with the 
2030 vision. MTP 2 builds on the achievements of MTP 1 and sets a target of gradually closing 
Kenya’s infrastructure gap, and making the overall economy more frictionless (Government of 
the Republic of Kenya, 2013). An ambitious list of programmes is set out for implementation 
during the plan period and the First Annual Progress Report measures the country’s 
performance in meeting the targets set out in MTP 2. Of the 17 reported challenges that 
hampered full implementation of MTP 1 initiatives in the transport sub-sector, financial 
inadequacy was alluded to 3 times, emphasizing the significance of the funding problem 
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(Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2015a, p. 45). Granted, finance is not the only 
challenge that will need to be surmounted in closing Kenya’s infrastructure gap, but it is 
certainly a central one. By articulating Kenya’s future aspirations, Vision 2030 establishes a 
benchmark from which the country’s infrastructure needs can be evaluated, and the 
infrastructure gap approximated. Briceño-Garmendia and Shkaratan (2011) calculate that 
implementing Kenya’s MTP 1 and 2 projects would cost approximately US$ 4 billion annually 
for a decade, with capital investment accounting for over 70% of this expenditure (Briceño-
Garmendia & Shkaratan, 2011, p. 22). To meet the growing demand for electricity and improve 
the reliability of power supply for instance, an additional US$ 1 billion would be required each 
year. According to the authors, the total infrastructure funding gap in Kenya stands at US$ 2.1 
billion dollars annually, and they are categorical that “the funding gap can be addressed only 
by raising additional finance or, alternatively, by adopting lower-cost technologies or less-
ambitious targets for infrastructure development” (p. 31). Reducing ‘ambition’ and scratching 
out development plans, and hoping Kenyans will be content with a poorly-networked, poorly-
maintained and largely dysfunctional transport system is not a sustainable strategy, and it is 
unlikely to find appeal among the population. The authors approximate that by adopting low-
cost technologies, the funding gap could be reduced by as much as half; this is probably a better 
idea than scraping development plans. Despite the country spending a substantial 18% of its 
GDP on infrastructure every year (see figure 7 below), a large funding gap remains which 
continues to perpetuate the infrastructure deficit. 
 
















While Kenya has successfully raised funds from international debt markets in the past, it is 
notable that this is not a panacea for funding its infrastructure needs. Yes, Kenya has slashed 
its debt service burden greatly over the last 25 years, currently paying about 2% of GDP to 
service public debt (see figure 8) and is at par with the average SSA levels. 
 
Figure 8: Kenya and SSA total debt service as a percentage of GDP, 1991- 2014 
With such a debt service ratio, it is tempting to think that the country has room to pile on debt 
to fund infrastructure programs. Presbitero and company point out that when issuing sovereign 
bonds, SSA countries are more exposed than low-income countries in other regions to the 
prevailing global market conditions. Consequently, SSA countries typically pay a premium of 
100 basis points on their external government debt (Presbitero et al., 2016). For this reason, 
while it is possible that external debt could be a cheap source of funds to finance the 
implementation of Kenyan megaprojects, external sources would be attractive only on a case 
by case basis, and when the conditions in international market allow. So, while international 
debt markets could be tapped occasionally to retire costlier external and domestic debt, Kenya 
(as a country within the SSA region) would rely on the prevailing vicissitudes of the markets. 
Sometimes this could bode well for the country, and other times this could mean trouble. 
According to the 2016 MTDS report for Kenya, debt service stood at 29.7% of total revenues 
(Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2016, p. 44), meaning that for every 100 shillings 
collected by the government of Kenya, about 30 shillings went to service principal and interest 
payments on public debt. This study observed earlier that nearly half of Kenya’s public debt is 














portfolio and 30% of the total debt portfolio (p. 11). With 30% of Kenya’s debt portfolio 
vulnerable to US dollar movements, a single 5% appreciation in the US dollar relative to the 
Kenya Shilling would have the effect of making Kenya’s debt service costs 1.5% more 
expensive. A 10% appreciation is the US dollar, and Kenyans would have to cough out 3% 
more to service existing debts. As the IMF finds (International Monetary Fund, 2016), Kenya 
is indeed performing well in terms of keeping its public debt within manageable levels. That 
said, the country does not have much capacity to take on more public debt without ‘fragilizing’ 
the overall economy by increasing its exposure to exchange rate currency shocks. External debt 
should therefore not be relied on as the primary source of financing to pay for Kenya’s heavy 
infrastructure needs. Doing so could have the effect of making Vision 2030 much harder to 
achieve. 
Chobanov and Mladenova (2009) estimate that the optimal size of a government’s total 
expenditures should be about 25% of GDP, and the optimal size of government approximately 
10.4% (measured as the ratio of government consumption to GDP) (Chobanov & Mladenova, 
2009). DiPeitro and Anoruo (2012) confirm this assertion using a sample of 175 countries and 
conclude that if their data analysis results hold true, “to promote economic growth, there is a 
real need for policies that reduce the size of government and size of public debt, and for 
effective strategies that reduce incentives for growth in the size of government and in the size 
of public debt” (DiPeitro & Anoruo, 2012, p. 417). Megersa adds to these voices, suggesting 
that there is an association -if not clear causality- between large debt balances and low 
economic growth rates in SSA countries in an analysis of 22 countries including Kenya 
(Megersa, 2015). According to the findings of the Kenyan Auditor General (Office of the 
Auditor-General, 2015) and using data from the World Bank, the Kenyan Government’s total 
expenditures are approximately 30% of GDP and general government final consumption stands 
at about 14% of GDP as at the end of 2014. Based on these statistics and the findings of DiPeitro 
and Anoruo (2012), one can infer that the Government of Kenya is currently not optimised in 
terms of its size within the economy, with the implication that its size may be holding Kenya 
back from achieving higher economic growth. This suggests that the large-scale infrastructural 
projects currently being implemented across the country, intended to stimulate economic 
growth, could in fact be depressing it, since the Government may very well be too big. As it 
stands, even if Kenya wanted to take on significantly more debt to fund a program of transport 
62 
 
megaprojects, there hangs a Sword of Damocles28 over it. This ‘sword’ is double-edged: a 
narrow capability to sustainably service more public debt, and increases in the domestic cost 
of credit caused by additional debt. Both of which have political repercussions for decision 
makers. Consequently, debt of any source, even cheaper foreign debt, may not be the best way, 
or a sustainable way, to pay for Kenya’s much-needed transport megaprojects. 
The country thus finds itself in a bind: on one hand, there is a large infrastructure deficit that 
needs to be urgently addressed if Kenya is to meet its Vision 2030 developmental goals. On the 
other hand, the Government of Kenya may already be “too big” in terms of its expenditures 
and consumption within the economy, with little room for further public debt-funded projects. 
Kempe (2010) observes that “addressing Kenya’s infrastructure deficit will require sustained 
expenditure”, acknowledges “that a substantial funding gap exists” and concedes that “given 
the order of magnitude of the annual infrastructure spending requirements, there is need to 
mobilise other sources of investment capital and more needs to be done to attract private 
investment and PPPs, in particular private participation in infrastructure (PPI)” (Kempe, 2010, 
p. 99). It is in this environment of tightening fiscal and macroeconomic constraints and a 
significant infrastructure deficit that this study lives. It aims to put forward a practical set of 
ideas that may help to address the Kenyan infrastructure funding problem without adding to 
the public debt, and ultimately contributing to faster economic growth. The research challenge 
therefore is to innovate alternative funding models for transport megaprojects in Kenya. 
Drucker (2002) describes innovation as “the means by which the entrepreneur either creates 
new wealth-producing resources or endows existing resources with enhanced potential for 
creating wealth” (Drucker, 2002, p. 5). This study shall explore the megaproject funding 
landscape in Kenya to identify areas of weakness and opportunities for innovation within the 
ecosystem, and to propose practical solutions that could help plug in the Kenyan infrastructure 
funding gap. These solutions may be entirely new funding models; or they may combinations 
of existing models, or tweaks to existing models, that work better to produce better outcomes. 
The study shall evaluate several large-scale projects implemented over the last 25 years to 
identify the common features of successful projects, and then embark on an integrative thinking 
process to develop innovative solutions that address the funding problem for transport 
                                                 
28 In the Tusculan Disputations of Marcus Tullius Cicero, the ancient Roman philosopher politician (106 BC – 43 
BC, when Damocles revels in the throne and bed of the king, the tyrant king Dionysius orders that a sword is hung 
over Damocles’ head, suspended only by a single horse’s hair. The sword serves as a constant reminder of the 
perils Damocles is exposed to, admonition to all those in power of its transient nature. 
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megaprojects in Kenya. Given the closeness between Kenya and the SSA bloc in terms of GCF 
rates and debt service levels, the country should be a good test case for addressing the 
infrastructure funding problem with a view of generating scalable solutions that can be applied 
elsewhere on the continent. In delving deeper into the megaproject funding landscape in Kenya, 
it is hoped that any findings and recommendations proposed, while addressing the uniquely 
Kenyan context, may have relevance to the broader continental challenge. An innovative set of 
practical solutions that address the inherent problems in planning, decision-making and 
implementing megaprojects, ideas that build on the lessons from megaproject experiences 
globally, insights that consider the growing role of PPPs in implementing megaprojects, and 
that appreciate the country’s contextual nuances, are urgently needed. This study hopes to 
provide some. 
Many scholars have expressed themselves clearly on the matter of economic growth and 
indicators like GDP as being necessary but not sufficient for the widespread improvement of 
social welfare. The notion that “a rising tide lifts all boats” has been disproven time and again, 
and is better substituted by the “rising tide lifts many yachts and some boats”. In as much as 
literature strongly makes the case for investment in physical infrastructure as a stimulant for 
economic growth, the author appreciates that improved physical infrastructure is no guarantee 
for improved social welfare. By improving transport links and reducing friction within and 
across the economy, commerce is catalysed and the probability of economic prosperity rises. 
If this study might have suggested that improved transport infrastructure will guarantee 
improved socio-economic conditions for all Kenyans, the author takes this opportunity to 
correct that perception. No such guarantee is given, or can be given. However, the guarantee 
that may be given is that improved transport infrastructure will increase the probability for 





Research approach, strategy and design 
Systematic combining: an abductive method for doing case-study research 
Dubois and Gadde (2002) developed a creative method for doing case study research in their 
2002 paper. The authors described their method - systematic combining - as “a process whereby 
theoretical framework, empirical fieldwork, and case analysis evolve simultaneously, and it is 
particularly useful for development of new theories” (Dubois & Gadde, 2002, p. 554). From 
the onset, such an approach (see figure 9 below) lent itself well to the aims of this study since 
it allowed for theory-building through a reflective process in which the ‘initial working theory’ 
of the researcher, and analysis of the specific case, evolved over time through the reflective 
process to culminate in the construction of a cohesive theory. The aspiration of this study was 
to propose a set of practical ideas that could actually work for the Kenyan context. To begin 
with a hypothetical proposition which the study would have attempted to prove or disprove in 
the empirical world would have suggested: 
(i) that the funding landscape for transport megaprojects in Kenya was well 
understood, 
(ii) that from a larger set of hypotheses, the proposed hypothesis had the highest 
probability of addressing the research problem, and 
(iii) that proving or disproving the hypothesis would have been equally acceptable 
outcomes of the study.   
Not so. First, it was unlikely that the funding landscape for megaprojects in Kenya was well 
understood, for if it were, the research problem would most likely not have existed. But it did. 
Secondly, knowledge of the probability of any proposed hypothesis to successfully address the 
research problem would presuppose knowledge of the research problem and a mechanism for 
evaluating its effectiveness in addressing the problem. Which was not the case. Third: proving 
or disproving a hypothesis were not equally acceptable outcomes for this study. If the proposed 
hypothesis turned out to be effective in addressing the research problem, that would have been 
an acceptable result. However, if it came to be that the proposed hypothesis would be 
ineffective in addressing the research problem, the research problem would remain unresolved 
and the study would have failed to achieve its primary objective. This study desired to conduct 
research through a process that not only avoided the risk of failure, but one that ensured high 
chances of success in addressing the specific research problem. With systematic combining, 
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research does not seek to merely prove or disprove a researcher’s initial working theory, but 
evolves it, adapts it and tests it for real-world fitness through interaction with empirical data, 
to ultimately result in a theory that can stand on its own. A theory that could later be submitted 
to a process of proving or disproving its effectiveness in addressing the research problem. 
Being an abductive process, systematic combining emerged as an ideal method with which to 
approach the research problem since it (systematic combining) doesn’t seek to ask “Can this 
proposed solution solve the research problem?” but, “How best can the research problem be 
solved?” 
An exercise in systematic combining begins with the development of a preliminary framework. 
This framework guides the interaction between the researcher’s initial working theory and the 
empirical world in collecting, analysing, and interpreting data with respect to the specific case 
being studied. This framework needs to be robust enough to ably direct the study’s immersion 
into the empirical world with focus, while remaining flexible enough not to leave the researcher 
with tunnel vision. A “tight and evolving framework” (p. 558) is a compass to the research 
process, guiding the study into specific directions, but without constraining it to particular 
coordinates. This is a defining characteristic research done using systematic combining, where 
the preliminary framework is tight but evolves. Tightness allows the research process to be 
bound by and confined to the specific case (that is, the research problem), while providing a 
perspective at which to look at the empirical world from. Adaptability is essential for the 
reflective aspects of an abductive process, that the study can pause to zoom in to certain areas 
of the problem space, orient itself to the locale, learn, and later zoom out and move on ahead. 
Through this process, the initial working theory that research would begin with is certain to 
evolve over time, moving the researcher closer to a theory that corresponds better to the 
empirical world. 
In addition to the preliminary framework, the researcher would set off into the empirical world 
with a loosely guiding preliminary theory (“theory” here is used softly to mean a stance or 
cognitive hypothesis or “hunch”) that would be relied on to initiate the conversation between 
the case under study and the empirical world. Like the preliminary framework, it must be 
‘loosely robust’ for any meaningful research to happen. Given that theory here is strictly used 
is the soft sense, “the researcher should not be unnecessarily constrained by having to adhere 
to previously developed theory...The question of whether one should start with ‘received 
theory’, which has been debated by inductionists and deductionists, is not an issue with which 
systematic combining is concerned” (p. 559). This is another defining characteristic of doing 
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research using systematic combining. As mentioned earlier, this study was not concerned with 
finding out if one particular funding model could solve the research problem or not. The study 
was concerned with solving the research problem, period. This opened the problem space to an 
exponentially large solution set, that the study could systematically narrow down to only those 
potential solutions that were informed by the empirical world and its limitations, and therefore 
had the highest chances of successfully addressing the research problem. Consequently, this 
study was not going to test out the effectiveness of any one potential solution, or try to generate 
an infinitely large set of potential solutions; it aimed to develop a set of solutions that had high 
chances of addressing the research problem, based on a certain understanding of the terrain in 
the empirical world. 
The non-linear, back and forth movement between the framework, theory, data and case 
analysis is a matching process that results in the “identification of unanticipated yet related 
issues that may be further explored in interviews or by other means of data collection” (p. 555). 
The previously-unknown power structures, relationships, trends, and insights on research 
subjects that rise to the surface through the matching process are the gems that scholars and 
researchers seek when mining fields of knowledge, the raison d'être of research. However, 
while viewing the empirical world with expanded lenses is a crucial aspect for doing research 
using systematic combining, it is important to be deliberate in establishing boundaries. Where 
to look and where not look, when to look and how to look. The empirical universe must be 
parameterised, or else it can be as big as the universe itself. Too narrow and the research process 
is hindered from the start, but too wide and the research process can never end. Parameterising 
the empirical world before research begins prevents flooding the process with useless 
information which could otherwise be jeopardising. How those boundaries are set up is of 
“major importance because it determines what will be found” (p. 557). From the very 
beginning, one can suppose that any research done through systematic combining has an 
inherent sampling problem. Not necessarily because of poor sampling, but because a minor 
variation in the empirical boundaries could result in a significantly different outcome at the end 
of the research process. To accommodate for this, the research process can be directed or 
redirected several times throughout the research process by “expansion or change of the 
theoretical model” (p. 552). This ensures that the empirical world has been observed from 
multiple points of view and that research outcomes are a good map of the entire set of viable 
solutions, not just a map of a single corner. 
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With the preliminary framework and initial working theory in hand, the researcher is equipped 
to meaningfully engage the empirical world to try and develop deep insight and understanding 
of the case, that the initial theory can be evolved into a cogent theory that addresses the research 
problem. 
Of note is that systematic combining acknowledges that research is not done in a black box. 
The lived experiences of the researcher matter. When one has a tooth ache, the opinion of an 
experienced dentist matters much to them than the opinion of a mechanic. But when one has 
car trouble, the opinion of a mechanic matters much more to them than that of an accomplished 
dentist. The experience of the researcher matters. There are nuances of the case, insights that 
the experiences of the researcher can help tease out, that spill over into the research process. 
Even with the same preliminary framework, initial working theory and data set, no two 
researchers will come to identically similar results. Through matching, and direction and re-
direction, the researcher’s reflective knowledge seeps into the study, giving it an added layer 
of texture. The challenge therefore is for the researcher to open themselves up and willingly go 
wherever the winds of the study take them, rather than try and pilot the process into a certain 
direction. 
As a result of the continuous confrontation and iteration of theory with empirical data, the 
theory that eventually rises out of a process systematic combining process is likely to be potent 
in the real world. For one seeking to solve practical problems through research, this is the ideal 
for which one strives, making this research method appropriate for this study. Having said that, 
because the lived experiences of the researcher inevitably affect the research output, it must be 
made clear that two researchers working on the same study are likely to arrive at different 
results. For this reason, the outcome of a systematic combining exercise such as this should not 
be taken as definitive or truth, but rather considered opinion. 
 
Integrative thinking: an enabling framework for doing systematic combining 
Applying systematic combining in research requires the establishment of a preliminary 
framework that directs the interactive process between the initial working theory and the 
empirical world in collecting and analysing data, and in interpreting it with respect to the 
specific case. The choice of framework is an imperative one, for it is the cognitive toolkit with 
which the researcher shall embark into the worlds of theory and reality. A good toolkit will 
enable the process, and a bad one shall cripple it. The framework must be set up deliberately, 
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carefully designed to match the requirements of the specific case, and built to provide a solid 
foundation on which research is conducted. Integrative thinking empowers us to deeply 
contemplate different models or alternatives at the same time, to make creative resolutions 
of the tensions that may exist between the models or alternatives, with these resolutions 
producing better outcomes than would be the case if each of the existing models was taken as 
they are (Martin, 2007). Integral to integrative thinking is the deep contemplation of the 
different choices available, the benefits of each choice and the payoffs from making a decision. 
So often one is confronted with a fork in the road and a decision that requires the selection one 
option and forfeiting the other must be made. Martin (2007) proposed a new way of thinking 
about such seemingly binary choices. The integrative thinker benefits from having a mental 
framework that expands the boundaries of seemingly binary decisions, to allow for the 
innovative generation of new options that could result in better outcomes. Desiring to innovate 
alternative funding models for transport megaprojects, use of integrative thinking liberated the 
researcher to interrogate the dominant funding models for transport megaprojects in Kenya to 
understand what made each model work, and then provided the cognitive tools for innovating 
a new model that leveraged on the benefits of each of the prior models. If systematic combining 
was the lighthouse that the research process relied on to navigate towards new frontiers, 
integrative thinking was the illuminating torch atop the lighthouse. Figure 9 (below) illustrates 
the methodology that the study made use of, and how the various aspects of systematic 




Figure 9: Systematic combining in practice 
The features of integrative thinking that made it a compelling framework for doing systematic 
combining were explained by Martin (2007) as follows: 
1. An expanded view of what matters - “Integrative thinkers take a broader view of what 
is salient...More salient features make for a messier problem. But integrative thinkers 
don’t mind the mess. In fact, they welcome it, because the mess assures that they 
haven’t edited out features necessary to the contemplation of the problem as a whole” 
(p. 42). An exploratory point of view is vital for innovation, and is necessary for one 
trying to discover new things. It means an ability to see the whole picture, and how 
individual aspects contribute to whole. But as was said earlier, the boundaries of an 
expanded view shall have to be clearly demarcated to minimise information overload 
and to ensure that the evolving theory is exposed only to relevant, value-adding 
information. 
2. Consideration of nonlinear and multidirectional causality – “Integrative thinkers 
don’t flinch from considering multidirectional and nonlinear causal relationships. 
Simple, unidirectional relationships are easier to hold in the mind, but they don’t 
generate more satisfactory results” (p. 42). In the matching and sense-making process 
that goes on between the evolving theory and the observations from the empirical 
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world, the researcher is required to adopt a curious stance. Neither enforcing his or her 
assumptions of what is, or what should be, nor contently accepting things at their face 
value. Instead, the integrative thinker seeks to understand the deeper, more complex 
causal relationships that exist within the problem space, open to the discovery of new 
insights that better explain phenomena in the real world. If done right, this is likely to 
result in moments of cognitive dissonance during the research process, where the 
researcher comes across counter-intuitive information that is at odds with one’s 
expectations. Admittedly, this could result in the loss of some information as the 
integrative researcher struggles to mentally come to terms with unexpected insights. 
Pre-emptive measures that can equip the integrative researcher with the cognitive 
muscle to manage the problem include engaging reflective practices such as meditation. 
Even then, such practices cannot entirely do away with the cognitive dissonance that is 
only human. In exploring the multiple webs that connect the various aspects of the 
existing funding models for transport megaprojects, the researcher may unearth the real 
drivers that make each model so prevalent, and becomes well placed to discover deeper 
insights that will facilitate the innovation of a better model. 
3. The whole is visualised while investigating the individual parts – “Integrative 
thinkers don’t break a problem into independent pieces and work on each piece 
separately. They keep the entire problem in mind while working on its individual parts” 
(pp. 42–43). This is a key cognitive skill of the integrative thinker, one that enables him 
or her to take a holistic view of a problem, while still able to see the various aspects of 
it. Essentially, the integrative thinker can see the forest, as well as the individual trees. 
Succumbing to the natural urge to concentrate on individual pieces of a puzzle (as 
opposed to the whole puzzle) could lead to an excessive closeness of inquiry that could 
totally shift the study in a new direction. While the study aspired to look at the subject 
matter closely, looking too closely was a risk, and doing so could have easily blinded 
the integrative researcher from insights that lay outside his direct field of view. One 
must be vigilant of this and work to maintain sight of the whole. The study aimed to 
innovate alternative funding models for transport megaprojects in Kenya. Excessive 
closeness in exploring one specific funding model could have had the effect of diverting 
the researcher’s focus from ‘developing a better funding model’ to ‘fixing a particular 
funding model.’ While fixing a particular funding model may have been a necessary 
condition for addressing the research problem, it would not have been sufficient in 
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resolving the problem because the study sought a solution that had been refined by 
observations from empirical data. In the event that these observations suggested that 
the chosen funding model would not work, even with a funding model at hand, the 
research problem would remain unresolved. For this reason, the integrative thinker had 
to maintain an open and accepting stance. In addition to this, the integrative researcher 
believes that the whole is often greater than the sum of the parts, and that as individual 
parts of the problem receive attention, focus must be kept on addressing the entire 
problem, and not just its constituent parts. 
 
Figure 10: The features of integrative thinking 
4. Creative resolutions are sought for tensions – “The integrative thinker will always 
search for creative resolution of tensions, rather than accept unpleasant trade-offs. The 
behaviours associated with such a search...can appear irresolute from the outside, but 
the results are choices that could only have been generated by an integrative thinker 
who won’t settle for trade-offs and conventional options” (p. 43). The ultimate good of 
research is discovery. By approaching the study through the method of systematic 
combining, and applying integrative thinking as a framework for doing systematic 
combining, research is positioned to produce new insights and a nuanced understanding 
of the case at hand. It is possible that the insights produced from research could be very 
different to what the researcher is familiar with or expecting, causing cognitive 
dissonance to arise. Not only that, these insights may not only be at odds with the 
researcher’s expectations, they could very well be in divergence with each other. It is 
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at such moments when the researcher lands at a fork in the road that his or her 
integrative thinking credentials are put to the test. Does the researcher ignore one set of 
insights and accept the other? Does the researcher accept both sets of insights, even 
though they are pulling in different directions? The integrative thinker does neither. To 
get to the end of the integrative thinking process, the researcher must wrestle with what 
is found, and creatively resolve these tensions. The next section shows how the 
integrative researcher can seek a ‘third way,’ one in which both sets of insights can hold 
true at the same time. 
 
 
Data analysis methods 
After exploring the research problem holistically to understand what really drives the adoption 
of the various funding models, what of the models makes them so prevalent, and their 
limitations, the integrative thinker then must innovate a way that leverages the best of each 
model. The final leg of the integrative thinking process is when innovation really happens. It 
follows then, that one would wonder “how exactly do you innovate?” For the integrative 
thinker and researcher, Martin (2007) sheds some light on this and offers tools for doing 
innovation: 
A. Generative reasoning – The author describes “a form of reasoning that enquires into 
what might be rather than what is. Generative reasoning helps build a framework for 
creative resolutions that is sturdy enough to withstand the rigors of the real world” (p. 
115). What is it that stirs the integrative researcher to direct or redirect the research 
process, or to better match empirical observations to the emerging theory and the 
specific case? That feeling, that cognitive dissonance, that realisation that things can be 
explained much better than they presently are, is an important aspect of systematic 
combining. Generative reasoning is what enables the integrative researcher to seek 
better solutions for the tensions that arise from the integrative thinking process. The 
integrative researcher holds the belief that existing models do not necessarily represent 
reality, and that better models can be created (pp. 92–94). Deduction and induction are 
the premier methods of thinking and logic taught in formal education systems all across 
the world, and have been pivotal in developing the body of knowledge through time. 
Another useful form of logic is modal reasoning that entails enquiry into “what could 
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possibly be true?” as opposed to the deductionist/inductionist enquiry into “what is 
true?” Unfortunately, modal reasoning has not received nearly as much attention as 
induction and deduction. Fortunately, as the world grows increasingly more complex, 
it is not enough to ask, “what is?”, and asking, “what could be?” is becoming much 
more common. In addition to deductive and inductive logic, the integrative thinker 
makes use of an additional thinking tool - modal reasoning- to make creative mental 
leaps in developing new models that can create a new reality. 
 
B. Causal modeling – An additional mental tool at the disposal of the integrative 
researcher is causal modeling. “Two forms of causation are important to causal 
modeling. The first is material causation, which says that under a certain set of 
conditions, x causes y to happen: if we price our product 10 percent below our 
competitor’s price (x), our market share (y) will rise. The second form of causation we 
need to know about is teleological causation, which asks, what is the purpose of y, or 
why do we want y to happen?” (p. 120). For the integrative researcher aiming to make 
an intervention in the existing megaproject funding landscape, having a deep 
understanding of both material and teleological causation is fundamental for the success 
of the proposed solution to the research problem. It requires a deep understanding of 
why each model works as it does, and what about them makes them so frequently used 
in financing transport megaprojects in Kenya. With this understanding, the integrative 
researcher is empowered with the knowledge required to design a new model that builds 
on the whats and whys of prior models. 
Generative reasoning and causal modeling will help the study in “answering the four critical 
questions related to enhancing practical wisdom: 
• where are we going with this specific problematic(sic)? 
• who gains, and who loses, by which mechanisms of power? 
• is this desirable?  
• What, if anything, should we do about it?” (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p.162 as cited in Flyvbjerg, 
Landman, & Schram, 2012, p. 5).  
By using generative reasoning and causal modeling, the integrative researcher will 
effectively be exploring what should be done. This would transform this phase of the 
systematic combining process from one in which the integrative researcher asks, “what 
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could be done?” to one where the researcher explores “what can be done within this 
specific context?” In doing so, the study hopes that it can offer valid, plausible and 
practical solutions to the research problem. With generative reasoning and causal 
modeling, the integrative researcher has powerful tools with which to innovate, whether 
for incremental change of an existing model or disruptive change in creating a new one. 
The innovations produced from the integrative thinking process are imbued with the 
same DNA that makes the status quo work. This gives the integrative researcher doing 
systematic combining confidence, that whatever innovations are produced, have a 




Application to the study 
The study considered the two dominant models of funding infrastructure in Kenya i.e. 
traditional government procurement, and the use of private-capital financing initiatives. 
In cognizance of the fact that models are merely “our customized understanding of reality” (p. 
50), the study dug deep into each of the two funding approaches to tease out the salient features 
of each model. Large scale projects built in Kenya between January 1991 and January 2016, 
and costing at least KES 10 billion (approximately US$ 10029 million in 2016 terms) made up 
the data set. For this, the traditional government procurement process in Kenya was reviewed, 
and several projects funded using private-sector capital were analysed. Of note is that this 
review was not limited to projects in the transport sector alone. While Kenya has long relied 
on the government to fund and implement transport projects, the use of private capital in 
transport projects in Kenya is a relatively new phenomenon, and hence the data on this sector 
                                                 
29 The study considered megaprojects in Kenya to be any large-scale infrastructure project that costs at least KES 
10 billion, or approximately US$ 100 million. This differs from Flyvbjerg’s estimation of US$ 1 billion 
(Flyvbjerg, 2014) for two reasons: 
(i) Flyvbjerg states the US$ 1 billion figure as an estimation, and not as a precise minimum benchmark for the 
cost of a megaproject. 
(ii) The relative worth of US$ 1 billion – The economic effects arising from a project costing US$ 1 billion in a 
developed country with an enormous economy like the USA or China could probably be compared with the 
economic effects from a project costing much less in a smaller, developing economy like Kenya. A project costing 
US$ 1 billion in the USA could be the equivalent of a fraction of a tenth of 1% of the overall economy, while a 
project of the same cost in Kenya could be the equivalent of nearly 1% of the overall economy. The study then 
uses a heuristic of an infrastructure project costing at least KES 10 billion, or US$ 100 million to represent a 
megaproject in Kenya. 
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was scarce and scanty. Furthermore, since the study was concerned with how the public-sector 
and private-sector could collaborate to fund transport megaprojects, the lessons from successful 
past collaboration in other sectors such as energy and telecommunications were useful in 
informing any proposed solution for the transport sector. 
After this, the study drew causal loop diagrams of the financing structures underpinning each 
approach using Sterman’s method (Sterman, 2000, pp. 163–190) that: 
(i) considered the possible multidirectional and nonlinear relationships across the salient 
features of each financing arrangement and, 
(ii) held those relationships within a latticework. 
The causal loop diagrams were a representation of the salient features within each of the 
models, the power structures and/or incentive relationships between the various actors in the 
models, and a demonstration of how value was created by each of the models. From here the 
study engaged generative reasoning to innovate, either by improving one or both funding 
models, or to create a new and better model of funding transport megaprojects in Kenya. 
 
Figure 11: The methodology 
Figure 11 (above) summarises the methodology that was used to conduct the study: Dubois 
and Gadde’s (2002) systematic combining approach to doing case study research, with Martin’s 
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(2007) integrative thinking applied as the analytical framework. This methodology enabled the 
researcher to emerge from the process better informed about the research problem, and bearing 
a potential solution that had been refined by input from the theoretical world as well as the real 
world. The study puts forward that rigorous application of this process succeeded in “producing 
research that has relevance to decisions about what can and should be done, and also how to 
do it” (Schram, 2012, p. 19) on the important and urgent matter of developing alternative 





RESEARCH FINDINGS, ANALYSIS, AND DISCUSSION 
Research findings 
Traditional government procurement 
The government of Kenya typically finances the implementation – design, construction, and 
operationalisation - of large-scale infrastructure projects through budget allocation and direct 
state spending. Taxes and other revenues collected by the state, domestic debts and externally-
sourced loans, and grants from donors are used to finance the implementation of infrastructure 
projects and other government programs. This set of fundraising mechanisms, where resources 
are collected by or on behalf of the government of Kenya for its infrastructure and other funding 
needs, is what this study refers and has been referring to as “traditional government 
procurement”. 
The governing law relating to matters of public finances and their management in Kenya is the 
Public Finance Management Act (chapter 412C of the Laws of Kenya). It is “An Act of 
Parliament to provide for the effective management of public finances by the national and 
county governments; the oversight responsibility of Parliament and county assemblies; the 
different responsibilities of Government entities and other bodies, and for connected purposes” 
(Republic of Kenya, 2013a, p. 11). By defining what constitutes public finances, detailing how 
the national and 47 county governments in Kenya are required to manage public finances, and 
setting up a regulatory framework and oversight bodies, the PFMA, sets up the procurement 
process for all state expenses, including transport megaprojects. 
The PFMA establishes the National Treasury, the state department responsible for matters 
relating to finance, which is mandated to “formulate, implement and monitor macro-economic 
policies involving expenditure and revenue” (Republic of Kenya, 2013a) as well as other 
responsibilities related to making, implementing and monitoring the economic and financial 
policies of the government of Kenya. Following a deliberative process that incorporates the 
medium- and long-term plans of the government, and determination of the economic and 
financial priorities and policies to be implemented at the national level, the National Treasury 
is required to prepare a Budget Policy Statement of the revenues and expenditures of the 
national government over the next financial year. The document is presented to the Cabinet for 
deliberation, consideration, and approval, before submission to Parliament. Among other 
things, the BPS includes a financial outlook with respect to national government revenues, 
expenditures, and expected borrowings over the next financial year. In the BPS, the National 
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Treasury, through its Cabinet Secretary, allocates public resources towards the various state 
departments for their recurrent expenses and development needs, including the implementation 
of transport megaprojects by the relevant state department. Following Parliament’s adoption of 
the BPS, financial estimates and other supporting documents are prepared by the National 
Treasury and presented to the Cabinet for approval. The National Treasury also prepares draft 
bills addressing the national government’s plans for revenue collection, appropriations and 
expenditures, and revenue sharing with the 47 counties, which are also presented to the Cabinet 
for deliberation. After receiving Cabinet approval, the CS submits budget estimates and 
supporting documentation to Parliament (excluding those for Parliament and the Judiciary), as 
well as the draft bills on revenue collection, expenditure, and revenue-sharing with the counties 
that would be used to implement the national government’s budget. Every year, the CS for the 
National Treasury is required to make a public pronouncement of the budget policy highlights 
before the National Assembly, that includes an explanation of the proposed measures of 
collecting revenue for the national government, and important policy changes. On the same 
date, the CS is also to submit a legislative proposal that elaborates on these revenue-raising 
proposals and following that submission, the parliamentary committee responsible for 
oversighting public accounts and expenditures is required to introduce a Finance Bill to the 
National Assembly. This bill essentially puts together the national government’s financing 
plans over the next year into a form that can be debated, amended, and passed as legislation by 
Parliament. In addition to this, the National Assembly is also required to deliberate, consider, 
and enact a Division of Revenue Bill and a County Allocation of Revenue Bill. Taken together, 
these bills – the Finance Bill, the Appropriations Bill, the Division of Revenue Bill, and the 
County Allocation of Revenue Bill- when passed as legislation, are the foundation stones on 
which the national government’s spending plans can be implemented. Any additional national 
government spending arising in the course of the financial year is to be requested and its 
financing articulated through a supplementary budget tabled before Parliament. If approved, a 
supplementary Appropriations Bill, and a statement explaining the need for and financing of 
the additional state spending is introduced to Parliament for debate, consideration, and approval 
by its members. At the end of every financial year, the National Treasury is required to prepare 
financial statements that consolidate the financial statements of all national government 
entities, and submit copies of these financial statements to the Auditor-General, the Controller 
of Budget, the Commission on Revenue Allocation, and publish these statements that they can 
be accessed by the public (Republic of Kenya, 2013a). Figure 12 (below) illustrates the 
traditional government procurement process. The planning and preparation of the financing 
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arrangements for a state-sponsored megaproject would be carried out during the integrated 
development planning stage of the budget-making process, with the funding for specific 
projects consolidated into the overall national government budget. 
 
Figure 12: The stages of the traditional government procurement process in Kenya 
Through the provisions of the PFMA, public finances collected or raised through taxes, fines, 
levies, licences, domestic and external debt, grants, donations, etc. are budgeted for, allocated, 
and spent through various national and county government agencies (see figure 13 below). 
 
Figure 13: The flow of funds in the traditional government procurement process 
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Private-capital financing initiatives 
Other than the traditional government procurement model, Kenya has made use of other 
approaches to finance various infrastructure projects. Various state-owned enterprises in the 
transport sector have been privatised through initial public offerings of their shares or direct 
sale to strategic investors. The financing and operating roles of various existing transport 
utilities have been transferred to the private sector through concession agreements, and the 
private sector has played an important financing role in mobilising the capital required to 
implement various infrastructure projects by participating in the government’s infrastructure 
bond programs. With privatisation and concession programs, the government requires to have 
already planned, designed, and constructed the transport utility, with the private sector later 
coming in to simple run the operations of the utility. While such arrangements may go a long 
way in improving service delivery, they have not helped to address the funding problem that 
this study is concerned with. In recent years, PPPs have become increasingly important in 
delivering infrastructure in Kenya, and they offer the advantage of providing the initial capital 
required for implementing specific projects, a benefit that concessions and privatisation 
programs do not. 
The study looked at megaprojects that were implemented in Kenya between January 1991 and 
January 2016, that were partially or wholly funded outside of the model of traditional 
government procurement by using private capital. As explained in the methodology, the study 
considered only those transport projects that cost at least KES 10 billion (or US$ 100 million) 
at the time, and the data set was expanded to include not only transport projects, but 
infrastructure projects in other sectors such as energy and telecommunications. As was 
explained in earlier sections, this is done for two reasons: (i) there are very few projects in the 
Kenyan transport sector that have been funded using private capital owing to the novelty of the 
funding approach in Kenya, and (ii), of importance to the study’s aims was the insights that 
could be gleaned from the financing arrangements of the various projects, not so much that a 
specific project was implemented in the transport sector. Several large-scale projects that 
incorporated the use of at least KES 10 billion (or US$ 100 million in 2016 terms) of private 
capital were identified and interrogated, and their operating and financing arrangements 




Kenya Airways Airline Privatisation 
In 1995-96, the Government of Kenya privatised the national carrier Kenya Airways through 
direct sale to a strategic partner, and an initial public offering of its shares. Incorporated in 
1977, Kenya Airways was wholly owned and operated by the Government of Kenya as a state-
owned enterprise, with the additional responsibility of carrying the national flag. Over the next 
two decades, the company accumulated financial loses and was encumbered with a heavy debt 
burden that it was unable to service. As part of a nationwide privatisation program laid out in 
1992, a new board of directors and management team was appointed to lead the firm through 
a restructuring process that included privatisation of the airline. A multi-tranche privatisation 
process begun, starting with the sale of a minority ownership stake to a strategic partner who 
would be charged with steering operations of the airline, followed by an IPO of some of the 
Government’s shares to the Kenyan public (World Bank Group, 2008). The Government of 
Kenya sold 26% of the ownership equity to KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, and 51% to members 
of the public via an IPO in the Nairobi Securities Exchange (then the Nairobi Stock Exchange) 
in 1996. Through these transactions the state received more than US$ 70 million from its share 
sales, the airline received a US$ 15 million loan from the International Finance Corporation to 
modernise its fleet, and the airline – now a leading carrier on the continent- was been profitable 
for nearly two decades ever since. The total project value of US$ 85 million- US$ 70 million 
to the government of Kenya and US$ 15 million in debt to the airline- in 1996, translates to 
about US$ 130 million in 201630 terms. 
 
Figure 14: Kenya Airways’ initial ownership structure 
 
                                                 
30 The US dollar had an average annual inflation rate of 2.15% between 1996 and 2016, meaning that US$ 1 in 







Figure 15: Kenya Airways’ revised ownership structure 
Figure 15 (above) illustrates the ownership structure of the airline following the share sale to 
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines in 1995 and privatisation in 1996. By privatising the airline, the 
government of Kenya relinquished the immediate operational control to KLM Royal Dutch 
Airlines, which is the oldest airline in the world and possesses a rich history and wealth of 
knowledge on international airline operations. The government reduced its initial 100% stake 
in the airline’s ownership to 23%, leaving the airline to be operated and financed like any other 
for-profit airline business. The private sector collectively still owns more than half31 of the 
airline’s shares, and loans advanced to it are on commercial terms. 
 
Kenya-Uganda Rail Concession 
In October 2005, the governments of Kenya and Uganda issued a joint international tender for 
two nearly identical 25-year concessions for the rehabilitation, operation and maintenance of 
key railways that were then operated by the Kenya Railways Corporation and the Uganda 
                                                 
31 There have been several rights issues of the airline’s shares since its listing, where the state has always taken 
up its rights shares. Depending on the response from other shareholders during such events, the state may have 
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Railways Corporation (both are state-owned enterprises). The tenders were awarded in 2006 to 
two special purpose concessionaire companies set up by the tender winner, Rift Valley 
Railways consortium. In Kenya, the concessionaire would be additionally required to operate 
the passenger services of the railway line for a period of 5 years. The concessionaires were 
required to rehabilitate the tracks to allow safe passage of trains at an average speed of at least 
30 kilometres per hour, to upgrade the locomotive fleet, to repair and rehabilitate the existing 
wagon fleet and passenger coaches, to purchase new locomotives and wagons, to renovate the 
existing buildings, workshops, depots, equipment and machinery, and to install new 
information technology systems. Though legally separate, the two concessions were intended 
to be operated seamlessly as one railway system. The concessionaires were required to invest 
at least US$ 47 million through cash injections and internally-generated cash flows, while a 
US$ 64 million loan was jointly extended to the new entities by IFC, the World Bank Group’s 
private-sector investment arm, and KfW, a German state-owned development bank (World 
Bank Group, 2013, p. 10). 
 













Figure 17: Revised railway operating structures under the concessions 
The total project value of US$ 111 million (a minimum US$ 47 million investment by the 
concessionaire for rolling stock, and a US$ 64 million loan jointly extended to the two 
concession companies by the IFC) in 2005, is the equivalent of about US$ 136 million in 201632 
terms. Following these concessions, operational responsibilities were transferred to the private 
concessionaire RVR, while final ownership remained with the respective governments. For its 
financial investment, and running railway operations, the concessionaire would earn revenues 
from passenger ticketing and cargo fees over the 25-year concession period. 
 
Telkom Kenya Privatisation 
In 2007, Telkom Kenya Limited, a monopoly state-owned fixed-line communications company 
was privatised by the Government of Kenya (International Finance Corporation, 2007). A 
consortium led by France Telecom won a competitive bidding process to acquire majority 
ownership in the company, paying US$ 390 million for 51% of the issued shares. At the time 
of the transaction, Telkom Kenya was on the verge of bankruptcy owing to operational and 
cashflow challenges, and facing dim prospects due to intense pricing pressure from privately-
                                                 
32 The US dollar experienced an average annual inflation rate of 1.9% between 2005 and 2016, meaning that US$ 
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held competitors. In fact, the state had twice tried to privatise the firm but was unsuccessful in 
its attempts owing to the immense challenges the business faced. Part of Telkom Kenya’s 
privatisation program involved unbundling its 60% shareholding in Safaricom Limited, a 
leading mobile telecommunications company. 15% of this ownership stake (that is, 9% of 
Safaricom Limited) was sold by the state to Vodafone Kenya Limited (the firm already owned 
31% of the company) with proceeds from the sale going towards restructuring Telkom Kenya’s 
balance sheet. In return, Telkom Kenya was awarded a mobile telephony operating license, 
which would be part of the assets that the new shareholders would receive upon taking over. 
The Government of Kenya also sold 25% of the 60% shareholding (15% of Safaricom Limited) 
to members of the public by way of an IPO that was held in June 2008. The IPO was dubbed 
the most successful one in Kenya’s history, “raising more than KSh. 50 billion (about US$ 800 
million) which more than offset the cost of restructuring” (p. 2).  
 











Figure 19: Telkom Kenya’s revised ownership and structure 
From the sale to France Telkom, the state earned US$ 390 million in exchange for 51% 
ownership in the firm. Furthermore, the state earned more than US$ 800 million from the sales 
of 9% and 15% of Safaricom Limited (initially a subsidiary of Telkom Kenya) to Vodafone 
Kenya Limited, and through an IPO in the Nairobi Stock Exchange respectively. The total 
value generated by the Telkom Kenya privatisation program was in excess of US$ 1 billion. 
From these transactions, more than half of Telkom Kenya’s and Safaricom Limited’s 
ownership is held in private hands, with the firms operating as typical for-profit commercial 
entities. 
 
Thika Power Limited Heavy Fuel Oil Power Project 
The Government of Kenya’s Least Cost Power Development Plan (Kinyanjui et al., 2011) 
encourages the establishment of independent power producers to generate energy stocks and 
contribute supply into the national power grid with a view of bolstering and diversifying the 
country’s energy mix. The plan is supported by the World Bank Group, and benefits from a 
combination of guarantees from the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, and the 
International Development Association, and funding from the IFC. Since power plants 
typically take several years to build and operationalise, with investors receiving returns many 
years into the future, early confidence in the long-term viability of a project is essential for 
investors. Investors need to be sure that once they invest their money and project construction 
commences, future energy offtakers will buy their power supply at the agreed prices and make 
payments on time. Investment guarantees such as those offered by MIGA and IDA provide that 
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much-needed confidence and reduce the riskiness of projects by ‘insuring’ such investments. 
When highly-regarded entities such as MIGA and IDA guarantee an investment, third-party 
financiers such as commercial banks are provided the assurance that credit extended to the 
guarantee holder is secured to the extent of the guarantee provided. This has the effect of 
transferring risk to the guarantor, de-risking the project by protecting a financier’s capital, thus 
making such investments much more attractive to private capital. 
Thika Power Limited was the first power project to be implemented under the Least Cost Power 
Development Plan. It consisted in the construction and operation of an 87 megawatt (MW) 
heavy fuel oil power plant in Thika, a busy industrial town on the outskirts of Nairobi (World 
Bank Group, 2016a). In 2009, the Government put 3 power plants up for tender, aiming to 
encourage private sector involvement in electricity generation. Melec PowerGen Inc. was 
awarded the tender in 2009, with total project costs estimated at US$ 153 million. Thika Power 
Limited, a subsidiary of Melec PowerGen Inc., entered into a 20-year power purchase 
agreement with the Kenya Power and Lighting Company, Kenya’s national electricity 
transmission and distribution utility (Kaçaniku & Izaguirre-Bradley, 2015). The IFC and AfDB 
each invested €28.1 million in Thika Power Limited, while MIGA issued a 15-year guarantee 
totalling US$ 61.5 million covering a loan extended to Thika Power by ABSA Capital. The 
guarantee provided cover for the risk of breach of contract and swap exposure from currency 
changes. IDA provided a partial guarantee to Thika Power covering short-term liquidity risks 
that would support short-term access to credit. The guarantees extended to Thika Power 
Limited effectively reduced the risk inherent in investing in the firm, by promising 
counterparties that in the event that specific events occurred, the guarantor would pay a 





Figure 20: The financial structure of Thika Power Limited  
Guarantees provided by organisations widely considered to be credible makes financiers much 
more comfortable to invest equity or extend loans which they would otherwise shy away from, 
or would only do so on terms that could make projects unviable. The total project value of 
Thika Power Limited’s 87 MW plant stands in excess of US$ 120 million in 2009 terms, or 
over US$ 130 million in 201633. 
 
Olkaria III Geothermal Power Project 
The Olkaria III power plant is located in the Olkaria geothermal fields in Nakuru County, about 
120 kilometres northwest of Nairobi. Olkaria III is the only privately owned and operated plant 
in the geothermal fields, the others- Olkaria I, II and IV – are owned and operated by the Kenya 
Electricity Generating Company Limited, the largest power producer in East Africa. MIGA 
provided a guarantee to Ormat Holding Corporation for an equity investment in OrPower 4, 
Inc. in the year 2000, which funded the expansion of Olkaria III, a baseload geothermal power 
plant (World Bank Group, 2015). The plant went online later that year with a capacity to 
                                                 
33 The Euro is worth roughly 1.2 times the US dollar, such that €56.2 million converts to approximately US$ 67.4 
million. The combined €56.2 million investments from AfDB and the IFC, and US$ 61.5 million from ABSA 
Capital adds up to over US$ 120 million dollars. Since the US dollar experienced an average inflation rate of 
1.63% annually between 2009 and 2016 (“2009 dollars to 2016 dollars,” 2017), US$ 120 million in 2009 would 
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produce up to 8 MW of electricity, all of which was to be sold to the Kenya Power and Lighting 
Company. This made Olkaria III the first privately funded and operated geothermal power 
project on the African continent. To support the plant’s expansion program, MIGA issued a 
US$ 99 million, 15-year guarantee to Ormat Holding Corporation, covering the risks of transfer 
restriction, expropriation, and war and civil disturbance. This expansion initiative was 
completed in 2014 with the plant’s total installed generating capacity up from the initial 8 MW 
to 110 MW, all of which is sold into the national grid through the Kenya Power and Lighting 
Company under a 20-year power purchase agreement. A US$ 99 million investment guarantee 
from MIGA supported the third expansion phase of Olkaria III by enabling an equity 
investment in the project by Ormat Holding Corporation and a US$ 310 million debt facility 
from the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. 
 
Figure 21: Olkaria III expansion investment guarantee and financial structure 
The investment guarantee provided by MIGA to Ormat Holding Corporation for its equity 
investment in the project, de-risked the project, and provided partial security for a loan 
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Research analysis and discussion 
Based on the findings from the empirical world detailed above, the study went on to make full 
use of integrative thinking as a framework for applying systematic combining to the research 
problem. Highlighting was mentioned in the research methodology, the integrative researcher 
must have a good understanding of the salient features of each model, an ability to tease out 
what really matters about each model, and why. While doing so, the integrative researcher 
must consider the nonlinear and multidirectional causal relationships that exist among the 
various actors present in each financing model. What are their incentives? These relationships 
must be held in view as part of a whole, an elaborate web, a complex system through which 
value is generated for the various actors through these relationships. The researcher must 
therefore be conscious to avoid narrowing down the focus to a specific part of a system because 
of the risk of overlooking or undervaluing the other parts that would be outside one’s view. A 
deep understanding of both megaproject funding models, knowledge of the critical actors in 
each system and how they relate(d) with one another, and their motivating incentives, would 
also produce insights as to why neither funding model was robust enough to address the 
research problem at the time. With this understanding of the benefits and the value produced 
by either model, the researcher could apply the tools in the integrative thinker’s mental toolkit 
(causal modeling and generative reasoning) to creatively resolve the tensions and 
contradictions that existed between both funding models and the research problem, and 
innovate a solution for the research problem. To do this well, the integrative researcher needed 
to cultivate in themselves a point of view that was solution-seeking. A mentality or outlook or 
frame of mind that was not only open to new or different things, but actively sought them when 
it came to solving problems. Martin (2007) described the stance and beliefs about the world 
and themselves that the researcher must hold fast to if they are to successfully navigate this 
phase of the integrative thinking process (Martin, 2007, pp. 93–106): 
Outlook on the world  
1. Whatever models exist do not represent reality. Just because transport infrastructure has 
been funded and constructed mainly by the government, does not mean that it must 
always be this way. 
2. Conflicting models, techniques, styles, ideas, or ways of doing things are not cast in 
stone; they can be twisted and tweaked to create better approaches. 
3. The existing models, approaches, techniques, styles, or ideas are not perfect; better ones 




Outlook on themselves 
4. “I am capable of finding or creating a new and better model”. 
5. “I am capable of navigating complexity to identify different or new and better ways of 
doing things”. 
6. “I can give myself the time that is required to innovate”. 
From the above, the integrative researcher understands that even with the right mindset and 
tools to work with, the process of innovation cannot be rushed. It takes the time it takes. This 
could mean many years, or a moment’s flash of brilliance. The integrative thinker is ready to 
rigorously apply their toolkit to the research problem, for as long as it takes, to develop a 
solution that best addresses the problem at hand. The following sections detail how integrative 
thinking was used as a framework for activating and applying the method of systematic 
combining, and how it was applied to the research problem in search of potential solutions. 
 
What were the salient features of the two funding models? 
The first step in analysis was to identify the salient features of each of the two models being 
considered, that is, traditional government procurement and private-capital infrastructure 
financing initiatives. The study sought to identify the defining features, characteristics and 
traits that were relevant and important about each of the two funding models. It is important to 
re-emphasise here that “salience is individual and idiosyncratic; what I see as salient may be 
completely different from what you see as salient. And both of us have blind spots that make 
it likely, though not certain, that something important will be left off our list of salient 
concerns” (Martin, 2007, p. 27). This meant that whatever would be highlighted as salient, was 
not all there could be. Salience is subjective to the individual, and is informed by an individual’s 
worldview, knowledge and lived experiences. Another researcher conducting the very same 
study could have identified other completely different features as salient. 
Based on the research findings, the following attributes were identified as salient features of 
the traditional government procurement model of funding transport infrastructure in Kenya: 
• The influencing factor of politics – The national government budget-making process in 
Kenya began with short-, medium- and long-term development planning, which are 
central tenet of politics and political governance. The next stage involved the 
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preparation of a cabinet-approved Budget Policy Statement. Even if Cabinet was 
constituted of appointees who were career professionals and technocrats, they typically 
served at the pleasure of a President or Prime Minister, who in turn is a political being. 
Set on this foundation, a national budget is essentially a political document. Its contents 
and derivatives, including proposals to implement various infrastructure projects, are 
intended and designed to be either (i) good for the country in terms of improving the 
welfare of its citizens, (ii) good for the politicians and government technocrats in terms 
of maintaining a hold of state power, or (iii) both. Furthermore, because Parliamentary 
approval was required for the budget estimates, revenue and appropriations bills, 
proposed infrastructure programmes and projects were probably evaluated on the 
backdrop of the prevailing political climate in the country and the political calculations 
and machinations of Members of Parliament. Because financial resources are usually 
scarce compared to the country’s needs, limited by the ability to raise revenue or sustain 
further debt, infrastructure projects tend to be implemented in order of priority. Even 
with access to additional sources of capital, a sovereign’s ability to directly implement 
infrastructure projects is restricted by capacity limitations, with projects tending to be 
implemented in phases and in some sequential order. Because of this, and the urgent 
infrastructure needs that a developing country faces, political manoeuvring is a 
common feature of the planning process of state-sponsored projects, as political capital 
is sought to move priority projects along. In sum, the study found that politics was a 
significant influencer and played a major role in determining what and how transport 
megaprojects were implemented under the traditional government procurement 
approach.  
 
• A tight legal framework – Since the resources funding infrastructure initiatives under 
the traditional government procurement model are public resources, they are governed 
by the PFMA in Kenya. Planning, budgeting, fundraising, and reporting procedures 
must adhere to the Law and its provisions which establish mechanisms for oversight 
over public resources. At the same time, these beneficial provisions of the Law have 
imposed limitations on how various initiatives and government projects can be funded. 
For instance, it was (and still is) only the Cabinet Secretary to the National Treasury 
who wields the power to guarantee a loan to a county government or any other borrower 
on behalf of the state, and the Law requires that the loan guarantee must be approved 
by Parliament (section 58, subsection (1): “Power of Cabinet Secretary to guarantee 
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loans”). This tight governing framework is good because it provides legal protections 
to public resources which the governing class is entrusted. But it has limited the 
flexibility with which government can raise or help raise the funds required to 
implement infrastructure projects. A project sponsor from the private sector needing a 
government guarantee to secure a loan would require the CS of National Treasury to 
make a proposal to Parliament, and for Members of Parliament to approve it. Such 
processes and requirements, necessary as they may be, complicate fundraising 
processes even for private infrastructure initiatives where the endorsement of various 
political actors in the executive and legislature is sought. 
From the research findings, the following were identified as salient features of private-capital 
financing initiatives: 
• The profit motive – For the 5 private-capital financing initiatives interrogated in the 
study, it was evident that in each case there was a clear and distinct profit opportunity 
that the private-sector party sought to benefit from. While the state and its agents are 
(or should be) motivated by the requirement to meet the needs of citizens through the 
provision of infrastructure, private enterprise is less inclined to act purely for the sake 
of the common good as much as it to make profit. Granted, it is now widely agreed that 
business does not exist for the sole pursuit of shareholder profit, and sustainability and 
stakeholder value have become corporate buzzwords. The business world seems to 
appreciate that a singular focus on maximising profit at the expense of other aspects 
that affect the businesses is a recipe for short-lived success. Even then, profit is a 
necessary condition for the long-run sustainability of a business, and remains a pre-
eminent motivator for the private-sector. Private-sector actors therefore do not involve 
themselves in the provision of infrastructure for altruistic reasons. In the case of Kenya 
Airways, KLM Royal Dutch Airlines sought to make profit by participating in the 
business of transporting people and cargo by air. For Melec PowerGen Inc. and Ormat 
Holding Corporation which invested in the Thika Power and Olkaria III power projects 
respectively, the opportunity to make profit through those power plants was enough to 
attract them to make investments. The opportunity for, and ability of, private actors to 
make positive net returns on their investments is vital for the viability of any private-
capital infrastructure financing initiative. If the private sector considered the profit 
opportunity in a megaproject to be too small or too risky, it would be very difficult to 
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attract the needed financial investment, but if the opportunity was compelling enough, 
there would be no shortage of interested parties. 
 
• Ownership rights, and/or operational and management control – In the private-sector 
financing initiatives interrogated in the findings, private entities either partially or fully 
owned the underlying assets, or owned long-term rights to manage the operations of 
those assets. In the case of Kenya Airways, KLM Royal Dutch Airlines owned 51% of 
the airline’s equity, giving it majority representation on the board of directors and 
enabling it to exercise authority over the airline’s management. Because of its 
significant shareholding, KLM was not only the majority owner but enjoyed the added 
advantage of being able to dictate airline operations through the board of directors and 
its senior-management appointees. For the Kenya-Uganda railway concessions, the 
RVR Consortium was granted operational and management rights over railways in 
Kenya and Uganda for a 25-year period, after which operational rights would transfer 
back to KRC and URC. So long as the provisions of the concession agreements were 
met, the RVR Consortium would have the liberty to run the railways as they liked. Even 
without ownership over railway assets, with the freedom to operate the railways and an 
ability to charge customers for services provided, the private sector was sufficiently 
incentivised to participate in the provision of infrastructure services as demonstrated by 
the RVR Consortium. Without the ability to own rights to the equity of a utility, or 
rights to operate and/or manage a utility, convincing the private sector to participate in 
a transport project or other initiative would be a rather tall challenge. 
 
What were the causal relationships between the salient points of each model? 
Having identified the salient features of each model, the integrative researcher went on to 
determine how these key features linked up to each other to make the models work. This 
understanding would clarify how the salient features influenced each other. Did a tight 
governing framework increase the influence of politics in getting infrastructure projects 
financed through the national government budget? Did the right to ownership or operational 
control over an infrastructure asset influence the profit motive of private-sector actors? Maybe, 
maybe not. And so the study embarked on a process of answering such questions about the 
various salient features that had been identified in the findings. 
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Regarding the traditional government procurement process, the integrative researcher needed 
to investigate the following question: was there a relationship between the tight legal 
framework governing the use of public resources in Kenya, and politics in Kenya, with 
respect to financing infrastructure projects through the national government budget? Based 
on the research findings, the study drew the following conclusions: 
Yes, there was a relationship between the tight legal framework governing the use of 
public resources and politics in Kenya. 
Because of the tightness of the legal framework manifested in laws such as the PFMA, 
project promoters needed to navigate around a variety of political interests to push their 
projects forward and get access to the public purse. It is the nature of the beast that the 
planning, financing, and implementation of state-sponsored infrastructure projects 
includes a ‘double dose’ of the political sublime referred to in the literature review. The 
Public Finance Management Act for instance requires that budget estimates and 
allocations made through various bills are considered by members of Parliament for 
discussion, debate, and approval before they can be enacted as legislation and 
implemented thereafter. Parliamentarians are political beings, borne out of an elective 
process, and their existence is a political life. Their goings in and goings out tend to be 
politically inspired or motivated in some way. Consequently, the lenses with which they 
look at the world and its contents tend to bear a political hue. Because Parliamentarians 
have oversight responsibilities over all public expenses through laws such as the PFMA, 
the relationship between the tight legal framework (the law) and politics not only exists, 
but is strong. Members of Parliament have the power to question and even alter the 
allocation of public resources to specific infrastructure projects by proposing 
amendments to the various national government budget bills. Since they are elected to 
Parliament based on their ability to push forward certain agendas, they are likely to 
individually push forward potentially competing infrastructure agendas, each eying the 
implementation of projects where their constituents would be direct beneficiaries. This 
also happens at the level of the sponsoring political parties. Political parties frequently 
take alternative points of view regarding proposed budget plans and resource 
allocations, individual aspects of the budget bills or even specific infrastructure 
projects, making the process of implementing infrastructure projects much more 
complex. For political convenience, rival political groups may adopt a stance where 
projects get approved not on the basis of their societal importance or economic 
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significance, but on the basis of ‘scratch my back and I scratch yours.’ The decision-
making process could easily metamorphosize into in a political game of the type where 
if one politically-aligned grouping gets approval for a project, they return the favour to 
the other side on a future project. The two salient features identified in the traditional 
government procurement process in Kenya were strongly linked and influenced each 
other heavily, and any process of innovation that touched on one of the salient points 
needed to be conscious of the second-order effects on the other.  
With respect to the salient features of private-capital financing initiatives in Kenya, the 
integrative researcher needed to investigate the following question: was there a relationship 
between the right to ownership or operational control over an infrastructure asset, and the 
profit motive to the private sector, when it comes to financing infrastructure projects through 
the private sector? By exploring this question, the study drew out the various causal 
relationships that existed between the salient features, and gained understanding of how and 
why the private-capital infrastructure financing model worked in practice. Based on the 
research findings, the study arrived at the following conclusions: 
Yes, there was a causal link between the rights of a private actor to own and/or operate 
and manage infrastructure assets, and the incentive for the private actor to earn profit. 
Before investing in a project, a rational investor must be sure that in return for their 
financial outlay and the risk they bear as a result, they will receive ownership rights 
and/or operating and management rights to the underlying project or asset, from which 
they can receive future revenue. The private actor acts for their personal gain. If they 
are not sure of their ownership rights, or whether they get management control over the 
underlying infrastructure asset, or whether they can earn revenue from the asset, if their 
desired private gain is not reasonably assured, a private actor is unlikely to invest in a 
project. If the ownership and/or control rights, and the rights to charge users fees from 
infrastructure usage are not guaranteed and legally protected, no rational investor would 
risk losing their capital. Furthermore, the higher the cost of acquiring ownership and 
operating rights to a project, the lower the profit motive. This is because the high 
acquisition costs would require higher user charges (costs to the consumer), which may 
have the negative result of lowering the overall revenue earned due to reduced service 
usage with fewer consumers able to afford services. In a competitive business 
environment where customers probably have alternatives, such service providers may 
be unable to shore up market share if their competitors can provide similar services at 
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lower price points. For the private sector to be convincingly attracted to infrastructure 
projects, the price for ownership and operating rights must be considerate of the fact 
that the private entity must recoup its investment within a reasonable period of time, 
and enjoy a reasonably profit opportunity. But if a proposed project meets an investor’s 
criteria but simply costs too much, is it likely to remain exactly that – a mere proposal. 
Ordinarily, ownership rights are bundled together with the operating rights of an asset, 
and are vested in the equity of the legal holding entity. If such rights are unbundled, for 
instance through a concession arrangement, it is expected that the sale price for a set of 
unbundled rights is likely to be lower than that if both sets of rights were bundled 
together. This is because operating rights allow the operator of the asset to earn fees or 
royalties that charged for usage, while ownership rights allow the owner of the asset to 
earn profit. When taken together, the potential revenue to the rights holder is likely to 
be higher than if they were held separately. Consequently, project planners and 
promoters must be aware of the strong causal relationship that exists between 
ownership and control rights and the profit motive of the private sector. When a 
decision that may affect one of the salient points of private-capital infrastructure 
financing is made, the strong causal effects of such a decision on the other salient point 
must be weighed and considered. 
 
Determining an appropriate decision architecture 
Having identified the salient points of each model and established the causal relationships that 
link them, the integrative thinking process moved on to build a decision architecture that would 
be used in the resolution stage of integrative thinking process. This architecture was informed 
by the prior processes that identified the salient features of each model and the causal 
relationships among those salient features. The points of salience and their causal relationships 
were held in a latticework that allowed the integrative researcher to look at the research 
problem and propose potential solutions while keeping the whole in mind, similar to the way 
one would look at a map. Martin (2007) described it in this way: “Integrative thinkers don’t 
break a problem into independent pieces and work on each piece separately. They keep the 
entire problem firmly in mind while working on its individual parts. Integrative thinkers want 
to avoid the trap of designing a product before considering the costs of manufacturing it. So 
they would consider manufacturability as they design their product” (Martin, 2007, pp. 42–43). 
In imagining new and better ways through which transport megaprojects in Kenya could be 
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funded, it was essential that while the integrative researcher worked on the various parts of the 
problem, the whole remained firmly in view. It would have been foolhardy to focus on a single 
aspect of the research problem and design a solution for it: even if that solution worked, it 
would not have addressed the research problem, just a part of it. In the same way, one does not 
solve a jigsaw puzzle by focusing on only one piece. Martin noted that “with respect to 
architecture, the most common failing of conventional thinking is the tendency to lose sight of 
the whole decision. It may be easier to dole out pieces of a decision to various […] functions, 
but that ensures that no one will take a holistic view of a particular problem. And in the absence 
of a holistic view, a mediocre result is the likely outcome” (Martin, 2007, p. 46). A thoughtful 
arrangement of the salient points and their causal relationships produced a decision architecture 
that had the potential to yield a desirable solution for the research problem. Based on the 
literature review and the findings of the study, the following set of rules was established as the 
decision architecture that would guide the researcher in the later stages of the integrative 
thinking process: 
✓ No proposed solution would have the effect of increasing the Kenyan public debt; 
✓ No proposed solution would have the effect of increasing the existing rates of taxation; 
✓ All proposed solutions would be designed to avoid the use of public resources for 
funding the implementation of transport megaprojects; 
✓ All proposed solutions would have the effect of increasing the pool of funds available 
for transport megaprojects in Kenya. 
These four golden rules allowed the study to cut through the immensity of the solution space 
and quickly narrow down on only those solutions that met this criteria. 
 
Creatively resolving the tensions arising from the two models 
With this decision architecture in place, the integrative researcher made use of their 
understanding of the identified salient features and their causal relationships to creatively 
resolve the research problem. After understanding the essence of the two models and 
establishing a decision architecture that filtered for the desired outcomes, the integrative 
researcher could confidently embark on a creative process to propose potential solutions to the 
research problem. Having said that, it must be noted that the researcher could not possibly 
proffer an infinitely exhaustive list of potential solutions. The decision architecture served to 
narrow down the proposed set of solutions from the realm of possibility to the realm of 
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probability, and even then, the set of proposed solutions could yet have remained very large. 
Having arrived at this final stage of the integrative thinking process, how did the researcher 
evaluate potential solutions and choose among various sets of benefits or payoffs against 
others, when, ideally, it would have been preferable to keep them all? Fortunately for the study, 
Martin (2011) provided three handy strategies for dealing with such payoff decisions. This 
allowed the researcher to approach the solution set with a toolkit that made it possible to select 
and keep only the payoffs that were most desirable in a potential solution, and had a high 
probability of success based on the context in which the research problem existed. Martin’s 
three approaches are detailed below. 
a) Doubling down on one model – When faced with clashing models, “our first impulse is 
to determine which one represents reality and which one is unreal and wrong, and then 
we campaign against the idea we reject. But in rejecting one model as unreal, we miss 
out on all the value that can be realised by holding in mind two opposing models at the 
same time” (Martin, 2007). If the integrative researcher prefers one infrastructure 
funding model for its payoffs, but also desires the payoffs presented by another model, 
a “double down” strategy could be applied. This strategy avoids missing out on the 
value that can be found in both models by pressing hard on the salient features of the 
preferred model, and in doing so, the benefits of the other model can also be realised 
(Martin, 2011b). By doubling down on model A, for instance, that produces desirable 
effects X, desirable effects Y from model B can also be realised in a double down 
strategy. If the integrative researcher finds that they desire a solution that produces the 
benefits of both infrastructure funding models, a strategy of doubling down on the 
salient points of one to produce the benefits from both could potentially be available, 
depending on the causal relationships that exist between the points of salience. 
 
b) Disassembling the problem – Another way to avoid missing out on the value that can 
be found in two opposing models is “to disassemble the problem in such a way as to 
enable the use of both logics simultaneously” (Martin, 2011a). Ordinarily, to fully 
realise the benefits from the two funding models, the integrative researcher is likely to 
be presented with a set of solutions that lead into divergent directions that each focus 
on one of the two funding models. This approach is useful if the researcher finds that 
the models cannot be applied together to solve the problem. But by disassembling the 
problem into its component parts, the integrative thinker may find that they can use the 
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divergent solutions arising from the two models to solve those component parts in a 
way that ensures that the problem, as a whole, is addressed. If the integrative researcher 
finds that the solutions alluded to by the two infrastructure funding models are in 
opposition, a strategy of disassembling the research problem could prove useful. In 
disassembling the research problem, the self-imposed constraints that are implied in the 
way the research problem is framed are removed. The component parts of the problem 
can then be looked at with clearer lenses and the integrative researcher may find that 
solutions which initially seemed very divergent may now be applied easily to parts of 
the problem, and the problem as a whole solved satisfactorily. 
 
c) Finding the “hidden gem” in both models – What of the integrative researcher who 
only desires a minor component from each model and in fact dislikes a great deal about 
both models? There can be instances when the researcher finds that neither model can 
produce the desired benefits or wholly solve the research problem. In other cases, the 
researcher may on only desire minor aspects from each of the models. An additional 
strategy consists in discarding most parts from the two models and retaining only a 
small kernel from each that forms the foundation for a new model (Martin, 2011c). If 
the integrative researcher finds that neither model can produce the desired benefits nor 
solve the research problem, but that both models contain minor elements that are 
desirable, these nuggets can be extracted and used as the basis for building an entirely 
new model that solves the research problem. The integrative researcher here has the 
challenge of looking at the two potentially-opposing models and seeing these desirable 
“non-obvious” gems from each, and then developing a new model around them. 
Based on the research findings (the empirical world) and insights (preliminary theory) gained 
from the integrative thinking process (framework), the study determined that it only desired 
solutions that could harness the private sector’s motivation to make profit to attract private 
capital into transport megaprojects. By doubling down on the private sector’s desire to make 
profit, the Government of Kenya could stimulate increased interest in private-capital 
infrastructure financing initiatives. Should this increased interest translate into increased 
investments, many more transport megaprojects could be implemented across the country 
without the state having to spend its resources. If transport infrastructure improved across the 
country and Kenyans could have faster and better services, and more options for travelling or 
transporting their goods, the goals of politics would be achieved. Politics is concerned with the 
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welfare of the body politic. Through a strategy that doubles down on the private sector’s profit 
motive to stimulate private-capital investments in transport megaprojects, the welfare of the 
body politic that is vested in the public sector could be enhanced, and the aims of politics thus 
achieved. 
Having resolved the tensions that existed between the two funding models, the time was now 
ripe for the researcher to ask themselves the following question: based on the research findings 
and insights gained from the integrative thinking process thus far, can I create new and better 
funding models for transport megaprojects in Kenya? The answer to the question “can I create 
new and better funding models for transport megaprojects?” was an unequivocal yes. The 
next few pages paint a clear picture of how the study proposed to create that new and better 
funding model for transport megaprojects. 
From the literature review and research findings it had been established that both the public 
and private sectors in Kenya had been active in funding infrastructure megaprojects, including 
those in the transport sub-sector. The literature review showed that the provision of transport 
infrastructure was never a preserve of the public sector, and that the private sector had played 
an essential role in financing and implementing transport initiatives. The literature review 
suggested that Kenya required sustained heavy spending on its infrastructure, including 
transport systems, but that the state faced a funding dilemma. The country had a huge 
infrastructure deficit as well as funding gap. It had limited capacity to absorb much more public 
debt without setting off other effects in the economy, and could not possibly raise enough 
through taxes and other government revenues. On the other hand, the research findings had 
demonstrated that the private sector had actively participated in the past in funding and/or 
managing infrastructure projects in various sectors including transport. The study had set a 
decision architecture to ensure that the public debt levels and taxation rates were not increased 
as a result of this study’s proposed solution(s) to the research problem. The study appreciated 
that because of the tight governing legal framework over public resources, projects could take 
unduly long to move through the stages of approval, and that the political complexity already 
inherent in megaprojects could get compounded when public resources were involved. 
Consequently, the decision architecture was set up to avoid the use of public resources in any 
proposed solution, which thereby established the private sector as the primary source of 
funding by default. The decision architecture also sought to increase the quantum of private 
capital available for transport megaprojects, meaning that any proposed solutions had to build 
in the insight that the profit motive was a primary incentive for the private sector. Put together, 
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the proposed solutions would have the effect of (i) meeting the private sector’s need for profit, 
while (ii) achieving the public sector’s need for increased investment in infrastructure. 
Increased private-sector investment in infrastructure would free-up public resources such that 
the existing public debt could potentially be paid faster. Over time this would have the 
positively reinforcing effect of allowing the state to invest more in infrastructure programs 
since resources that were previously used to service debts would then be available for 
infrastructure investment as the public debt reduced. And as increased investment was made 
into Kenya’s transport infrastructure, domestic trade would be catalysed as raw materials could 
be moved to factories and finished goods hauled to markets faster. Slow-growing areas could 
be opened up by new infrastructure and local economies catalysed. As the quality and variety 
of transport alternatives increased, their costs would reduce, and, over time, customers could 
potentially get more value at cheaper prices. Producers of goods and services would have 
access to wider markets as the distance between different parts of the country was reduced by 
a more efficient transport network. The potential economic spillovers could be astronomical. 
Figure 22 (below) illustrates this double down strategy in action.  
 
Figure 22: How a double down strategy can lead to increased private-sector funding of transport megaprojects in 
Kenya 
By doubling down on a point of salience from one of the models (e.g. the private sector’s profit 
motive) to achieve specific benefits (e.g. increased private-sector spending on transport 
megaprojects), the benefits from the other model could potentially be indirectly achieved if the 
right salient points were selected (e.g. improved quality of transport infrastructure and reduced 
public debt, both of which are goals of politics). 
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Conclusions and recommendations 
From the research findings and subsequent analysis of these findings using Martin’s (2007) 
process of integrative thinking, the study arrived at several conclusions regarding the research 
questions. 
Who were the key players in the infrastructure funding ecosystem in Kenya? 
The research findings showed that the major actors in the infrastructure funding 
ecosystem in Kenya were: 
▪ The national government of Kenya, including Parliament and its members, the Cabinet 
Secretary to the National Treasury and the various county governments. The various 
public service institutions that directly procure transport infrastructure, such as the 
Kenya National Highways Authority, the Kenya Railways Corporation, the Kenya Civil 
Aviation Authority, and so on. 
 
▪ Members of the political class such as politicians and political activists were major 
players in the infrastructure funding ecosystem. They exercised an oversight role over 
the traditional government procurement process and (ideally) served to protect the 
public-interest even when considering privately funded infrastructure initiatives. 
 
▪ International financiers such as multilateral lenders (e.g. IFC and the World Bank), and 
development banks such as the AfDB and KfW were critical actors in the funding 
ecosystem for transport megaprojects. 
 
What were the bottlenecks in the system? 
Insights from the research findings showed that there were several weaknesses in the 
funding ecosystem for transport megaprojects in Kenya. 
o The influencing factor of politics – When it came to funding transport megaprojects 
through the traditional government procurement process, political manoeuvring needed 
to be done by project promoters to ensure that their projects could get considered for 
implementation. Considering the myriad potential investments that could be made by 
the state, project promoters would have to work the political system to ensure that their 
desired projects gained visibility and stood a chance of implementation. Politics could 
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also rear its head into the traditional procurement process via the Cabinet and 
Parliamentary approval stages during national budgeting. A cabinet member or 
Members of Parliament was likely to promote the project that, ideally, advances the 
general social good, but typically, promotes their personal or collective political 
agenda. Either way, the decision being made was political in nature. Project planning 
and funding processes could be hampered by political activities in many ways, from 
politically-motivated delays in issuing approvals, to budget freezes, and/or budget cuts 
introduced through Parliamentary amendments. Projects which were financially viable 
and promised social, environmental, and economic benefits to the citizenry could easily 
get slowed down, side-tracked, or even completely blocked because of unrelated 
political issues. 
 
o Slow decision-making processes – For projects funded through the traditional 
government procurement process in Kenya, project actors were required to adhere to 
the PFMA and its provisions. The law stipulated the various stages through which 
national government budget proposals made by the CS to the National Treasury must 
be passed before a coin of public money could be spent. The process was and is long. 
Budget proposals originated from an integrated development planning process that 
yielded the Budget Policy Statement, which later required Cabinet approval before 
submission to Parliament in the form of legislative proposals. Like all other legislative 
proposals, the national budget was subject to Parliamentary discussion, debate, and 
amendment. This process was intentionally designed to protect public resources and 
ensure accountability, but in doing so become a slow and long-winding one, 
significantly lengthening the planning process. 
 
o Complexity – By themselves, megaprojects and other large-scale infrastructure ventures 
are rife with complexity. To ensure that the private sector’s profit incentive was 
protected, coordination with various state agencies was and is required. Coordination 
between the Registrar of Companies at the State Law Office, the Kenya Industrial 
Property Institute regarding intellectual property, the national tax collecting authority 
KRA, licensing agencies within the national and county governments, regulators, and 
other arms of the executive branch of government could stretch planning processes out 
by many years. Even privately-funded transport megaprojects were required to subject 
themselves to the scrutiny of many of these state actors and regulators. The coordination 
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necessary to navigate through all the agency-specific requirements introduced a large 
dose of complexity to the megaproject planning process. 
 
What roles have private-capital financing initiatives played in the development of 
infrastructure in Kenya? 
Private-capital financing initiatives have played a major role in facilitating large-scale 
infrastructure projects in Kenya by providing the funding they require for 
implementation. The 5 cases in the research findings demonstrated various levels of 
government and private-sector collaboration in funding infrastructure projects. In some 
cases, the state sold its equity shareholding (ownership) in specific operating assets 
such Kenya Airways or Telkom Kenya to private investors. In other cases, the 
government sold only operating rights to private-sector players and retained ownership 
of the underlying assets, as was the case for the 25-year rail concessions by KRC and 
URC. Through such arrangements, private capital was successfully attracted and 
leveraged to implement and/or upgrade infrastructure assets for better service provision 
to Kenyan citizens. Additionally, private-sector actors have helped to de-risk projects 
by providing investment guarantees that enabled project promoters to access the capital 
they required to implement projects. In the case of Thika Power Limited, investment 
guarantees from MIGA and IDA to Thika Power Limited enabled the project to access 
debt from ABSA Capital to develop the power plant, and a short-term credit facility for 
its working capital and liquidity needs. Investment guarantees provided by MIGA to 
Ormat Holding Corporation over the years enabled it to access the debt funds it required 
to invest in OrPower 4, Inc. and the Olkaria III geothermal power plant. 
 
How can the private sector be better incentivised to direct capital into transport 
megaprojects? 
From the literature review and research findings, the study concluded that for the 
private sector to be attracted into any infrastructure investments, it must be sufficiently 
incentivised to do so through profit opportunities. If a profit opportunity is considered 
small relative to the risk that potential investors would be exposing their capital to, it is 
unlikely that such a project would generate much interest. But if the profit opportunity 
could be enhanced through the acquisition of ownership equity or long-term operating 
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rights at prices that allowed investors to recoup their investments over time, the private 
sector would be much more interested and willing to participate in infrastructure 
projects. By pulling on this lever - the private sector’s profit incentive - Kenya could 
stimulate private-sector interest and financial investment in public infrastructure 
initiatives such as transport megaprojects. 
Following from the above responses to the questions posed by this study, the integrative 
researcher could now weave together the insights from the entire process to put forward 
specific suggestions for alternative funding models for transport megaprojects in Kenya. The 
identified decision architecture led the researcher to a double-down strategy where the profit 
motive of the private sector would be emphasised to set off a series of events that would have 
the ultimate effect of improving transport infrastructure in Kenya without increasing the 
country’s public debt burden. 
Generative reasoning stood out as a powerful tool for responding to the four Flyvbjerg 
questions (highlighted in the research methodology) that pertained to the forms of case study 
research that seek practical implications or actionable outcomes. The 4 questions are: Where 
are we going? Who gains, who loses, and by which mechanisms of power? Is this desirable? 
and, What, if anything, should we do about it? Summoning all the insights gained from 
literature and rigorously applying the method of systematic combining, the study could 
holistically interrogate the research problem and propose solutions that were practical to the 
case at hand and actionable in the real world. 
- Where are we going with the current models of funding transport megaprojects? Based 
on the evidence from this study, we are fast heading towards a future where Kenya’s 
public debt soars to levels that could potentially cause serious harm to the economy, 
and making the recent trend of heavy state-sponsored investments in infrastructure 
unsustainable. As Ansar and company (2016) showed, “unproductive projects carry 
unintended pernicious macroeconomic consequences: sovereign debt overhang; 
unprecedented monetary expansion; and economic fragility” (Ansar et al., 2016, p. 
384). If not treated with utmost care, megaprojects could be extremely harmful. And 
when toxic projects are funded by public resources, their overall potential for harm is 
magnified. Public debt has been relied on to fund the country’s infrastructure programs 
for the last decade and a half. Because of this reliance, the public debt portfolio has 
increased at a rate that is higher than the rate of economic growth as measured by GDP, 
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leading many to hypothesise that the country is approaching a tipping point where the 
socio-economic costs of public debt outweigh the benefits yielded by government’s 
investment in infrastructure. Consequently, new models of funding infrastructure are 
needed. The literature showed that a set of skewed incentives characterised by cost 
underestimations and benefit overestimations, and the confluence of Flyvbjerg’s 4 
sublimes, created an environment that made megaprojects irresistible to decision-
makers. 
 
- Project promoters, planners, politicians, special-interest groups, and other parties in 
power gain; the taxpayer, who is supposed to be the principal beneficiary of any public 
spending, loses. The citizen bears the burden of servicing public debt: they pay more 
for their basket of goods because of high inflation, they are charged higher interest rates 
for loans that they are less likely to be given, and they bear the brunt of a slow-growing 
economy. 
 
- Are such outcomes desirable? In one word, no. 
 
- What, if anything, should we do about it? From the integrative thinking process that 
guided the research methodology, the study concludes that much can be done. 
Bottlenecks in the funding ecosystem for transport megaprojects have been pointed out, 
and the salient features of the two funding models identified. Fortunately, the 
integrative researcher is not satisfied with merely pointing out a problem; their 
aspiration is to solve the problem. It is in this regard that the study makes the following 
four recommendations. 
 
1. A public education campaign to sensitise Kenyans about the Public Private 
Partnerships Act, and its provisions (Republic of Kenya, 2013b). 
The law provides mechanisms through which the private sector can participate in the 
financing, construction, development, operation, or maintenance of the public 
infrastructure projects. A nation-wide campaign to educate citizens on the contents and 
provisions of the PPP Act would ensure that there is widespread knowledge about the 
law, and could increase the public’s interest in PPPs and other forms of private sector 
participation in the provision of public infrastructure. Increased public awareness could 
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boost the level of public participation in megaproject planning processes, and lead to 
increased scrutiny of projects. 
 
2. The classification of investments in public infrastructure through PPPs and other 
private financing initiatives as a standalone asset class. 
The insurance sector in Kenya held nearly KES 500 billion in assets (approximately 
US$ 4.7 billion) as at the end of December 2015 according to the industry regulator 
(Insurance Regulatory Authority, 2016, p. 3). The pensions and retirement benefits 
sector held another KES 800 billion (approximately US$ 7.6 billion) as at the end of 
December 2015 (Retirement Benefits Authority, 2015). The money required to fund 
infrastructure projects is clearly there, and it is even available locally. Through its 
regulations, the RBA, establishes 14 categories of assets and sets the maximum 
portfolio value that can be held in any specific asset class by a retirement scheme or 
pooled fund. The regulations stipulate the maximum value (as a percentage of the total 
assets) that a pension or other pooled fund can hold in various asset classes. This 
protects the contributions of members by preventing overexposure to specific asset 
classes, but it also restricts the sectors in which investments can be made. Like many 
parts of the world, pension and other pooled retirement funds in Kenya are some of the 
largest sources of private capital in the economy. By amending the RBA regulations to 
introduce a 15th asset class that allows for investments in PPPs and other private 
infrastructure financing initiatives, institutional capital held by the pension and 
retirement benefits industry can be channelled into infrastructure projects. Such an 
amendment, simple-seeming and easy to do, is likely to result in convex effects that 
free-up and make hundreds of millions of dollars available for infrastructure programs.  
 
3. Increasing the attractiveness of transport megaprojects by bundling-in assets that 
generate revenue for investors. 
Through the PPP Unit of the National Treasury, the state can take an enterprising role 
in making planned infrastructure projects compelling to the private sector by bundling 
bland utilitarian public assets with more attractive income-generating elements. Taken 
together, such projects will serve the public good (the bland public asset) even while 
providing the private sector with its desired return (the income-generating element). 
A typical road construction or rehabilitation project may not attract interest from the 
private sector other than those individuals and firms concerned with the construction of 
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roads and associated infrastructure. But if such a project was infused with income-
generating capacity, say via the inclusion of a toll or parking building, the project as a 
whole could probably attract much greater private-sector interest. While their primary 
interest would be operating the toll or parking building for the revenues they would 
generate, the public good would be served through the construction of the road. Using 
such innovative approaches, projects can be embellished for the increased participation 
of the private sector in the provision of public infrastructure. 
 
4. Formulation of a Private Infrastructure Incentives Plan (“PIIP”). Rather than dole out 
incentives for the private sector in bits and pieces via national gazette notices, a 
collaborative process that involves all the stakeholders should be launched to develop 
a comprehensive set of incentives for the private sector. The proposed PIIP would 
harmonise new and existing financial incentives in a single document with the aim of 
attracting private-sector resources towards public infrastructure initiatives. Such a 
document would serve several essential purposes: 
a. Set or emphasise the policy for private funding of infrastructure construction 
using tools such as investment guarantees; 
b. Standardise the transaction documentation for the revenue-generating 
components of infrastructure assets such as sale and purchase agreements, as in 
the energy sector in Kenya where power-purchase agreements typically run for 
20 years; 
c. Attract private-sector investment in infrastructure though incentives such as tax 
holidays, tax deductions, and tax rebates to companies that make capital 
investments, reduced tax rates charged on incomes earned from infrastructure 
investments, etc. 
A broad set of financial incentives that enhances the private sector’s profit opportunity 
would go a long way to increase the interest and participation of the private sector in 
the provision of public infrastructure. A prototype of this document (PIIP) has been 




Figure 23: How the proposed recommendations are intended to work 
Figure 23 (above) illustrates how the proposed recommendations are intended to work, to 
stimulate private sector’s interest and investment in transport megaprojects in Kenya. The 
proposals aim to make transport megaprojects attractive investment opportunities for private 
capital. A by-product of increased private-sector investment will be a reduction of state 
spending on infrastructure, enabling the state to fast-track its debt service. With a reduced debt 
burden in future, less of the public purse will go to paying debts and resources can be 
sustainably spent on infrastructure and other public programs. 
 
 
Are these recommendations plausible? Can they work? 
From the onset, this study stated that it aimed to produce work that would be of high practical 
value. That the insights the research process surfaced, the conclusions drawn, and the 
recommendations put forward could be of practical use to policy makers, scholars, and 
practitioners. To verify that this was achieved, the study will reflected on its recommendations 
to confirm that indeed they were valid and plausible, remembering that “if there is to be any 
attainable truth[…] it is plain that the only way in which is to be attained is by trying the 
hypotheses which seem reasonable…” (Hartshorne et al., 1994). But how does one determine 
reasonableness? By what means does one establish the validity of ideas that have emerged from 
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an integrative thinking process, and their plausibility in producing the outcomes that the study 
desired? The reasonableness of the ideas proposed by the study was measured probabilistically, 
against their expected likelihood of achieving their objective. Having gone through a context-
conscious integrative thinking process that systematically deconstructed, analysed, and 
combined elements of the traditional government procurement process and private-capital 
financing initiatives, the researcher believed that the recommendations were valid eo ipso and 
had every chance of addressing the research problem. A look at literature demonstrated that the 
recommendations made by this study had been tried and tested in some form or other in the 
past, and therefore stood in good stead when it came to solving the research problem. 
✓ Flyvbjerg demonstrated how the mass media could be leveraged to disseminate research 
results to ensure they made impact in policymaking and in practice. The author 
suggested that by problematising the tension points existing between research findings 
and practice, as this study did, and using the media to create public awareness of these 
tension points, changes in policy and practice could be made and the chances of 
megaproject success increased (Flyvbjerg, 2012). The proposed public education 
campaign is therefore not a far-fetched idea. 
✓ “If a particular infrastructure project is judged to be profitable by investors, they will 
know the value of the proposition and invest” (Mezui, 2012, p. 9). Several African 
governments have encouraged institutional investors like pension funds to actively 
participate in infrastructure financing initiatives by providing tax and other incentives 
(African Development Bank Group, 2015b, p. 192), demonstrating that a well-crafted 
scheme of private-sector incentives is a plausible idea. 
✓ Arezki and Sy (2016) showed different channels though which private-sector 
institutions could direct capital into infrastructure projects. The authors illustrated 
various ways in which private-sector capital had been used to fund infrastructure 
projects in Africa, directly through unlisted equity investments (such as direct 
investment in projects themselves, investing in project funds or buying project bonds), 
or indirectly through investments in listed equity and corporate debt options (Arezki & 
Sy, 2016).  
✓ Through a series of reforms in the pension and insurance sectors, the governments of 
Chile, Malaysia and South Korea were able to create a pool of institutional investors 
with an appetite for low-risk, long-tenure infrastructure assets that were denominated 
in local currencies (World Economic Forum, 2013). With these governments ensuring 
112 
 
that infrastructure assets posed low levels of risk, investments in infrastructure were 
much more attractive to the private sector and assets were quickly taken up by private 
investors. 
With such illustrations, the researcher was more than convinced that the proposed ideas could 
work. Some of the proposed ideas had been implemented as-is elsewhere and worked 
successfully (not to suggest that just because they have worked elsewhere, they would also 
work in Kenya). And in other cases, scholars had proposed the same or similar 
recommendations on similar issues of infrastructure financing. The validity and plausibility of 
the recommendations of this study was clearly demonstrated. It was, and still is, the 
researcher’s belief that, on a fair scale, the proposed solutions meet, at the very least, the test 
for reasonableness. 
Infrastructure funding gaps pose significant challenges to developing countries like Kenya. To 
grow, Kenya needs to invest heavily in its physical infrastructure. But it being a developing 
country, lacks the financial resources it needs to fund its infrastructure development. At the 
time the study was being conducted, public debt levels had risen to levels that made it difficult 
to rely on sovereign debt as the primary source of funding for infrastructure projects and 
initiatives. This study sought to innovate alternative ways around this problem. Figure 23 
illustrates the theory that evolved from the systematic combining exercise, having observed the 
empirical world with respect to the specific questions the study was looking to answer in 
addressing the research problem. The researcher believes that the conclusions that were drawn 
and the findings  that were unearthed spoke “not just about what is true, but also about what it 
would be good to do in given circumstances” (Schram, 2012, p. 19). Having analysed the two 
models that dominate the infrastructure funding ecosystem in Kenya, the study proposed a set 
of recommendations that, if implemented, would: 
i. benefit the Kenyan state, by releasing financial resources to clear accumulated debts in 
the short term, which would have the effect of increasing the availability of resources 
for sustained infrastructure development in the long term, 
ii. benefit Kenyan citizens, who would enjoy the use of improved transport infrastructure 
and any benefits of faster economic growth that could result, and, 
iii. benefit the Kenyan private sector and investors, who would have a pipeline of long-




In just a few years, Kenya could make significant strides in addressing its infrastructure gap, 
reduce its public debt, and become an example to other developing countries on how innovative 
funding models for public projects could be created and implemented. Kenya could have its 
cake and eat it too; the country simply needs to be innovative in how it bakes its cake of finances 
and slices it up to address various needs. 
 
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
Building on the literature review and following from the research findings and the study’s 
recommendations, there is plenty of fertile ground for future research and investigation. 
Systematic combining involved the use of a preliminary framework that guided the researcher’s 
immersion into the empirical world and informed their perspective for analyses with respect to 
the case at hand. A key feature of this research method was that the researcher did not 
necessarily have to restrict themselves to ‘received theory’. Such freedom was particularly 
useful to this study since it sought not to prove or disprove a hypothesis, but to innovate around 
a specific problem. The objective of the study was to develop a plausible alternative model by 
which transport megaprojects in Kenya could be funded, that would address the infrastructure 
deficit without increasing the country’s burden of public debt. After going through the process 
of systematic combining, a theory evolved to suggest various ways by which private-capital 
financing initiatives in Kenya could be stimulated to increase the pool of financial resources 
available for transport megaprojects and other infrastructure initiatives in Kenya. A preliminary 
suggestion for future research would be to test this theory in the real world for its efficacy in 
increasing private-sector financial investment in infrastructure projects in Kenya. In addition 
to this, future research could evaluate whether: 
i. there is a causal relationship between public awareness on PPPs and other private financing 
initiatives, and the level of private-sector interest and investment in the provision of 
infrastructure. Does increased awareness translate to increased investment? 
ii. an effort to increase the bankability and attractiveness of megaprojects translates to 
increased investments by the private sector in infrastructure projects. Does increased 
project bankability lead to increased investment? 
iii. financial incentives to the private sector catalyse private-sector interest and investment in 
infrastructure ventures. Do financial incentives to the private sector for investments in 
infrastructure work, and if so, how effective are they? 
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iv. the introduction of a specific asset class for infrastructure investments leads to increased 
investments. Does the creation of a specific asset class for investments in infrastructure by 
the pension and retirement benefits sector lead to increased investments from this sector?  
v. increased private-sector investment in infrastructure translates to reduced public debt and 
higher levels of economic growth in the long run. Can the private-sector substitute the state 
in the provision of infrastructure? Does increased private investment in infrastructure lead 
to higher levels of economic growth? 
It is important to note that the funding model that this study proposed is not necessarily the 
single most optimally resilient one that could have been created. Use of integrative thinking 
allowed the researcher to identify features that he considered salient, and to make creative 
resolutions to the tensions that arose when considering the two dominant models of 
megaproject financing in Kenya. This is the beauty and the burden of using integrative thinking 
in doing research work. On the one hand, integrative thinking allowed the researcher to identify 
the features that he himself found salient. Yet on the other hand, it is quite possible that another 
researcher doing the same study could have identified other features as salient, meaning that 
the outcome of that study would be very different from this. Knowing this, before a definitive 
model can be proposed for funding transport megaprojects in Kenya, it would be ideal to 
conduct two or three other similar studies with the aim of finally designing a model that brings 
together the consensus view of various similar studies. Therefore, future research work should 
include re-doing the study as it was done here, with the expectation that a different outcome 
would most likely be the result of that effort. Two of three such studies would greatly increase 
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Comparable data between Kenya and Singapore, 1960 to 2015 
Source: World Development Indicators, retrieved via the World Bank website on 19 July 2016 
   Kenya  Singapore 
 Year 
































1960 791,265,459  98  -   -   704,453,107  428  79,869,596  9.5015  
1961 792,959,472  95  -   -   764,298,138  449  88,134,221  12.7068  
1962 868,111,400  101  -   -   825,874,494  472  127,791,354  14.2196  
1963 926,589,349  104  -   -   917,210,032  511  159,118,529  15.8879  
1964 998,759,334  109  130,479,962  12.4194  893,722,817  485  177,117,772  19.9971  
1965 997,919,320  105  143,639,956  12.8227  974,186,784  516  211,582,315  20.9577  
1966 1,164,519,673  119  216,719,913  14.7151  1,095,902,965  567  238,271,022  19.5332  
1967 1,232,559,506  121  248,639,900  18.6733  1,237,415,176  626  271,525,738  19.4826  
1968 1,353,295,458  129  271,319,891  18.5178  1,425,020,122  708  351,232,523  22.8503  
1969 1,458,379,415  134  282,519,887  17.9898  1,659,044,471  812  469,551,366  26.1031  
1970 1,603,447,357  142  391,187,843  19.6818  1,919,496,192  925  733,204,425  32.1392  
1971 1,778,391,289  153  425,319,830  22.7037  2,262,529,370  1,071  907,514,018  36.2022  
1972 2,107,279,157  174  470,287,812  21.7592  2,719,900,396  1,264  1,112,105,437  37.2710  
1973 2,502,142,444  200  645,833,633  20.4497  3,693,760,000  1,684  1,438,293,333  34.7137  
1974 2,973,309,272  229  765,794,626  19.1194  5,216,837,422  2,340  2,323,540,981  37.5407  
1975 3,259,344,936  242  591,241,699  20.2131  5,633,455,805  2,490  2,186,082,879  34.8885  
1976 3,474,542,392  248  703,393,930  19.9800  6,326,445,458  2,759  2,505,039,449  34.9709  
1977 4,494,378,855  309  1,066,215,929  20.9694  6,617,425,714  2,846  2,332,162,363  33.1547  
1978 5,303,734,883  352  1,579,944,929  25.0765  7,515,823,694  3,193  2,845,617,824  34.6311  
1979 6,234,390,975  398  1,130,468,294  19.1713  9,294,553,436  3,900  3,915,049,195  35.5914  
1980 7,265,315,332  447  1,780,521,045  18.3228  11,893,624,074  4,927  5,356,117,847  39.5257  
1981 6,854,491,454  406  1,570,599,903  18.6113  14,171,752,830  5,595  6,347,392,128  42.1451  
1982 6,431,579,357  366  1,405,957,065  19.0278  16,078,932,759  6,076  7,441,413,652  45.8298  
1983 5,979,198,464  328  1,251,151,196  18.1146  17,775,115,135  6,630  8,259,876,486  46.1228  
1984 6,191,437,070  327  1,226,587,576  17.1532  19,735,453,641  7,223  9,266,652,539  46.2467  
1985 6,135,034,338  312  1,553,686,632  17.2714  19,138,445,912  6,995  7,872,313,162  40.8239  
1986 7,239,126,717  355  1,575,815,795  19.6359  18,569,643,987  6,794  6,794,092,581  35.1562  
1987 7,970,820,531  377  1,936,067,102  19.6261  20,897,470,244  7,531  7,638,317,578  32.3905  
1988 8,355,380,879  382  2,126,364,307  20.4469  25,337,427,488  8,902  8,474,758,426  30.3307  
1989 8,283,114,648  365  2,059,354,393  19.4581  30,423,195,895  10,380  10,374,846,268  31.7186  
1990 8,572,359,163  366  2,071,432,832  20.6482  36,152,800,270  11,865  12,885,010,960  31.7103  
1991 8,151,479,004  336  1,709,407,116  19.0301  45,474,442,836  14,505  15,447,120,116  33.1337  
1992 8,209,129,172  328  1,389,053,537  16.5814  52,156,414,979  16,144  18,511,540,823  35.1753  
1993 5,751,789,915  223  1,012,915,228  16.9376  60,644,572,348  18,302  22,542,022,528  34.6145  
1994 7,148,145,376  269  1,379,109,055  18.8731  73,777,792,327  21,578  24,247,282,965  33.3087  
1995 9,046,326,060  330  1,973,886,735  21.3856  87,890,009,877  24,937  29,742,556,794  33.1461  
1996 12,045,858,436  428  1,807,339,241  16.0091  96,403,758,865  26,263  33,762,056,738  37.8546  
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1997 13,115,773,738  455  1,985,857,747  15.3879  100,163,995,151  26,386  38,266,433,190  38.4671  
1998 14,093,998,844  477  2,352,671,257  15.6752  85,707,636,233  21,824  27,057,122,371  38.0972  
1999 12,896,013,577  426  2,001,643,769  15.5914  86,283,126,844  21,796  28,217,404,130  34.5854  
2000 12,705,357,103  409  2,212,522,399  16.7088  95,833,932,715  23,793  33,444,721,578  32.0438  
2001 12,986,007,426  408  2,440,115,016  18.1516  89,286,208,629  21,577  24,786,124,909  31.0566  
2002 13,147,743,911  402  1,990,333,858  17.2369  91,941,192,896  22,017  23,425,555,680  27.1683  
2003 14,904,517,650  444  2,456,584,865  15.8382  97,001,377,569  23,574  17,111,583,056  25.2537  
2004 16,095,337,094  467  2,730,170,839  16.2592  114,188,557,567  27,405  26,383,149,923  24.5228  
2005 18,737,895,401  530  3,307,179,475  18.6991  127,417,688,056  29,870  27,224,885,845  23.0751  
2006 25,825,524,821  712  4,812,221,224  19.4244  147,797,218,201  33,580  32,993,202,845  23.0606  
2007 31,958,195,182  858  6,537,681,082  19.9647  179,981,288,567  39,224  41,611,770,951  24.4814  
2008 35,895,153,328  939  7,040,012,837  18.8649  192,225,881,688  39,721  58,509,364,619  28.3376  
2009 37,021,512,049  943  7,157,229,289  18.5051  192,408,387,762  38,578  53,230,938,467  29.2710  
2010 39,999,659,234  992  8,293,884,382  20.3218  236,421,782,178  46,570  65,890,135,680  26.1275  
2011 41,953,433,591  1,013  9,105,052,539  20.3908  275,221,020,830  53,094  74,380,664,653  25.5658  
2012 50,410,164,014  1,185  10,858,989,041  21.2088  289,268,624,470  54,451  86,131,871,649  26.7627  
2013 55,100,780,396  1,261  11,111,272,379  20.5991  300,288,499,960  55,618  91,030,128,666  27.9233  
2014 61,395,415,492  1,368  13,810,527,944  22.9269  306,344,408,492  56,007  88,613,369,111  26.5477  
2015 63,398,041,540  1,377  13,443,947,394  21.5185  292,739,307,536  52,889  76,961,739,889  25.5110  
Totals     150,540,154,126        1,172,706,343,141    
 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s GDP and GCF, 1991 to 2015 
Source: World Development Indicators, retrieved via the World Bank website on 19 July 2016 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Year 
 GDP (current 
US$) 
 GDP per 
capita (current 
US$) 
 Gross capital 
formation (current 
US$) 
 Gross capital 
formation (% of 
GDP) 
1991 319,242,644,293  610  53,600,149,649  16.0933  
1992 315,397,427,361  587  48,261,703,244  14.3908  
1993 303,770,108,486  549  48,345,025,086  15.5083  
1994 298,056,876,899  525  54,965,664,401  16.9282  
1995 337,323,149,165  578  62,826,266,630  16.1713  
1996 348,990,455,749  582  61,927,268,859  17.4807  
1997 360,983,891,937  586  62,288,254,270  16.3503  
1998 340,524,879,271  538  62,399,590,074  18.1348  
1999 343,169,880,527  528  59,393,947,168  16.3425  
2000 367,684,964,387  551  61,496,015,084  15.4414  
2001 342,258,522,219  499  58,098,223,530  15.7720  
2002 366,799,826,512  521  62,121,943,419  16.9214  
2003 468,482,928,040  648  87,568,252,720  18.4876  
2004 582,611,848,265  785  110,869,061,043  18.2849  
2005 685,042,578,987  898  126,184,898,094  17.5951  
2006 799,471,145,176  1,021  154,542,112,020  18.1833  
127 
 
2007 929,083,765,335  1,154  179,251,878,508  17.9589  
2008 1,060,100,505,690  1,281  208,333,920,969  18.6069  
2009 1,012,946,855,153  1,191  200,643,504,747  18.5749  
2010 1,355,385,369,041  1,551  278,790,270,154  19.9016  
2011 1,527,194,806,784  1,701  306,767,461,173  20.1962  
2012 1,595,978,753,437  1,729  330,607,849,456  21.0379  
2013 1,678,735,616,972  1,770  346,829,505,068  21.0473  
2014 1,754,486,218,759  1,801  368,668,369,702  21.3920  
2015 1,572,873,067,288  1,571  322,981,220,585  21.6000  
 
 
China, Singapore and South Korea GCF, 1991 to 2015 
Source: World Development Indicators, retrieved via the World Bank website on 19 July 2016 
   Gross capital formation (% of GDP) 
 Year  China  Singapore  South Korea 
1991 35.9343  33.9688  36.8458  
1992 37.2624  35.4924  34.5446  
1993 44.2449  37.1707  33.0126  
1994 41.9754  32.8653  34.1134  
1995 41.6656  33.8407  34.8243  
1996 40.2179  35.0215  35.9243  
1997 37.7291  38.2038  33.1343  
1998 36.8907  31.5691  22.9354  
1999 36.5366  32.7033  26.6731  
2000 34.9209  34.8986  32.9417  
2001 36.0653  27.7603  31.5596  
2002 37.6564  25.4788  30.9396  
2003 40.9791  17.6406  32.0149  
2004 43.0381  23.1049  32.1171  
2005 41.8820  21.3666  32.1631  
2006 42.7068  22.3233  32.7007  
2007 41.3937  23.1201  32.5795  
2008 43.6699  30.4378  33.0185  
2009 47.5837  27.6656  28.4657  
2010 47.3471  27.8697  32.0229  
2011 47.1665  27.0258  32.9588  
2012 47.3249  29.7757  31.0012  
2013 47.6781  30.3142  29.1022  
2014 46.1988  28.9261  29.2769  
2015 -   26.2902  28.4882  
 
Average 




A Prototype Private-Sector Infrastructure Incentives (PIIP) Plan 
 
PROPOSED INCENTIVE ANTICIPATED BENEFITS 
Partial debt guarantees 
provided by the state for up to 
70% of project cost 
Reduction in interest rates charged on debt extended to private 
investors in infrastructure projects that reduce construction 
costs and, consequently, lower overall project costs. 
Partial equity guarantees by the 
state for up to 70% of project 
cost 
Reduced exposure to risk by project equity investors, reducing 
the cost of equity and overall project cost of capital, increasing 
investors’ return per unit of risk, and consequently increasing 
the private sector’s profit incentive for investments in 
infrastructure. 
Tax incentives for private-
sector capital investments in 
infrastructure 
By providing a set of tax benefits – holidays, reduced rates, 
deductions, and rebates- for investments in infrastructure, the 
costs incurred by investors in capital projects are reduced, with 
the effect of increasing project returns. 
Standardised transaction 
documents 
By standardising the transaction terms and documents, the 
private sector is provided with the certainty it requires to 
evaluate investment opportunities. Investors are safe in the 
knowledge that cost and revenue terms are standardised and 
protected for the long project time horizons. Standardised terms 
and documents also make the structuring of projects easier for 
prospective investors, potentially simplifying the planning and 
financing process. 
